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Preface.
The more usual course for a prospective Doctor of Phil¬
osophy to follow in pursuing his researches is to under¬
take some form of historical Investigation, - an expos¬
ition of the views of some little-known philosopher, a
long or short history of the treatment of some typical
philosophical problem, a translation into plain English
of the theories of some difficult philosopher on some
subject or subjects, a gathering together of views on
a subject which a philosopher has mentioned in many places,
but never pointedly discussed, or a conjecture as to
what he must have thought about some subject which he
did not explicitly mention. All these require some meas¬
ure of independent philosophising, even if the problem
or problems in question are not merely re-presented but
also discussed, because one cannot sort out the relevant
from the irrelevant material, without oneself having a
solid understanding of the issue. And presumably at least
one of the criteria for judging such a product would be
whether the selection of material displayed any consist¬
ent and intelligible grasp of the problem.
The pages which follow are the result of a consid¬
erably more ambitious undertaking than any of these, -
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an attempted independent philosophical investigation. I
now experience some regrets, that I did not content myself
with something more modest. On the one hand I have come
to see the point of the solid scholarship which the more
conventional type of thesis at its best represents, and
on the other I have found out that my talents do not appear
to be quite commensurate with the pretensions of my under¬
taking. Some of the loose ends which the reader will dis¬
cover are so because one must limit the discussion some¬
how, and there are some things which I have chosen to
exclude. But I must confess they cannot all be justified
in this way. Apart from the problems I do not even recog¬
nizee, there are many issues which I know I should discuss,
but to which I cannot at present see any clear solution;
and there are many views which I have expressed which I
know are unclear, or open to the most serious doubts. And
yet I cannot at present find ways of making them clearer,
or of resolving such doubts. One of my most chronic ail¬
ments is a constitutional inability to even conceive of
moral philosophy as not being in some sense morally en¬
lightening. It is not merely that 1 disagree with alter¬
native views: I cannot even suggest what they might be,
no less offer a defence of them. This strain will be
discernible throughout, and particularly in Chapter Three,
I am also seriously dissatisfied with the contents of
my last chapter.
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In view of all this, one might well expect that I
should withdraw the thing - do something else instead,
or wait for a day when I see things more clearly. dy
Justification for rejecting this very proper suggestion
is partly that I think the problem I am attacking is so
important, and so little discussed that any treatment of
it is better than none at all, partly that there are
many things I have said of which I am entirely confident,
and partly that even in the case of those things with
which I am dissatisfied, my dissatisfaction nowhere
approaches the critical point where I seriously suspect
that I am quite wrong. I have a continuing conviction
that I am at any rate on the right path. This is of
course small assurance to offer anyone else, but to me
it Is quite significant, because I have so often seen
the folly of ways which I had once embraced with the
warmest conviction; and whereas other ideas have endured
for weeks or months, the present point of view has sur¬
vived half my philosophical career.
I would like to maite a few remarks about terminology.
The only deliberately technical usage which I am aware
of having adopted is that I have used the words 'ethics'
and 'ethical' to refer to philosophical activities con¬
cerning morality, and the words 'moral', 'morals', 'mor¬
ality', to refer to moral experience or the moral life,
including ordinary direct thinking about moral problems.
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Thus when I speak of e.g. moral thinking, I mean not the
kind of thing that goes on in philosophy, but the kind
of thing that goes on in practice. But this choice of
words should not be taken to express any view about the
relation between philosophy and moral experience. Had I
discussed this relation (which I did not - perhaps I
should have), 1 should have felt as free to come to the
conclusion that there was no difference, as that there
was no relation, or any of the possibilities lying bet¬
ween. (But though I did not systematically discuss this
question, my views about it may be seen, particularly
in Chapters Three and Four.)
Apart from this usage, I have chosen words as the
occasion demanded, trying on the one hand to depart as
little as possible from common English, and on the other,
where it was necessary so to depart, to employ the common
philosophical usage in preference to the more special
and technical philosophical terminology. In common, I
presume, with most other philosophers, I have often
been forced to use a variety of words or phrases for the
same idea, in the interest of an agreeable prose style,
and while the alternate words are not always perfectly
ant, one expects that the appropriate substitutions will
be made by the reader.
Upon re-reading my first two chapters, I find that
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I have used the words 'clarity' and 'unclarlty' to refer
to such a diversity of things that it may be wondered
whether there is any common element. I think if I define
an 'unclear statement' as any statement which has logical
tendencies to confuse, mislead or perplex, this difficulty
may be relieved. By the use of the word 'logical' here,
I mean to exclude such tendencies where they arise from
laziness, stupidity, perversity or other idiosyncrasy on
the part of the person confused, misled or perplexed; -
or to put it positively, I mean that a statement has no
'logical tendencies to confuse etc.', where it is in
principle possible to be reasonably confident that one
has understood the author's intention, or that communic¬
ation has occurred.
I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to Professor
tfacmurray for the patience with which he endured the
hectic and woolly expressions of the early phases of my
struggle with the problem, and for his restraint in not
saying the cruel things which he would have been entire¬
ly Justified in saying, and which would almost certainly
have discouraged any further progress; and to Edinburgh
University for the grant of a "Studentship", without
which, both financially and psychologically, I should
probably not have been able to get on with the Job.
Boar's Hill, Berks. J F M H
September, 1956.
Introduction.
The problem of method, - briefly, of what to do and how
to go about doing it, - is the ultimate question in
moral philosophy. This may sound surprising to those
who have always heard that the ultimate problem is that
of defining 'the good', or answering the question, 'what
is the good life?', or of convincing people that they
should eschew evil. But the very multiplicity of these
views should tell us that none of them defines the ult¬
imate problem. The business of deciding between them
is at least more ultimate than the business of attacking
the problem they pose.
The problem of method is not ultimate in the sense
that one first decides what to do, and then does it: one
could not decide about any given project without trying
it for a bit, and seeing how it worked out. And as a
matter of intellectual history, it is probably only
through doing various kinds of moral theory that the
criteria by which one would decide between them would
ever emerge. We could not sit down before all experience
of moral theorising and decide, by what criteria we
would decide which was good theory and which not.
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But if the criteria thus in some way emerge from
the practise of philosophy, still they do not depend
logically upon it, while what we will accept after the
criteria emerge will depend logically on those criteria,
whatever they may be. This is the sense in which the
problem of method is ultimate.
In spite of this, the questions what to do and how
to do it have never to my knowledge been systematically
discussed in ethics. This Is not to say that philosophers
have not in fact thought about them. There is ample evid¬
ence that they have. Much of Socrates' behaviour in the
early Dialogues can be regarded as an indirect meditation
on the subject of method. His "ignorance" can be inter¬
preted as an expression of the opinion that casuistry is
not a proper philosophical aim; and in Republic. Book I
we see one of his reasons for thinking this, - that any¬
thing one attempts to say easuistically requires such
endless qualification, even as an expression of a given
person's moral outlook, that one can never attain that
degree of precision that a philosopher demands (or should
demand), before he will say that he 'knows'. Aristotle
can be seen as disagreeing with these lofty scruples,
and as making it a matter of principle to overlook
question-begging arguments, and to remain content with
vague, imprecise and misleading propositions. Kant, with
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his rejection of the Aristotelian method of arguing from
opinions** and his insistence that moral principles are
to be found 'in pure rational concepts only', re-affirms
Socrates' scruples, but without his academic scepticism;
and Hegel agrees with Kant that there must be something
logical or universal about philosophical pronouncements
concerning morals, but pursues the method of discovering
these bit by bit through a phenomenological analysis of
moral experience. Moore's discussion of the "naturalistic
fallacy" is a small meditation on ethical method, but the
rest of what he has to say shows little evidence that he
explored the subject much further; and Ross and the many
modern philosophers who use common opinions as a 'datum'
return to Aristotle with a logical perversity which could
not come naturally, and must be regarded as the fruit of
some brooding about method. The questions asked and answer¬
ed by people who analyse moral language are so sophistic¬
ated that they must proceed either from elaborate think-
* See
31i "Nor could anything be more fatal to morality than
that we should wish to derive it from examples. For every
example of it that is set before me must be first Itself
tested by principles of morality, whether it is worthy to
serve as an original example." (Abbott translation.)
It makes no difference if for the word 'examples' we
substitute the word 'opinions'. - See also Kant's more
vehement remarks on the following page.
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ing about what to do, or from fine training. But again
we are never given an account of why this, and not some¬
thing else is the thing to do. People Just do it.
Because of the dearth of overt discussion of method,
I propose to offer what may pass as at least the beginning
of a systematic treatment of the matter, in the hone that
it may thereby become less a thing of deep feeling, stub¬
bornness and mutual suspicion. Two broad methods of
approach suggest themselves. The first is to sort out
into as few distinct methods as possible the existing
ways of doing ethics, and then in whatever way one can,
compare the merits of these, with a view either to dis¬
covering which on the whole is best, or, putting together
the lessons gained from the study, formulating some new
method having as far as possible all the advantages and
none of the disadvantages.
To do this would have two obvious merits: (1) through
having things to say directly about every philosopher's
way of doing business, it would promise to be more per¬
suasive than any other, because if you can directly show
a man that he is mistaken, he is much more likely to
come to agree with you than if you leave his existing
views relatively unmolested. And (il), if it were con¬
scientiously done, it would enjoy more prospect than
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other methods, of encountering and corning to grips with
all the subtleties and difficulties of the problem. From
the intellectual Isolation of one's armchair it is not
only easy, it is almost bound to hanpen, that one will
over-simplify difficult problems, - not dishonestly, as
the word over-simplify suggests (I could not find a better
phrase), but through falling to encounter or realize the
complexities.
But the disadvantages are not Inconsiderable. The
most obvious in this instance is that in view of the trad¬
itional reticence of philosophers about method, it becomes
a matter of conjecture and even suspicion, what the exist¬
ing methods are.* And even if this were not a difficulty,
there is always a very large element of falsification in
the reduction of complex philosophical phenomena to a
limited number of types; and this is particularly distress¬
ing when the discussion of the type is taken as at the
same time a discussion of all the members of the type, -
members whose differences may at times be as great as
their similarities, and often more significant. The third
difficulty is that there is a tendency for a conscientious
theorist to get into those peculiarly infuriating Arguments
* And here may be as good a place as any to apologize for
the dark suspicions I have in many places expressed as
to the private but important thoughts of other philosophers.
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With i-ien Who Are ttot There. If we could criticise a type
of theory and leave it at that, this problem would not
arise. But we are sometimes honest enough to think of
possible replies to our criticisms, or slight modifications
of the view in question which would make the criticism
inapplicable. Then of course we must ourselves reply to
the reply, and if we are decent, give the chap who is Not
There a chance to reply to our reoly, and so on. One can¬
not presume to have disposed of the Absentee's method
until one has exhausted, not only everything which might
be said for it, but all reasonable variations of it; and
in view of the immensity of human ingenuity it is quite
impossible to know when to call a halt.
Finally, this approach seems to presuppose some sort
of critical apparatus which would be outside its actual
terms, - or at least it does to the extent that one can
say that it is not possible fruitfully to conduct a dis¬
cussion such as this without a settled idea beforehand of
where the argument is leading; - and it might therefore
be more to the point simply to expound this idea and
explain what can be said in its favour.
The other broad method of attack is the 'clean sheet'
approach, where one sets aside all actual views on the
matter, and goes about building up the elements of a
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problem, in as much complexity as seems fair or necessary,
and then traces a path through the elements which seems
to do ample Justice to all sides of the problem.
This too has its advantages and disadvantages. The
advantages are (i) that it makes possible a greater deg¬
ree of organization of the material than the more histor¬
ical method, which is forced to take the material pretty
much as it comes; (li) it allows one to reduce the problem
to its simplest and most genuine terms without incurring
charges of historical falsification, and frees one both
from the profitless necessity of discussing odd, perverse
and over-sophisticated views merely because they happen
to exist, and from the temptation to get into arguments
with People Who Are Not There; and (iii) being a direct
exposition of the author's views, it has not the air of
pretense which we found in the final objection to the
former approach.
But equally there are dangers. There is the danger
that the problem is not in fact nearly as simple as it
is represented ae being; that the material may be chosen
and arranged only with a view to making the solution
sound plausible; and that, through being so divorced
from all actual alternatives, the solution offered will
be some strange thing, neither agreeing nor disagreeing
with what anyone else thinks, a solution to nobody's
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problem.
But I think these are dangers rather than difficulties.
A given instance of this approach might display all these
tendencies, and might equally display none of them. As I
said at the beginning, it is doubtless not possible to
discuss such a problem as this without an actual acquaint¬
ance with its history; but if one's systematic discussion
must in fact grow out of the history of the thing, it does
not follow that one must directly demonstrate one's hist¬
orical knowledge (i.e. by discussing alternative views),
as long as one's acquaintance with the problem is in any
event evident from what one does say.
I shall therefore follow the latter method. Another
way of putting my general question is 'What is moral
philosophy?', - but since this has a tendency to suggest
that it could be answered either by reference to some
Idea of philosophy 'laid up' somewhere, by which the
practise of philosophers will ultimately be judged, - or
by reference to what philosophers in fact do and have done,
- it would perhaps be better to re-word the question to
read 'What ought philosophy to be?', or 'In what way
would it be most reasonable to conceive the nature of
philosophy?'. By this I do not mean to preclude the
possibility that there may in fact be an 'Idea' of it.
I could quite cheerfully accept this view, as long as it
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was not taken to imply that the way to find out what this
Idea is has anything in common with the ways in which we
would ascertain the truth about other existing phenomena, -
atoms, for example, or events in the past, tables in the
next room, mountains on the other side of the moon or ideas
in other people's minds. If there were such an Idea, I
suppose the only analogy it would bear to common experience
would be that of a 'quiz show', in which the panel of
experts were told by the master of ceremonies, 'I am
thinking of an Idea. X have called it 'Philosophy', but
I would not advise you to draw any inferences from its
name, except that it is something quite distinct from all
my other Ideas. The only other clue I can offer you is
that this and all my other ideas, both individually and
taken together are entirely reasonable. 1 will answer no
questions about it, and even if you do get the right
answer I will give no sign whatsoever that this is the
case. But don't think that I will not know how well your
conjectures are proceeding. Because I will.' Except to
the extent that one might become excessively self-con¬
scious about the knowing gaze of the master of ceremonies,
I think that this depicts an entirely healthy and approp¬
riate atmosphere in which to conduct philosophical dis¬
cussions, - and in this sense I suppose I am a Platonist.
And I think it is worth mentioning that it is quite
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irrelevant under the circumstances whether the matter of
ceremonies or his Idea does actually exist, since one is
not invited to discover the Idea by any of the methods
appropriate to finding out about existing things, - by
quizzing the M.C., or by watching his facial expressions
as you discuss the matter, or by fitting him up with elect¬
rodes or any other gadgets ingenuity may devise. The panel's
thinking is carried on entirely as if he did not exist,
except in one respect: that there hangs over the discussion
a prospect of being right or wrong. And without this I
am unable to see how one could do any serious thinking
whatever.
But this is of small moment, perhaps. It is interest¬
ing, though, that discussions of the sort I am engaged in
are neither empirical nor 'a priori'*, and yet people do
change their minds about them, adopt new ways as improve¬
ments. and criticise others as being naive, muddled, fool¬
ish or mistaken. Since the question what philosophy is is
plainly logically more ultimate than anything which is
said as philosophy, it would be sad if we had to say that
the answers to it were governed by emotion, chance, trad¬
ition or anything else which was merely arbitrary or non-
rational.
What then are the criteria for settling such questions?
I regret I cannot answer this in any general way, - but I
* I.e. derivable from analysis of the concepts used.
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can make some remarks about how they may be discussed,
beyond what I have already said. In the first place I
suppose I cannot fail to say that the way to do it is
the way I am about to do^ since if I thought some other
way was better, I should of course do it that way.
But this is not very enlightening, and there are some
more informative things I can say. I can say that my
discussion is based on my own experience of ethical
theorising, I have been engaged over a considerable per¬
iod of time in trying to do moral philosophy, and in the
process have changed my mind more than once about how it
should be done. Particularly at first, I did not always
clearly recognize the reasons for making such changes,
nor was I altogether conscious of what exactly I had been
trying to do, or of what I was proposing to do in its
place. I Just had an uneasy feeling that there was some¬
thing fundamentally wrong; and when I started performing
in a different way, I felt less uneasy. But as time passed
I became more precise about these things, and was also
able to look back and see what I had been trying to do,
what had been bothering me, what I next tried, why I
found this more satisfactory, etc. I do not now think
either that all the changes were improvements, or that
on all the occasions on which I was 'bothered', I really
need have been. But I do now know what stages I passed
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through, what reasons I had for making the changes I
did make, what view X now hold and what considerations
induced me to adopt it, and also (or so I now think),
which of my past botherments were well-taken and which
were not, and why.
These are the resources upon which I think one must
draw in a discussion of this sort, and it is in this sense
that I think the discussion must be based on one's own
experience. What one must do is to present as plainly,
lucidly, candidly and systematically as possible the con¬
siderations which have in fact induced one to adopt the
views one has in fact adopted, attempting to make public
their convincingness by displaying as well as possible
whatever logic or rationality they nossess; - and where
it seems enlightening to do so, discussing alternative
views, bringing out the attractiveness or plausibility
which makes them worth discussing, and alleging whatever
criticisms appear instructive. If the things one finds
plausible but mistaken, or the things one finds convinc¬
ing happen to be represented in the history of philosophy,
It may be advantageous to refer to them, both because of
the general interest attaching to well-known theories,
and also because their familiarity is an aid to commun¬
ication. One's own Ideas are often strange and difficult
to express. But if there Is any necessity to make any
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reference to the history of philosophy, it derives solely
from the fact that what one says to the philosophic public
can be expected to be of interest to them, and their
primary interest can be assumed to be that of finding
some reasonable way through, some acceptable untangle-
ment of, the problems that the corpus of philosophers
has worried about. One is often inclined to ask on hear¬
ing some new theory, 'Yes but why do you tell us about
it? Whose problem does it solve? With whom does it dis¬
agree?' , And it seems to me that where there is no
answer to these questions, the only possible response to
the theory is a shrug of the shoulders.
It is perhaps an odd view that a thesis in philosophy
is in some sense autobiographical, - and yet it would be
Just as odd if It were otherwise. The reason it seems
strange is partly that we need to think that our ideas
are not merely personal, idiosyncratic; and we advance
them not only as being of general interest, but as being
of such a nature that we can expect people, if not to
agree with them, at least to accord them their serious
consideration. And it is partly that the Interest of
what we say is presumed to lie, not in ourselves, but
in our ideas. This is not to assume as a fact that people
are not interested in us personally, - they may well be.
But their interest in the ideas we are discussing is
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something else again; and in order not to confuse matters,
we must keep the two quite separate. These considerations
make, and always have made certain demands on our way of
talking, with which I do not wish to tamper. They demand
that we talk about the matters under discussion, not about
ourselves.
But on the other hand it would be odd if what I said
did not in some sense represent my intellectual history.
It would be odd if (being thoroughly candid) I said, 'I
invite you to accept this argument, but I have never been
convinced by it', 'This is a plausible view, but I have
never found it attractive in the least', or 'These are
the arguments I offer you, but I'll not tell you my own
reasons for thinking their conclusion is true*. The
obvious retort here is to say that of course the profess¬
ed arguments might quite well do the Job, and in that
event it would be entirely unimportant whether the author's
private thinking diverged from his public utterances.
Indeed his private reasoning might be of a very much lower
calibre. And this is true enough, - it aiaht happen. But
the way one does ethical theory is not to keep chattering,
on the chance of saying something sound. One directly
endeavours to make sense; and pitiful though it may be,
the only way for me to pursue this endeavour is to say
only those things which make sense to me.
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I would like to draw your attention to some of the
merits of deliberately doing philosophy in the quasi-
autobiographical way I suggest, - or the demerits of not
doing so. One suspects that it is in fact the usual way,
but not deliberately, and that because of the inevitable
self-consciousness attaching to it, and the misleading
connotations of the objective or about-Meas-not-about-
myeelf way of speaking, philosophers are induced to say
some very distressing things. We often see, for example,
the expression 'some philosophers think', followed by a
view which is neither to be heard around the common rooms
nor to be found to an extent such as would make it worth
mentioning in the books of philosophy, It is only natural
to suspect in such a case that it is not the prevalence
of the opinion which has led the author to mention it,
but the fact that he himself has at one time been attract
ed or deceived by it, and perhaps suspects that other
people have the same guilty secret. If this were the case
then in accordance with the principles above set forth,
he need not confess. - that is merely personal and irrel¬
evant. But equally it is a mistake to attempt to conceal
his guilt through the creation of fictitious villains,
fools and die-hards. All he needs do is represent it as
the plausible, seductive or natural idea it is, and talk
about it as such.
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Another thing which is very commonly found in phil¬
osophy, (and I find myself doing it, if you want to know),
is elaborate and zealous performances in criticism of
'tendencies', 'assumptions', 'presuppositions', etc.,
which the author flushes from behind every bush, even
the most unlikely, and trounces with the most thorough,
dry and deadly argument, Gn such occasions, particularly
when it is fairly doubtful whether many of the bushes
actually do conceal the monster, and when it is hard to
believe that such dry arguments are really what occasions
such extreme anxiety, one is led to wonder whether the
performance is actually the conscientious caretakership
it is made out to be, or whether it is not rather some¬
thing the author has his own private reasons for wanting
to say, - something about which he would find it embarr¬
assing to be forthright, and therefore chooses to express
indirectly through the process of dry and public criticism.
In any case where these suspicions were correct, I don't
think one can say that if the gentleman in question
practised a little candour, then what he said would always
be better philosophy. His embarrassment with his private
views might be very well taken. But one can say both that
he would be a better philosopher, in that he would make
fewer mistakes, and that philosophy in general would
benefit, in that it would be less cluttered with curious
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misrepresentations and strangely inapnropriate criticisms
I will add a note about plagiarism. There is a tempt¬
ation to regard this as a sin, and ^€o) eitherj avoid using
ideas or arguments which other people have already aired,
or to be very scrupulous in acknowledging one's indebted¬
ness on all sides. I think this is both impractical and
unnecessary. On the first alternative it is impractical,
- or unwise, - since one would then almost undoubtedly
find oneself leaving unsaid things which, for the purpose
need to be said; - and on the second alternative it is
impractical because one could never hope to acknowledge
one's indebtedness to every source from which one has in
fact profited. There is also a tendency for acknowledge¬
ments to cloud the issue, either by suggesting that one
is relying rather on the authority of other philosophers
than on the logic of the argument, or by inviting the
reader to Identify your views more extensively than you
would wish, with those of the author acknowledged. And
in any event acknowledgement is ordinarily unnecessary,
since personal glory la not at stake in a philosophical
discussion, which is about problems, not about how smart
philosophers are. And it is worth mentioning, {and a
trifle paradoxical, too), that this problem would never
arise If one consciously pursued the method I have been
advocating, since in representing the things that have
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convinced, tempted, misled and puzzled me, my interest is
confined to the characteristics of convincingness, attract¬
iveness, confusingness, etc,, which they had for me, and
would never stray to the merely sociological fact that
but for Aristotle, Kant or Colllngwood, these ideas might
never have crossed my mind. Curious, the way the subject¬
ive method is objective, and yice versa.
^ t
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Chapter One.
The normal and natural thing to do as moral philosophy
Is simply to get on with the business in whatever way
appears appropriate; - to discuss Justice, virtue or
the good life; to define 'the good'; to propound a
theory about conscience or duty; - working towards some
conclusion which one attempts both to state as clearly
as possible, and to defend or Justify. An examination
of a selection of such performances would reveal two
characteristic kinds of divergence: first differences
of moral opinion, and second differences of opinion
about what sort of thing a philosophical treatise about
morals should be. Or about the latter perhaps I shouldn't
say differences of opinion, since it is not always
clear that the philosopher in question has any very
explicit views about what a philosophical treatise
should be like. But in any case different philosophers
behave differently in this respect, and it is a differ¬
ence of quite another sort from the distinctively moral
difference.
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Some people say that this peculiarly academic
sort of disagreement is the only one that exists between
philosophers - that they never really disagree morally,
and that if one could effect a translation between the
different ways of doing moral theory, he would find that
everyone had the same thing to say. There is something
to be said for this view. One does find different phil¬
osophers having a special interest in different areas
of moral experience, and to this extent not being in a
position to disagree with one another; one finds phil¬
osophical theories in general so un-practlcal that it
is usually difficult, if not indeed inappropriate, to
decide what actual concrete consequences they would have;
and it is certainly difficult to compare the moral
import of theories cast in such a very different mold
as, say, that of iiant and that of Moore. If it is true
that all philosophers are really saying the same thing,
it would be very interesting to know what it is that
they are saying. But I do not think it is true. I strong¬
ly suspect that Kant, for example, would think Butler's
morals shoddy, Moore's precious, and those of Epicurus
muddled. I aim quite sure that it is not the case that
the vehemence with which Kant's ethical theory is crit¬
icised is born of austere academic disagreements; and I
know that I myself have what is as far as I can tell a
purely moral affinity with some philosophers and a
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corresponding dlsaffinity with others, and that this
often disagrees with my views as to their purely phil¬
osophical merits.
But it is not a thing which at present matters very
much. What I want to say is that in any case, differences
of the 'academic' sort are very noticeable in moral phil¬
osophy, and it is these which throughout X shall be con¬
cerned to discuss. So far I have only described them as
differences of opinion as to what sort of thing moral
philosophy should be, and I oust now attempt to be more
explicit as to their nature. They are of two general
kinds: differences as to what I shall for the present
call the 'goal' of moral theory, and differences as to
the purely theoretical standards by which it is to be
judged.
By differences of goal I mean differences of opinion
about the answers to such Questions as, Should moral
philosophy aim to Instruct people morally? If so, what
form should such instruction take? Should it be forth¬
right and explicit, or indirect and psychological? If
the former, should it be detailed and particular, or
succinct and general? Should it attempt to Instruct
people as to the whole of morality, or only as to some
aspects of It? And if on the other hand philosophy
should not have moral instruction as its aim, what
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ahould it do?
By differences of theoretical standard, 1 mean dis¬
agreements with regard to how clear and unambiguous it
is necessary to be, disagreements as to what degree of
stringency of argument is required (or as to whether
argument is necessary at all), and disagreements as to
what sort of argument is appropriate to the nature of
the suoject. To be assured that there is a wide variance
of practice in these respects, one need only remind one¬
self of Aristotle's schoolmasterly remarks on the subject
in Nicomachean Ethics, of Kant's annoyance, in the 'Fund¬
amental Principles', with those popular philosophers
whose works are "a disgusting medley of compiled observ¬
ations and half-reasoned principles', of the murklness of
Bradley's ethical writings, the groundlessness of those
of x4111, the ethical theorizing of social scientists, or
the quality of daily ethical discussions in university
common rooms.
I will devote this chapter to expounding in more
detail the above distinctions concerning the nature of
ethics, and to exploring some of the ways in which they
may become inter-related in the course of the actual
business of moral theorizing.
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To enlarge upon the subject of the goals of ethics
I think I cannot do better than ^ go back to what may
at any rate pass as the beginning, and set down some
alternatives which might naturally present themselves
to a novice. I know that such a list could never hope
to be either comprehensive or truly primordial. But even
so it is perhaps not less promising than to attempt to
classify the bewildering array of technical and often
over-sophisticated theories offered by the history of
philosophy. Moreover I think the presumption is a fair
one, that even such complicated fellows as Spinoza and
Hegel were not so unlike the rest of us that their basic
aims might not be discovered to be some or other of those
I am about to set forth.
First then, let us say, one may attempt to discover
and formulate the principle or principles of morality -
some succinct and very general formula by the use of
which, either directly or indirectly, correct moral
decisions could be made. An example of such a theory
would be the Utilitarian principle that "actions are
right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness,
wrong as they tend to promote the reverse of happiness.
And I suppose that a definition of 'the good' would be
*J.S. Mill: Utilitarianism. Everyman's, 1948, p. 6.
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another example, this time of a not so directly employ¬
able principle, this way of proceeding, supposing it
were successful, would have the obvious merits of being
direct and explicit, thoroughly comprehensive, and read¬
ily intelligible by anyone who chose to employ it. Its
directness, as compared with the character of some
theories, can be likened to the difference between ask¬
ing your room-mate to close the door, and complaining
to him of a beastly draught. It is comprehensive in the
sense that in principle it should supply a sufficient
clue to the making of any and all moral decisions - no
further hints or qualifications should be necessary. It
is in this sense also that it is intelligible.
Secondly, if we doubt the possibility of such a
single principle, (or if we merely start to work in a
different wayj, we may undertake the toil of casuistry,
by which is generally meant the practice of setting
forth our duties one by one, trying to maxe it quite
precise, on what sort of occasions they arise or do not
arise, how they may conflict one with another, and how
these conflicts are to be resolved. In short, casuistry
endeavours to take care of all the brain work required
by the moral life, - except of course the effort of
memory that is needed to master its endless niceties.
It Is like the first kind of theory in its directness,
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as well as, at least in principle, in its comprehenslee-
nees. But whereas you might say the forcer type was no¬
thing if it was not comprehensive, casuistry is in prac¬
tice so only in proportion to the diligence of the theor¬
ist. And it is doubtful whether one could ever know that
adequate coverage had been achieved.
When I refer to casuistry I shall hereafter mean the
sort of thing above outlined. But I shall call 'casuist¬
ical' any theory which aims to have, or can be taken as
having, direct practical application. I have added the
qualification "or can be taken as having.." in order to
include theories which, though represented by some very
sophisticated people as not being intended to have prac¬
tical application, are yet in themselves of such a nature
that they might as well have been so intended. By this
token I would call theories of the first kind 'casuist¬
ical*.
Thirdly we may think it either less presumptuous or
more philosophical to direct our efforts to something
less Immediately practical, - and so aake it our business
to say, not things which affect people's behaviour, but
their thinking. Of course anything you sav will first
affect a person's thinking; but perhaps I could express
what I mean by saying that in this case one Is trying to
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affect people's thinking as such, not merely as a means
of affecting their behaviour. Or perhaps it would be
better to say that in the first two types of theory, the
attempt was to affect what people think, whereas in the
thrid it is to make a difference in how they think. In
the former cases, there might be a direct substitution
of one set of ideas for another; whereas here, if a
person's ideas changed, it would only be because they
proved unsuitable to the new manner of thinking. Still
there appears actually to be no very crisp distinction
to be drawn here, because of course a person may always
think that he should think in a certain manner, and in
this case 'how' he thinks is also 'what' he thinks. But
even here the content of his thought is quite different
in kind from what it is when he is thinking about, say,
teiling lies. .. In any case people do have ways of
thinking, of the character of which they are for the
most part scarcely conscious, and with respect to which
they are certainly not deliberate. I may now offer some
examples. People tend to think by categories, rather than
by particulars. Thus if a person Is a Jew, they will take
him without question to possess characteristics which
many Jews possess; or If a social proposal is made by a
communist, they will automatically ta^e it to be as
iniquitous as they think communists to be. Or again,
people tend to compartmentalize their lives, keeping,
say, their family and social life quite separate from
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their business life, or their intellectual and artistic
life quite separate from both; and this separation may
appear to them to justify applying quite different moral,
aesthetic or other standards to the different compart¬
ments. Or once again, people tend to be 'absolutist' in
their thinxing. If something is once thought wicked,
they will take it to be bad absolutely, not just here
and now, under these special conditions. I would not be
entitled at this stage to pronounce that any of these
were bad habits. Suffice it to say that there are choices
to be made here, which might invite philosophical invest¬
igation.
I am not able to offer an example of any celebrated
philosopher who has extensively made this sort of thing
his problem, but amongst the lesser breed, it is certain¬
ly a common worry, and extensive talk about it is to be
found in the writings of social scientists. One suspects,
although in the general confusion it is difficult to say,
that many instances of 'relativism' are muddled attempts
to treat the problem of the third example I gave; and
there is a further suspicion, perhaps even more to be
distrusted, that the affection which many philosophers
with a special Interest in morals have for 'monism' is
a confused expression of their concern over such things
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as the departmentalization of the moral life mentioned
in the second example.
I think it is worth noting that these are subjects
about which it is embarrassing to talk; A and B can fair¬
ly cheerfully chat together about G's mental habits, (and
I note how, above, I found myself referring to 'some
people'), - but A will find it awkward to talk to B about
B's habits. It is easy enough to talk to a person about
things which he deliberately does, or concerning which
he has explicit opinions. But it is somehow too personal,
too almost psychiatrical, to offer criticism on things
which belong intimately to a person, but which he does
not consciously own as his.
And there is another difficulty, which I think I
can only explain by an example. Suppose you want to
criticise the departmentalizing habit: you first find
that it is difficult to specify an object for criticism,
since it takes so many forma; and on another side, I
think one would have difficulty providing a specific
alternative. If it were the case that the cure lay simply
in desisting from departmentalization, the job would be
easy. But presumably we must departmentalize in some way,
and to attempt to specify the right way would be to prac¬
tise casuistry. Similarly with the 'absolutist' habit:
if one is to be 'relativist' or flexible in one's think-
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lng, one must be so In a pertain way; and. we must con¬
sequently either criticise 'absolutism* without offering
an alternative, or once again take up some form of cas¬
uistry. I shall not assume that such an eventuality
would be intolerable. But on the one hand it is peculiar¬
ly difficult to be casuistical about thinking (rather
than acting), and on the other my point is simply that
this kind of theory has a tendency, if conscientiously
done, to end up as something quite different from what
it set out to be.
A fourth possibility is the aim of informing, or
reminding people of some of the more subtle and delicate
features of the world in which they live, particularly
those which are morally interesting. I don't mean plain
facts, like the number of bobbies in London, the weight
of a hydrogen atom or the colour of the Garribbean Sea,
but curious and uneasy truths, such as the fact that \ee
must always be at least a little uncertain what other
people are thinking, that we can't altogether trust our¬
selves, that there are some states of affairs in which
there is no intelligent thing to do, some states of
affairs in which there is nothing for it but that the
innocent should suffer, and some states of affairs in
which it is cruel to be kind. Thanks largely to the
ministrations of those who call themselves 'Existential-
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ists', we are not nowadays permitted to be unaware that
there are quantities of such facts. I am sure both that
they are very important, and that we are inclined to
forget them. We commonly act, for example, as if we knew
people's motives perfectly well, when it would be better
to act in a way which provided for the possibility that
we were mistaken. We often criticise people's actions as
if there had been something better that they might have
done, when in fact the situation was such that anything
they did would have been in some way regrettable. We
often blithely pursue what appears to be the course of
virtue, unaware of its insidious cruelty. And so forth.
This again is a type of theory which is directed to
people's thinking processes, inasmuch as the sensitivity
to these things is, I suppose, a mode of thought. But
the difference between this and the previous procedure
is that in this case the making of any given point is at
least partly dependent on empirical states of affairs,
whereas the constituents of the former kind of theory,
if not, as they say, a priori, are at least not capable
of being insisted upon by means of any reference to the
empirical world. Here, however, one is dependent at least
for the significance of what is done, on what is not
empirical: it would be of little interest to know that
sometimes the innocent must suffer if we did not at the
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same time think that it was somehow morally regrettable
that such a thing should happen.
Another way of doing ethical theory, perhaps less
likely to be undertaken by a beginner, is that of trying,
not to provide people with anything positive, anything
which they might not otherwise have enjoyed, - but to
cure them of mistakes into which they are led by such
things as language, popular philosophy, social science,
star-gazing and thinking too much. A few typical blunders
inviting such treatment are: on learning that the earth
is not really the centre of the universe one is brought
to the conclusion that 'man' cannot be as important as
he conceives himself to be; on hearing of the theory of
relativity, one reflects that 'Oh dear.' if everything is
relative, morals too must be relative, and so...'; on
dissecting the human brain one discovers no conscience
and no soul, and concludes that all this talk about
virtue and duty must be based on a false assumption; or
(would anyone be so foolish as this?) having noticed
that most adjectives 'stand for properties', and finding
to one's dismay that the word 'good' does not appear to
stand for anything, one concludes that this must be a
meaningless word.
A characteristic which these five suggestions have
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In common, and one which may appear distasteful to the
hardened philosopher, is that they all atfeempt to make
some practical difference, - or to nut it most baldly,
to do some good. This may be a mistake, but it is cert¬
ainly a very natural aspiration to have, and one which,
I hone no one will deny, is shared by not a few distin¬
guished philosophers, - by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle,
for example, and by Spinoza, Butler, Kant, Mill and Moore.
But I shall discuss the question of its justifiability
at a later stage (Chapter Three).
A sixth possible aim is simply (simply?) to under¬
stand, for the saxe of understanding. X should think
this would always be an acquired, never a natural taste,
but acquired tastes are in general by no means the least
exquisite. The word 'understand* in this context is not
one which to me carries any direct suggestion as to what
would constitute an example; but if I set down some
questions which appear to be ethical questions, and
which have no very plain practical import, perhaps this
will supply a meaning. 'With how much logical assurance
can one assert ethical propositions?' 'Is there any
sense in which they can be regarded as empirical state¬
ments?' 'If so, what, if any, is the logical status of
the residue, if any?' 'What are the likenesses and diff¬
erences between making moral decisions and making other
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sorts of decision?'
Personally I entertain some doubts as to how non-
practical such questions are. One can of course ask them
in a snirit of pure curiosity, but this one can do with
any question, and not least, I should think, with the
more obviously practical questions underlying the earlier
five sorts of investigation. And it appears to me that
there are conditions under which the answers to any of
the present questions could make a practical difference.
If, for example, one had a way of assessing the assurance
with which moral propositions can be asserted, it would
or could presumably make a significant contribution to
a decision whether to accept any given proposition. Again
if one had a way of determining what empirical elements
are properly allowable in moral thinking, this could be
alleged in criticism of people whose thought was too
empirical, or not sufficiently so, etc.
Here at any rate are six possible ways of doing
moral philosophy, and my exposition of them should serve,
if nothing else, to show that there is some problem of
what to do in ethics, and that anyone who generalizes
about what philosophy has always sought to do, for example
prove to Jjeople that they should be good, or define the
good, is much to be distrusted. The history of philosophy
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contains also at least two species of concern which I
have not mentioned. The first is the very large class
of subsidiary issues which may arise in the course of
doing any of the above* - questions like how to handle
moral scepticism, or the problem of freedom, or the
problem of whether one can think there is a true moral¬
ity making genuine demands on ua, without also thinking
that there is a dod, or that the world is the itlnd of
place in which this is thinkable. I have not assumed
that these are meaningless questions, but X do think
that they are secondary, in the sense that the answers
to them would never internally contribute to the more
obviously ethical deliberations I have outlined - (the
knowledge, for example, that we are free, or unfree,
would have no tendency to show that we should or should
not tell lies, or should think in an 'absolutist' or
'relativist' way, or anything else of practical Import),
- while on the other hand one could not sensibly engage
in such deliberations without at least hypothetlcally
assuming the good sense of ethics proper. But if you
disagree with this, I think it will not make a great
difference to the remainder of the discussion.
The other general sort of philosophical activity
which I have not mentioned is that type of investigation
which is like social science, except that its centre of
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interest Is moral phenomena. Questions like, What are
the nsychologlcal factors which make one man conscien¬
tious, and another not? What makes people become social¬
ists? How did the capitalist system come into being?
What are the causes of superstition? To what extent are
neuroses caused by guilt feelings? etc. 1 think it is
sufficiently obvious that the moral interest of such
questions is entirely non-essential - that they would
not be different in any episteoologically important way
if for the moral terms one substituted soiaething of a
plainly secular interest, - if we asked, What makes one
man like cream in his coffee, and another, milk? How
did the rules of cricket come into being? or To what
extent are neuroses caused by moon beams? And on the
other hand, one could define the moral terms used in
various ways, presumably according to the moral views
one held, and could also make differing moral judgments
about them. One could think socialism good, and caoital-
ism bad, or vice srersq., and one could think guilt feel¬
ings essential to a moral outlook, or one could think
that they are something of which the wise man will
endeavour to rid himself. And all such views will alter
the character of the empirical investigations to which
1/ they are subsidiary.
I have not intended the six suggested ways of doing
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ethics as exclusive alternatives. I would think that,
given a general principle, it would be gratuitous to
append to it anything which could be described as cas¬
uistry, and vice versa; and I should think that to the
extent that either of these purported to provide a def¬
initive way of making moral decisions, they would render
unnecessary such further refinements about ways of
thinking and kinds of error as are offered by the three
subsequent procedures. If it were true that given the
Utilitarian principle one cannot go wrong, what need
remains for advice about, say, 'absolutism'? - But on
the face of it, beyond the considerable threat that the
result would be a disorganized mass of compiled observ¬
ations, there appears to be nothing further to stand in
the way of any combinations of any of the six.
In pursuit of any of the goals, one could, at least
as far as can be seen in advance, adopt any technique of
discovery which appeared promising or appropriate. This
is not to say that there might not in the end be only one,
or even no method at all, adequate to achieving any given
end. But the idea itself of casuistry, for example, does
not include the idea that it should or should not be
pursued through introspection, or intuition, or consult¬
ing the wise, or generalizing about the opinions of
others, or anything else. And I think the same could be
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said of any of the others, Some of them, too, may be
pursued either by directly discussing the matters in
question, or by indirect methods, - by implication,
insinuation, or by saying things which could reasonably
be said only if something else were r>resupposed. Sut of
this I shall have more to say elsewhere (particularly
at the end of Chanter Two).
I will now attemot to provide a more detailed
account of the theoretical standards, by which the fruit
of any of the above endeavours (or any others) may be
judged. At this point I wish only to outline what sort
of standards would appear to be pertinent, - not to lay
down any conclusions as to what standards must be accent¬
ed, or even whether any are necessary at all.
I said aoove that they were of two itinds, - stand¬
ards of clarity, and of justification. With regard to
the former, I should say that there are two prime resp¬
ects in which a statement in ethical theory may be un¬
clear - in its essential meaning, and in the claim that
is made for it. If one says 'it is true for the most
oart that adultery is wrong', the essential meaning of
the proposition, - the definition of 'adultery', and
what is meant by saying that an action is 'wrong', -
may be quite clear; but it is unclear, precisely what
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claim ia made for it. It would not become clear until
some way was provided of ascertaining when exceptions to
the rule occurred. On the other hand if it is said, 'You
should never diddle with clients' funds', there is no
doubt what claim is made for the proposition, but consid¬
erable uncertainty about its essential meaning {i.e.
what constitutes 'diddling'?).
A second point is that there appears to be some
relation between clarity and comprehensiveness, at least
in something as (so to speak) pretentious as moral theory,
since anyone looking to it for enlightenment might prop¬
erly expect that it told the whole story, and would
remain unclear about the significance of what was said
as long as there were important things left unsaid. For
example if I say 'The wise man is without pity, fear or
malice', while in ordinary conversation this is in resp¬
ect of its clarity a highly acceptable remark, yet in
philosophy it reaiains unclear to the extent that we are
inclined to ask, 'But are these all the essential char¬
acteristics of the wise man?'. Asking such questions is
not just a typically philosophical bad habit - it is
made appropriate by the natural and perhaps necessary
pretensions of the trade.
From this it would appear that the simplest ideal of
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ethical theory Is thorough comprehensiveness. But it
may not follow that such an ideal is essential for
clarity's saxe. It is possible that by carefully explain¬
ing the limitations of a theory, its proper significance
might remain plain, in spite of its failure to be comp
plete.*
Thirdly, there is a fairly obvious distinction to
be drawn between clarity and simplicity. A simple idea
is always clear, but clear in the subjective sense that
it can be grasped easily, rather than in the objective
sense of expressing adequately what It sets out to
express. The former sort of clarity is always desirable,
but it is only in the latter sense, I thlnK, that clarity
can be demanded, of a philosophical theory. There is
always a temptation to achieve clarity by means of simp¬
licity. But unless the subject under discussion is Itself
simple, the hope of this would appear to be small indeed.
I would like to make a further distinction concerning
clarity for which I shall employ an example as follows:
Arthur and Beatrice, we will suppose, each understand
adequately the psychological infirmity from which Pat¬
rick is suffering. Arthur is attempting to explain this
complex state of affiars to Gharlie, who is an intelllg-
* See also Chapter Two, p. 75, seq.
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ent citizen, and well enough acquainted with the language
of psychology in general, hut who has no prior inform¬
ation about Patrick. There appear to be three states of
affairs in which Arthur could be said to have failed to
make himself clear. In the first, Arthur's language is
itself unclear; neither Beatrice nor Charlie understand
what is being said, and Beatrice in particular is not
able to say whether It 1b an accurate account of the
matter. This I will call an instance of verbal unclarity,
to distinguish it from the other two, which I shall call
cases of contextual unclarity. In the second case we will
suppose that Arthur's account is such that, were it not
for the presence of Beatrice, Chaflie would have no
reason, either verbal or drawn from his general knowledge
of psychology, to ask further questions. Arthur's account
is both linguistically intelligible and scientifically
plausible; but still Beatrice, knowing Patrick, knows
that it is not a clear account of his ailment. In the
third case, Charlie understands well enough what is being
said - his difficulty is not linguistic, - but still in
spite of the fact that, not knowing Patrick, he is in no
position to say th^t the account is inaccurate, he is
puzzled and led to ask further questions. What Arthur
says does not seem to square with his general knowledge
of psychology. His questioning might end either in
Arthur's having to amend his account, (in which case one
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might have expected Beatrice to have something to say),
or in Charlie's being satisfied with the original way of
putting it. He might then say that he had not appreciat¬
ed how unique was Patrick's story.
In Ethics,(or should I say particularly in Ethics?),
there is yet another kind of confusion which arises,
partly owing to the profusion of expectations commonly
entertained with regard to it, partly owing to the %heor-
ist's own indecision as to which if any of these he is
aiming to satisfy, and as to what is the appropriate
method of doing so. In the first sort of case, for example
where through reading a theory which was never so intend¬
ed as an attempt to instruct me as to what I should do,
I find it unclear or confusing, - one is tempted to say
that so long as when read in the appropriate way it is
not confusing, this is no concern of the theorist, part¬
icularly if he has provided some instruction as to how
the thing should be read.
But the fault in these matters is not always with
the reader: he is often not advised what he should
expect; and this is often because there is no adequate
advice possible. idany philosophers give every appearance
of being themselves confused as to what they are trying
to achieve, (and as a consequence confused as to how to
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go about doing it). When Butler, for example, talks about
benevolence and self-love, is his theory psychological
or casuistical? If it is the former, why does he not fol¬
low an empirical method? And if it is the latter, why
does he sustain such sin appearance of doing psychology,
and why does he not adduce the kind of reasons for his
conclusions that one would expect in connection with a
point of morals? In the earlier example, the three types
of unclarity were such that they could be removed without
any essential alteration in Arthur's thinking (although
any of them might, of course, betray 'essential' confus¬
ion). But here the reader is confused, not through his
own deficiencies, nor through the theorist's inability
to express himself, but because of an essential muddle
in the author's thought.
This much may provide an indication at any rate of
the general ways in which theories may vary as to their
clarity. I want now to perform the same function with
reBpect to the justification of them.
One is tempted to say 'Of course we all know what
is meant by justification, - a proposition in geometry
is justified by the kind of reasoning you see In Euclid;
one in physics by taking you through the chain of exper¬
iments and thoughts which has led the physicist to his
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conclusion; if you ask Peter how he knows there are
twenty-seven books in his room he says he has counted
them carefully; if you ask Paul how he knows it is cold
in Alaska he will tell you he has never heard any diff¬
erent, and what's more it stands to reason, being so far
north; and if you ask &ant how he knows he shouldn't tell
lies he will say that it is not a maxim which is unlvers-
aiizable'. But this is neither true nor very illuminating.
It is not true because we can't all of us always tell the
difference between justification and rationalization, for
example, or between either of these and persuasion. We
have not always known the appropriate technique for Just¬
ifying any given type of proposition, and we are not yet
sure, as far as one can see, what is the appropriate
method for justifying ethical propositions. It is not
illuminating, because it provides us no way of recogniz¬
ing fresh instances of justification. It tempts us to say
of a treatise In psychology, 'This is not well argued
because it is not like Euclid', - while at the same time
warning us against this, in that geometry is not like
physics, and neither of them is like geography. But we
are assured in spite of this that they all have their
methods of argument.
Of course, philosophers cannot hope to offer a def¬
inition of justification which would provide a sufflcJaat
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criterion of any given instance of it. But I see no
reason why they should not say anything they may find to
say which represents a necessary condition; and this is
what I am about to attempt.
First, several things which are ll&e justification,
but not it. Of these 1 will mention methods of discovery,
explanation of one's thinking in terms of causes, the
causal explanation of the fact that one believes some¬
thing, and justification of oneself for holding an opin¬
ion.
It is hard to imagine any practising theorist making
reference to his method of discovery as such, in support
of a theory he wishes to maintain. It would be silly to
say anything which amounted to ' i'his theory must be true
because I have been so empirical', or 'because I have
tried and erred', or 'because I have been disinterested',
just as it would be silly for a wife to try to convince
her husband that her cake was very tasty, by assuring
him that she had followed the recipe accurately. One
tests cakes, not by studying their history, or that of
the cook, but by examining the cake itself. And it is
the same, I should think, with theories. Not only is it
the case that since any good scientist can claim to have
been empirical, disinterested, etc., these representations
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do not serve to distinguish his view fro® that of any
other good scientist; - it is also the case that a part¬
icular theorist could allow criticisms of himself on
some of these counts, and still olaim that his view was
correct, on the ground that all such things had to do
with him, not with his theory, and they In no way affect¬
ed the argument which he presented for the truth of his
theory.
I said that this kind of mistake is hard to imagine
in practice; and Indeed it is rarely to be found. Text
books in social science commonly begin threateningly with
some sort of homily about prejudices, stereotypes, etc.,
but when they at last get on to the business at hand it
is in general to be found that such reflections are in
no way employed in their procedure, and might quite nice¬
ly have been left unsaid. And were it not for the well-
known good sense of mankind, this might appear surpris¬
ing, in view of the great pre-eminence that talk about
methods of discovery has had in philosophical deliberat¬
ions about knowledge, particularly since the time of
Francis Bacon. It was a considerable milestone in the
history of human thought to realize that when one is
making representations as to what is the case, it is
appropriate to have a look and see whether it actually
the case. The excitement over it is entirely under-
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standable; but one can not now help thinking that its
importance may have been exaggerated, and that the
excitement might by now quite well have subsided, at
least to a point where people were no longer to call
themselves 'empiricists' (signifying thereby that they
think the whole secret of knowledge lies in this one
principle),
It is easy enough to see, though, how the mistake
is made, because while there is no definitive relation
between the method of discovery and the form of justif¬
ication, there is yet some relation between the history
of discovery and the way the conclusion is Justified.
The method of discovery is expressible, if at all, in
a collection of maxims and aphorisms like 'Be very care¬
ful*, 'keep your test-tubes dry', 'Don't be fooled by
the results of one experiment, - special conditions may
prevail which you haven't noticed', 'Don't be discour¬
aged by negative instances, - they may be very informat¬
ive', etc. And I assume it is plain enough that to cite
one's conformity with any or all of such maxims will
prove nothing. Similarly 1 take it to be obvious that a
plain history of one's investigations is little to the
point. This would be too anecdotal, too full of tribul¬
ation.
And yet there must be some relation, otherwise there
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would be no necessity for any process of investigation,
I shall here only say that what I conceive this relation
to be is that the justification consists of a logical
history of the discovery process. By this I mean that the
final argument has no regard for the chronological order
of discovery, nor for all the many parts of the process
which in the end appear irrelevant. But it is neverthe¬
less historical in the sense that the things which are
mentioned actually did happen, and happened in the way
specified. And it is logical, both in the sense that it
displays the reason for the particular internal delimit¬
ation of the happenings mentioned, - and in the sense
that it connects them together in such a way as to dis¬
play their meaning or significance. This last is a point
which it is very difficult to communicate. One can say
that the theorist tries to convey something with his
account which is like the satisfaction one feels when
one 'sees' a mathematical argument; - or that he tries
to re-create the atmosphere of problem-and-solutlon in
which his investigations were conducted. But no way of
putting it seems to do more than ostend a particular
kind of experience, and if one is not familiar with this
experience, no words seem to provide any clue to what
sort of thing is meant.
A Becond way of thinking which is like justification.
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but riot It, can be described generally as the explanation
of an idea in terms of its cause. Consider the following
examples;
'Albert must be right in thinking X, because he is
sane (or wise, brilliant, has an I.Q. of...}'.
'Beatrice can't be right, because she is paranoid
(or a fool, too young, etc.)'
'You must believe me, because I am a philosopher,
and I know.*
'I say this is true because I have intuited it (or
because Inspection has revealed it to me, or
because my mind has performed certain operat¬
ions known to be the operations necessary to
the production of a true idea).'
The temptation to talk this way is, I suppose, natural
enough, particularly in matters where there is no other
definite way of ascertaining the truth. We suppose that
things like true ideas are the product of minds; and
given this much it is only to be expected that the prod¬
uct will vary as the producing agent, just as the qual¬
ity and performance of an automobile will vary as the
equipment and methods used in the place where it is made.
A mind therefore which is in fine working condition and
possesses ail the equipment for the job will turn out
ideas superior to those begotten of a mind not so const¬
ituted; and we can assess the ideas by studying the mind.
What could be more reasonable?
Yet on second thoughts it is not so simple. One does
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not assess the merits of an automobile by visiting the
factory, but by testing the car itself for comfort, mile¬
age, speed, pick-up, ease of handling, etc., and by en¬
quiring of long-time owners about such things as its
endurance. There are some things about it which can best
be learned by visiting the factory, - what quality steel
it is made of, or how many coats of paint it has. But
there is nothing which can only be learned there, while
there are many things, comfort, for example, concerning
which no amount of inspection of the factory could adequ¬
ately satisfy us.
Furthermore, a factory is not assessable except in
reference to the goods it produces or is to produce. Given
the specifications of an Austin saloon, I could visit the
Longbridge works and tell you whether I think they are
well-equipped to produce such a car. Or, given the spec¬
ifications, I could decide how well-equipped they are to
produce some new design of car. But one can form no opin¬
ion of a factory in the absence of information about what
it is to produce. Nor does the quality of the goods count
here: there are states of affairs which would provide one
with good reason to say 'This is a perfect factory for
producing these low-quality goods', and equally to say
'This is such a poor factory that I don't Know how it
succeeds in producing these high-quality goods'.
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Carrying these remarks over to the subject of minds
and ideas, (and here I do not wish to pronounce upon
whether minds, like factories, can be visited and studied
apart from their products), - we find that ideas can only
be tested by studying them, themselves, - checking them
for whatever may be analogous to comfort, pick-up, fuel
consumption, etc.; we find that if a proposition like 'It
is raining now' is enunciated, no amount of assurances
or evidence of fine workmanship will eradicate that
stubborn urge to have a peek out the window; and we find
that if any invariable relation between the truth of ideas
and the characteristics of minds were discoverable, it
would rely on our ability to tell independently that the
ideas were true, and would extend only so far as this
was possible. In the case of classes of ideas (if there
were any) whose truth we did not know how to assess, we
would of course not be equipped to discover any such rel¬
ations.
Or we could put it another way by saying that when
Millie says 'It is raining' and we ask 'Is this true?',
this is a question, not about Millie, but about the prop¬
osition she has advanced; and to consider the matter by
raising queries about Millie, - by saying 'Ave you crazy?'
or 'Don't be a fool', is always to change the subject.
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Another thing like justification, yet not it, is
the explanation of the fact that one believes something,
- as in 'I believe that the earth is round because it has
always been so held in our family', or 'because I had a
traumatic experience with a circular argument', or 'because
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my great grandmother had an affair with Christopher
Columbus'. This is in some resoects like the last, except
that where in the previous cases there was a reference to
what was supposed to be the direct cause of an idea, the
causes here indicated are indirect, - they operate on me,
and I in my turn, because I have been so affected, think
differently from what I might otherwise have done. The
problem here Is not so much to elucidate the error, as
to explain why it is so often made. And this I think is
because the kind of explanation offered is so often
either true, or at least plausible. In my family, it has
(I presume) oeen for some generations thought that the
world is round; and while I personally like to think that
this has not very much to do with my believing it, it is
still the kind of thing that could have had everything to
do with it. Consequently its very truth tempts rue to offer
It as an answer to the question, 'Why do you think that
the world is round?' And yet if it were true, what I
ought to say is, 'I have no reason for thinking so. I
have never thought about it. It just runs in the family'.
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Finally, I will mention the justification of oneself
in holding a belief. An example is this;
Q: Why do you think the universe is expanding?
A: Well I am no astronomer, and I really have no idea
how to tell. 3ut it is a view which has a wide
currency amongst astronomers, and in particular
is held by X and G, who are highly regarded in
the trade, and whose scientific respectability
even I can recognize.
This might be called the model of the 'outsider^ argument1;
and I would say that it was, of its kind, a genuine form
of justification. It carefully applies all the criteria
that one who neither knows nor can be expected to know
anything about the subject can apply, and leaves him as
much entitled as he ever will be to the opinion, - and
more entitled than he would have been had he mad6 no
examination of the credentials of those who hold the view
as experts. But it .is an outsider's argument, - it is not
through thinking this way that X and G acquire their
'scientific respectability'. If scientists thought this
way they would eoend their days waiting for others to make
pronouncements; and it would be logically impossible for
the first man who propounded a theory, to have any just¬
ification for it at all, since there would be no opinion
he could cite. Thus he would not be respectable, the
others could not follow suit, and the waiting would have
to be resumed.
But this is all too obvious in the example given.
Now let us look at a slightly different case:
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Q: Why do you think that you should pay your debts?
A: Well I am no (human being? moral philosopher?}, and
I would really have no idea how to tell. But it is a
view whioh has a wide currency amongst the experts,
and in particular is held by X and fl, who are regarded
as wise men, and whose wisdom even I can recognize.
If we accepted the analogy here we would have to say that
this was again a perfectly respectable Outsider's arg¬
ument, but that it would not do at all for the expert,
and that even for the outsider its worth depends logically
on the existence of expert opinion, constituted in an
entirely different manner.
One might try to say that of course the difference
between empirical and practical discourse made the anal¬
ogy unacceptable. But, at least if there is no more to
the argument than this it is too glib, because in all
analogies there are differences, but they are not all
essential; and nothing has yet been said to show that
this particular difference Is of a crucial sort. On the
contrary I think it will be seen that it is not essential,
If we repeat the conjecture above, that if watching others
were the expert or first-order way to decide questions,
there could logically be nothing but eternal waiting.
This reflection did not mention or In any way depend on
the recognition that It was empirical discourse with
which we were concerned; and this being the case, the
argument is not weakened or altered by the substitution
of any other form of discourse.
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I shall therefore take It that in morals an Outsider's
Argument could have the restricted validity it has, only
presupposing what I must now call an Insider's Argument,
But now we must notice a difference between the two cases
which does seem to carry some significance. When I was
formulating the 'Answer' in the second example, I had
some difficulty in making the substitution for 'astronomer'
(expert), (and if you think this is just my stupidity,or
that it is a trick, try it yourself). This might be ex¬
plained either by sayiug that there do not happen to be
any experts in morals, or by saying that there do not
happen to be any non-experts. Since the former alternat¬
ive appears equivalent to saying that there Is no possib¬
ility of rational argument in morals, I have a consider¬
able inclination to prefer the latter. And I think the
view that there can be no non-experts receives some
substantiation if we reflect how odd it would be, either
that one who must after all think as an insider concerning
at least the particularity of his moral life, should dec¬
line to do so concerning the more general features of it,
- or that he should allow something which concerns him so
intimately as the conduct of his life, to be determined
for him so passively, so arbitrarily, as opinions which
he accepts on the authority of 'experts'. For the ideas
which one has appropriated by the Outsider's Argument are,
one might say, curiosities, entertainments. It would be
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odd for a man to regard himself as having a stake in theoi
- to be in any way embarrassed or disjointed if the cur¬
rent of expert opinion left them behind, or rejected thera.*
And it would be equally odd if a man did not feel embarr¬
assed or disjointed if the ideas governing the conduct of
his life came to appear to him to be mistaken. I would
therefore say that in morals, either there is no reason¬
ing possible at all, or if there is, there is at least no
place for the Outsider's Argument. All the reasoning must
be from the inside. (This is a slightly less misleading
way of putting it than to say that there are no non¬
experts in moral discourse, for while this mistakenly
suggests that everyone is a polished moral thinker, the
other conveys the idea that in morals we either think in
the first-order mode, or we do not actually think morally
at all.)
with the exception of the remarks in the last para¬
graph, I have so far been talking mainly negatively about
* It would be strange, too, in empirical discourse, for a
scientist to build anything on what he has acquired by an
Outsider's Argument. A scientist may accept empirical ob¬
servations on trust, but he can be expected at least to
understand the reasoning by which they yield a conclusion
before he uses this conclusion as part of his theory. And
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justification, - it is not this, not that, etc. I must
now try to say something positive about it.
It is always a logical mistake for a person to offer
in justification of a belief, different reasons from the
reasons which have actually induced him to accept it. If,
for example, having notiaed that there are situations in
which his duties conflict and it is impossible not to
contravene one or other of two rules, he comes to the
conclusion that duties cannot be absolute, it is by re¬
counting these reflections that he can be expected to
publicly present this view, not by talking of the sexual
behaviour of South Sea Islanders, or by casting doubts on
the Two Worlds hypothesis which he sees in Plato's Theory
of Ideas. Of course a discrepancy of this sort will not
necessarily invalidate his argument: it is possible, if
unlikely, that the reasons he professes are better than
his actual reasons. Nor can one take it that the way to
test an argument is to check for such a discrepancy, - to
(cont.) and if a scientist's theory is analogous to a
person's morals, at least in the sense that they each have
a 'stake' in them, then a person could similarly be
expected to think as an 'insider' about morals.
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study the arguer's mind and find out whether his acuta!
reasons are different, - or to investigate whether he has
a history of candour and can therefore be assumed to be
candid in this instance. Arguments presumably have their
own criteria, and if Euclid's arguments are uttered by a
parrot, they are not less stringent for that.
What then is the significance of the point? - First,
I think, it may serve as a counsel of prudence to those
engaged in rational discourse of any sort: See that your
professed arguments square with your actaal reasons for
accepting any idea. If you do not, it may not show any¬
thing wrong with your argument, but it will always be a
ground for criticism of you personally. And secondly I
think it indirectly provides one of the criteria of a
sound argument, - that although It need not be identical
with its author's reasons for accepting its conclusion,
still it must be such that it would not be odd for peqie
generally to accept its conclusion on the kind of grounds
it provides. Through having read too much philosophy (or
too little), one may come to explain to a blind man that
the reason one helps him across the street is that doing
this kind of thing distinguishes one from the brutes, or
enables one to be free. But surely neither of these reasons
would ever induce such behaviour.
Everything I have said so far has been merely an
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attempt to elucidate what I mean by goals and standards
in ethical theory. I shall now try to explore some of the
relations between the various factors so far outlined. It
is obvious that different degrees of stringency of stand¬
ard could be adopted, and this might have considerable
effect on the choice of goal, - possibly disqualifying
some types of goal altogether, or having internal effects
on any given type - curbing its ambition or scope, making
necessary severe qualifications, etc. A philosopher who
had no standards could say anything it pleased him to say;
and on the other hand it is possible that having high
enough standards might force us however reluctantly to
decline to say anything whatever. (This may be the correct
interpretation of Socrates' "Ignorance".)
The choice of goal, too, could affect the standard,
both as to its stringency and as to its nature. If one
chooses, for example, to do casuistry, it is no doubt
possible, from the nature of the choice, to determine
with what level of standard one must be content, - or in
any case it will work itself out. Again, one can only
decide in terms of the goal what type of argument will
be appropriate. It would be foolish to look for mathemat¬
ical demonstration in a orown prosecutor's argument about
the guilt of an accused murderer, and foolish to look for
plain empirical evidence as to whether we ought to pursue
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the greatest happiness of the greatest number. And in
neither case is this because it is expecting too much,
but rather because these are not the sorts of argument
which will establish these sorts of conclusion.
While the nature of the goal would always seem to be
the prior consideration in questions about the nature of
the argument to be used in justification, I think that
in questions as to the stringency of the argument, if
there is any rational way of settling them, it is not one
which depends on the kind of thing which Is being said, -
otherwise there would be no possible way of disqualifying
any goal. One could 'legitimately' say whatever one chose
to say. And I therefore think that the question of
stringency of standards is the ultimate question in
moral philosophy.
There are some relations to be noted between clarity
and justification. Clarity would appear to be a necessary
prerequisite of justification. One ban hardly offer logic¬
al support of a proposition which, through being unclear,
is indeterminate in Its meaning. But clarity does not in
Itself ordinarily constitute any form of justification.
We are sometimes misled by the attractiveness of a very
lucid statement into thinking it must be true; but if
one's way of doing ethics was simply to provide as clear
an account as possible of one's own moral perspective,
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one could be entirely successful in this without such
success having any tendency to show that everyone should
think this way, or even whether I myself should think
this way. But in this example, if one made no further
claim about what was said than that it was a clear account
of one's own thinking, then at least to its author, this
claim would be justified by the clarity itself. But this
is the only sort of case I can think of, in which clarity
and justification are identical.
I have now outlined roughly and in general the
materials of the problem I am tackling; and having put
you in touch with this much of the problem, I may go on
to ask and attempt to answer questions like 'How high a
standard is necessary?', 'Can moral philosophy be pract¬
ical?', 'Are there any rules of procedure which it is a
mistake not to follow?', and 'Is there any form of argum¬
ent which is narticularly suited to the justification of
moral ideas?'.
Chapter Two.
In this chapter I ahali be mainly concerned to do two
things, - first, to illustrate some of the ways in which
the practise of ethical theory commonly displays varying
theoretical standards, and second, to attempt to arrive
at some conclusion as to what may properly be expected
in this regard.
It is not always easy to know, in a given case,
whether a proposition is an argument, or merely the expos¬
ition of a conclusion which would itself require an
argument to support it. Take the proposition, "We have
a natural right to property". Can this be divided into
two parts such as
(a) When we have acquired some article by recognized
procedures we are entitled to regard it as ours and
no one else's, and to think any person wicked who
attempts against our will to make it his; and
(b) This (immediately practical) proposition can be
deduced from an empirical, theoretical, or In any
case non-practical proposition about Mother Nature,
or about the way we naturally and necessarily think,
(or whatever it would be about)?
Or is It simply a statement claiming that in the class of
natural rights is included the right to property? - a
statement which, if it was empirical in intention, - if
it was analogous to 'Amongst the animals in Africa are
to be found lions', - would have to be Justified empiric-
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ally; - while if it were logical, claiming that 'the
meaning' of the expression 'natural rights' is such that
one can not fail to include 'property' as an instance,
- would have to be justified in whatever way one could
establish "the meaning of 'natural rights'".
Or again if it is said 'Man is born free', it is
not obvious whether this should be ta^en as merely record¬
ing a supposedly ascertainable fact about men generally
at the time of their first appearance in the world, or
whether it is an oblique way of expressing the opinion
that we should treat other people in such a way as to
leave it entirely open to them to decide and act of their
own accord, - or whether it at the same time expresses
the latter opinion and justifies it by reference to the
former.
And once again if we say 'Man is a social animal',
it is not plain, at least from what has so far been said,
whether this is a merely empirical observation, based on
such facts as that we feel loneliness, enjoy parties, and
denend on one another for our spiritual and material wel¬
fare, - or whether it claims to be a fact in a different
and you might say metaphysical way, asserting that we
really are social in spite of the fact that we often feel
and act in an un- or anti-social way; - or again whether
it says one or other of these things, but also carries
45
the Implication that since we are social, we ought to toe
social. We are moral through being true to ourselves, and
since we are social beings, we must so conceive ourselves,
and act accordingly, (whatever that may involve).
In all these cases I am asking you to think the prop¬
ositions merely toy themselves. It is probable that if you
looked up historical instances of their use, in Aristotle,
Locke or Rousseau, some of the confusion would be cleared
up by the context. But I am not here interested in comment¬
ing on these philosophers, but only in illustrating the
point that it is easy to be unclear, not only In our way
of expressing ourselves, but in our own minds, whether we
are merely asserting something, or merely proving it, or
both asserting and proving It. And the fact that we are
sometimes content to remain thus confused, is symptomatic,
I think, of our indecision as to what standards may be
required of a philosophical theory, - or of our opinion
that ne very high standard is required.
It is not easy to know, either, if a philosophical
utterance is to be taken as an argument, or merely as a
method of influencing people in a certain direction. If
a nasty critical philosopher went to work on a proposit¬
ion like 'i4an is born free' and said 'Look here, you can't
say that. Freedom is not a characteristic of new-born
babes, like the colour of their iy>it op whtthw thay
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eyes, or whether they resemble their fathers, which you
can observe. And even if there were some warrant for say¬
ing we are born free, it still would not follow that in
later life it is necessary to respect people's freedom.
You would not ask us to respect the youth of a middle-
aged man, on the grounds that he was born young.', - he
might be greeted with the reply that of course there was
not the beginnings of an argument here, the thing was not
intended as an argument. It was intended as a way of
influencing people In the direction of a greater respect
for freedom; and consequently if there is any criterion
by which to judge the proposition, it is neither 'Is it
true?', nor 'Would it argue for the conclusion i_f it were
true?', but 'How well calculated is it to achieve its end?'.
The defender of the proposition might go on to say that
the making of such calculations is no easy task, and
therefore invites the application of the philosophic mind.
But X shall not here discuss either whether such a task
is a proper one for philosophy, or how many examples of
philosophising can best be interpreted in this way.
Suffice it to say that there may be cases where things
which are said with some of the airs of argumentation,
may better be Interpreted as attempts to influence.
There is some difference between influencing and per¬
suading - or, since this sounds a little like a compar-
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ative 'analysis' of these words, perhaps X should say
that one can behave in a way significantly different from
the way X have termed 'influencing', and this different
way I think it appropriate to call 'persuasion', since
this word is often used this way. When we are doing what
I call influencing, the nature of the difference hoped-
for is left unspecified, whereas when we are persuading,
the difference is mentioned, - we are persuading people
of something. Persuasion is a forthright or direct way
of sneaking, while influence is indirect and one might
say, psychological. Persuasion, again, is to be disting¬
uished from rational argument or Justification in that
in the former we appeal to things which we know or assume
the person to be persuaded thinks, accents, feels or likes,
irrespective of whether we ourselves share these thoughts
or feelings, or of whether the appeal to them is a logic¬
ally satisfactory way of establishing the desired conclust
ion. Xf we try to argue that we should never tell lies
by pointing out the awkwardness of it in some cases, we
may know that this is a logically unsatisfactory argument,
and yet use It because we think that people generally
abhorr the kind of Inconvenience appealed to, sufficient¬
ly to blind them to the logical non-universality of the
conclusion. Or if we know that Mabel is a Christian, we
may try to convince her that as a Christian she must be
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a pacifist, even though we ourselves are pagans, though
we do believe in pacifism. But it is worth pointing out
that one might have a good logical point in urging that
Christians should be pacifists, and this would be accent¬
uated in a case where the person urging it was neither a
Christian nor a pacifist, but did so merely out of a love
of intellectual integrity.
This possibility raises in a fairly sharp form the
question, by what criteria we can distinguish justific¬
ation from other things like persuasion, influence, etc.
Can we say that any bad argument is a case of one or
other of the non-rational forms, - that is, that the
criteria are purely logical? Or should we say that the
question is to be decided by reference to the Intention
of the arguer or performer? Or that it is some combine
ation of the two? Or neither?
I don't think we could say either that all illogical
arguments must be persuasion, Influence, or something of
the sort, or that all instances of persuasion are illog¬
ical arguments. It seems to me that a person could know
what Justification is, and be intelligently attempting it,
and simply make a mistake. The only condition under which
this could be denied, I should think, would be if we were
forced to suppose that people never made mistakes except
under the influence of some perverse motive. But X see no
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reason to suppose that this is the case, and I therefore
think that the criteria cannot be merely logical. It does
appear, however, that if the mistake were of a certain
sort, then even if there were grounds for saying that it
was lust a mistake on its author's part, we could say
that he might as well have had the relevant perverse
motive, fake the example, 'Man is born free', fee found
that it was reasonable to interpret it as an attempt to
influence people towards a respect for freedom. But this
would have very little tendency to show that this was in
fact rtousseau's motive - indeed it is fairly doubtful
whether he had any idea what his motives were. But if on
investigation we found that he was honestly trying to
prove some forthright thesis, this would likewise have
little tendency to show that we were mistaken in thinking
that the most sense-making interpretation of what he
said was to a different effect. There is no necessary
relation between what one wants to say, and what one does
say.
But this also shows that the intention of the speaker
will not supply the criterion either. One could set out
to persuade, and succeed in proving; and even where one
sets out to prove, this 1b also persuasion, though perhaps
in a different sense. If the intention of the author were
the criterion, then we could never decide, from Inspecting
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the argument itself, what sort of argument it was, -
and this will not do. We must surely make judgments about
things in the light of their own characteristics.
I think the difficulty here derives almost entirely
from the fact that we have been assuming that whatever
the criteria are, they must apply equally or in the same
way to the intention of the arguer, and to the argument
itself; and that therefore the answer lies in having two
sets of criteria, one for arguments and one for intentions.
These may be closely related, but not In the simple
analytical way in which from one, the other can be deduced,
fou might say of arguments, for example, that they were
instances of justification if they exactly proved what
they set out to prove, without reliance on merely accid¬
ental factors, such as the beliefs or feelings of those
to whom they may be directed, or, (if they failed in
this), did not fail in any of the ways which could be
identified as one of the known forms of non-justification;
that they are persuasive if they rely (bn any important
respect on the idiosyncrasies of those to whom they are
directed; that they are cases of 1 influence' if their
conclusion is a matter of conjecture, and if no conclus¬
ion of the type to be expected in the context can be said
&-y to actually follow from the ideas expressed; and that
they are rationalization if, whether they are good arg-
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uraents or bad, they do not tally with the author's actual
reasons for accenting the conclusions he is advocating.
One is tempted to say that the corresponding criteria
for making judgments about the authors of arguments would
be, which of the above states of affairs they in fact
intended, regardless of what they actually achieved. But
this does not altogether work, because (a) one very com¬
monly has no conscious intention as one goes about talk¬
ing philosophically, and (b) while in none of the first
three cases would it be in any way surprising that a
person should so intend, it is almost logically imposs¬
ible to consciously Intend to rationalize, because fche
awareness that one was doing so would deprive one of the
conviction which the procedure was contrived to produce
or sustain. But I think that rather than invalidating the
above suggestion, these considerations serve to show
either that there are some circumstances in which one is
estopced from making judgments about the authors of
arguments, or that there are some cases in which the
judgment must be made, not on the basis of the facts
immediately surrounding the making of the argument, but
on general information about the arguer.
There are two types of uncertainty which the exist¬
ence of any of these in fhere they do exist) may
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indicate, - uncertainty about which state of affairs
actually prevails in a given case, and uncertainty about
whether what does prevail is good enough. If a person
argues, for example, from a sometime state of affairs to
a universal conclusion, he may not realize that this is
if anything a persuasive argument; - but he may realize
it, and think that this is good enough, that this is all
that can be expected in a subject like ethics. jNot every¬
body who behaves as if he held the latter view does
explicitly hold it. But let us discuss it as a contention,
rather than as a state of mind.
The first point to be made is that we must find
some criteria for its use - some way of circumscribing
its application, otherwise it could be used to justify
any type of proceedings whatsoever, and ethics would
become a subject in which 'anything goes'. I think that
in practise it is UBed indiscriminately, and that this
is not good enough.
And having said this, I cannot fail to make this
second point: that there can really be no question of
any abatement of standards; the only question there may
be is, what alternatives to the obvious ideals of forth¬
right speech, precision, comprehensiveness and valid
argument are consistent with the highest standards? I
say that I must say this, because the point I made in
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the last paragraph amounts to nothing but a re-introd¬
uction of strict standards. But in case this seems insuf¬
ficient substantiation for such an important thesis, I
have two other arguments to offer.
The first derives from the empirical fact that when
we maxe public a philosophical treatise, it passes from
our hands, toe have no control over whether it is read by
stupid people, analytical philosophers, existentialists,
twentieth century Christians, or any other special group;
and we therefore cannot count on its being judged by any
special or idiosyncratic standards, ft or can we lay down
any special or arbitrarily chosen standards, unless they
are deduced from, or entirely consistent with, standards
which we think that everyone must necessarily accept. Or
to put it a little differently, when something which claims
to be true is released to the public, it immediately
becomes caught up in the merry-go-round of public scrut¬
iny; we cannot expect to fool all the people all the time;
and when a good criticism appears, to say that the theory
was not intended for people so acute as the author of the
criticism is to abandon any claim it has to truth. (And
to admit publicly that the theory was intended for stupid
people is to abandon any use it has as persuasion, influence
or whatever else It may then be regarded as attempting.)
But this is at best a picturesque way of saying what
\
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may be more formally stated as follows: It is not in fact
possible to discuss how high a standard to pursue for any
purpose, because if the discussion is pitched to a high
standard, then it will be a discussion of what sort of
standards are consistent with the high standard of the
discussion; while if the discussion proceeds on anything
short of the highest standards, it will be necessary
again to discuss how high a standard the discussion of
the standards pertaining to the first-mentioned activity
need adopt; - and once again the same choice between
accepting the highest and discussing the alternative will
arise. It seems therefore to be a choice between the
strictest standards and eternal waffle, - an arbitrary
choice, if you like, but at least one in which one of the
alternatives is logically unassailable, since any crit¬
icism of it would presuppose what it was attempting to
deny.
If this proves, as I think it unmistakably does, that
there can be no case for permitting ethics to be a logic¬
ally sloppy subject, it still leaves unsettled, questions
about what particular sorts of theoretical practice are
consistent with the highest standards, - questions like
'What form of argument is appropriate?', 'Can we be con¬
tent to say things which are true for the most part?',
'Can we settle for anything short of certainty?', 'Will
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a rough outline of morals be sufficient?'. These questions
I will now discuss.*
Some of the arguments which attempt to show that a
high standard is not necessary in ethics merely serve to
point out that a certain kind of argument is not approp¬
riate; and some of the claims that no argument is approp¬
riate to moral discourse rely on the assumption that a
certain kind of argument would be appropriate, if any
kind were. An example of the latter is Ayer's famous
"Critique of Ethics" in"Language, Truth and Logic", where
he shows, what had never been seriously doubted except by
some particularly hard-working philosophers, - that moral
propositions cannot be empirically founded; - and con¬
cludes, on the apparent assumption that this if any would
be the appropriate method of founding them, that no just¬
ification of them is possible. It is not difficult to
show that this is a poor argument. How does he know that
* Compare Aristotle, iNilcomachean fthlcs. 1094b: "Our
treatment of this science will be adequate if it achieves
the degree of accuracy appropriate to the subject. ...
Questions of right and justice involve much difference
of opinion and much uncertainty. ... Therefore we must
be content to obtain not more than a rough outline of
the truth, and to reach conclusions which...have merely
a general validity. ...It is the mark of an educated
mind to expect that degree of precision in each depart¬
ment which the nature of the subject allows; to demand
rigorous demonstration from a political orator is on a
oar with accepting plausible probabilities from a math¬
ematician. "
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empirical justification would be the appropriate method?
Not because all (synthetic) knowledge is empirical. This
is a generalization which could not stand together with
his own conclusions about moral 'knowledge*. (And to
claim, as part of the argument, that moral beliefs are
not knowledge is to assume the final conclusion.) He
would therefore have to show that empiricism was peculiar¬
ly appropriate to ethics. This could be done by showing
that some ethical propositions are empirically provable.
But this would run counter to the conclusion that none
were.
The former sort of argument is more Interesting. An
example of its use appears in the passage from Aristotle
just quoted. He there argues that we can expect neither
precision nor certainty in ethics, because it is foolish
to demand mathematical demonstration. In Aristotle's time
this argument was no doubt more plausible than it is today,
because then the only science in which precision or cert¬
ainty was to be found was mathematics, and it was there¬
fore reasonable to grade sciences on a scale in which
differences of precision and certainty were the only sign¬
ificant differentia, and to say that what is non-mathem¬
atical must necessarily lack these characteristics. And
yet even so it is not entirely reasonable, because one
would have to be able to identify mathematical reasoning,
(and any other kind, too), by other criteria than their
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precision and certainty, otherwiee the argument would be
circular;'This (imprecise and uncertain) science is
imprecise and uncertain, because it is non-mathematical
(i.e. not precise and not certain)'. But today the arg¬
ument is even less plausible, because we have learned
that precision and certainty are necessities in any
science, and where these qualities are not evident on
the surface, as in the hurly-burly of nature, we have
found ways of seeking them out - as kant says, of behav¬
ing, not like a pupil, but like "an appointed judge who
compels the witnesses to answer questions which he has
himself formulatedTo us, therefore, the non-math¬
ematical nature of a science is no argument that it need
be imprecise or uncertain. To us Aristotle's remarks can
amount to nothing more than the observation that, however
one reasons in morals, it is not the same as the kind of
reasoning in mathematics. I shall have more to say about
what form of argument is appropriate in Chapters Four and
Five.
To Investigate the second question, let us take as
an object of discussion the proposition, 'It is true for
the most part that we should not tell lies'. Let us sup¬
pose that "telling lies" has been sufficiently defined
* Critique of Pure Reason, Bxlil (kemp Smith translation).
to remove danger of confusion as to which of its many
meanings is intended; and that we are attempting to put
this information to practical use. This Is not to assume
categorically that all such propositions must be pract¬
ically useful; but we must have some point of view from
which to interpret them, and this is the most natural
from which to begin. Well now I am asked a question which
I am expected to answer, and not knowing whether I should
answer it truthfully, I refer to this piece of philosoph¬
ical counsel. What does it advise? Tell the truth because
it is more likely that this is the moral course? If I
took this line in this case, I should have no reason not
to take it in other cases, and would therefore tell the
truth all the time, and thereby be led into the paths of
wickedness. But I have no reason to lie some of the time.
This might only compound ay wickedness, since while on
the first alternative I would certainly be wrong, say,
ten per cent, of the time, I might now tell the truth
when I should be lying and vice versa, and thus increase
my precentage of sins anywhere up to twenty per cent.
And for this reason it will not help if I go back to my
philosopher friend and enquire of him, in what percentage
of cases it is wrong to lie. If the percentage happened
to be fifty, then it would be equally advisable for me
always to lie, or always to tell the truth, since either
way I could count on being right half the time, whereas
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if I lied half the time and spoke the truth the other half,
I might he wrong as much as all the time, although no
doubt on the laws of chance it would work out the same as
if I always lied or was always truthful. (Of course there
are some conditions under which this kind of information
would be valuable. If the proportion of times when one
should be truthful were very high, and I had previously
thought it was very low, or vice versa, it would almost
certainly make for a net improveaent in my behaviour, but
such propositions are not addressed to particular people,
and so cannot rely on individual cases to show that they
make sense. And in any event, it is through their good
fortune, not their intrinsic merit, that they are ever
able to communicate valuable information - i.e. it is only
when the percentage to which they refer happens to be very
high or very low.)
In this example, through having less than a high
standard of clarity, the proposition has succeeded in
communicating either nothing, or virtually nothing. There
are two kinds of Implication which could be drawn from
the above criticism. One is that philosophy was proceed¬
ing in an entirely wrong way in trying to propound gener¬
alities about morals, and that it should turn to something
different, like elucidating a procedure for making up
one's mind in particular cases. After all, when we gener-
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alized, we must have generalized from something; and
what could this be but the results of such a procedure
in practice? This is the line a person could be expected
to take who insisted that philosophy should be practical.
But here is not the place to pursue this ooint. The other
alternative is to say that the mistake is in the angle
from which the proposition is viewed, - that such prop¬
ositions are not intended as practical counsel, and
should not be criticised as such; and that if any crit¬
icism is due in this connection, it is that the theory
of which such propositions formed a part did not make
this clear. This would raise the question, in what way
then the proposition to be regarded? 'As an answer to
the purely theoretical question, how far is it true that
we should not tell lies?', is a reply which immediately
offers itself. But this will not do, because it tells us
nothing. It is always possible to formulate some question
to which a given proposition is an answer, and if this
were the token, all propositions would be theoretically
significant. What we should need to know in this case, I
suppose, is where the question and its answer fitted into
a larger theoretical context, and also in what way an
answer as vague as the one in question could serve any
useful theoretical purpose; and for my part I find either
of these difficult to imagine.
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But It Is part of my present purpose neither to
criticise this particular way of talking as such, nor to
decide whether moral philosophy must be practical. Our
question is, can the practise of saying things which are
•true for the most part* be made consistent with the high¬
est standards of clarity? I think I have shown that, viewed
from a practical point of view, it cannot, and that from
a theoretical point of view, very extensive explanations
of the place of such propositions in a system (which it
is at present difficult to imagine) would be necessary
before we could even begin to decide whether they conveyed
any clear enlightenment. I have also shown that the att¬
empt to render them precise by providing percentages is,
at least from a practical point of view, profitless; and
further, that what might appear a promising way out, -
that of providing a procedure for maxing up one's mind
in particular cases, is in fact not a clarification of
true-for-the-most-part propositions, but an entirely
different way of doing business.
It is an interesting, if not a very valuable point,
that although restricted generality does not appear to
achieve the required precision, complete particularity
does. If it were ever possible to say 'It is certain that
in these exact circumstances this is the right thing to
do', I can see no possibility of mistaking the meaning
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of the proposition, - and this may he one of the heady
attractions of casuistry. 8ut on the other hand, its
usefulness, I should think, would be restricted to cir¬
cumstances identical with those represented, and this
might in practice amount to nil.
The criteria I have used here are that a proposition
is acceptable from the point of view of clarity if it
(a) contains some unmistakeable enlightenment, and (b)
creates no positive confusion. I have taken it that there
would never be any temptation to leave a proposition
unclear as to what in Chapter One I called its 'intrinsic
meaning'. The problem of expressing oneself is always a
personal one, and I cannot think under what circumstances
any difficulty in this regard could be attributed to the
nature of the idea. If it is a difficult idea to express,
either I am the man for the Job or I am not; and if S$~3r9
the latter, the only graceful thing to do is to talk
about something else.
Consider now the following propositions:
(i) It is probable that it is true for the most part that
we should tell the truth.
(ii) It is probable that we should always tell the truth.
(iii) The probability that it should be true that we should
tell the truth in any given case is 7/8.
(iv) The probability is 3/4 that it Is true that we should
tell the truth in seven cases out of eight.
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(v) The probability is that the average Englishman will
die at age 53.7.
Our primary interest in these will be to the extent
that they taark a difference between probability and cert¬
ainty, as distinct from what I shall call an 'objective
probability'; and we shall be concerned to discover how
far the saying of them is consistent with the highest
theoretical standards. But with a view to focussing
attention on the particular sort of probability in which
we are interested, I would like to point out some of the
interesting differences between these five statements.
The most general of these is the difference between being
less than entirely sure of the truth of what Is being
said, and saying something which is regarded as being by
nature uncertain or indeterminable. The former meaning is
most evident in propositions (i), (11) and (iv), - the
latter in (ill) and (v). We most commonly think that we
are sure of the uncertainty of things which are 'object¬
ively* or *by nature* uncertain, and it is perhaps for
this reason that propositions (1) and (iv) sound a bit
odd. This is so also, I think, because we are not always
very clear about the distinction between being less than
sure, and making representations about objective uncert¬
ainties, and these two propositions force the distinction
upon our attention. But lest there be any temptation to
think that it does not make sense to say e.g. 'It Is
probable that It Is true for the most part that...', I
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think this query will be seen to be ill-taken if we say
the same thing in different words. It does seem to make
sense to say 'I am not sure, but it does seem to iae that
it is true for the most part that...'; - or at least the
way in whloh it does not make sense is that it seems
unnecessary to say that one is unsure of something which
is itself so vague. If we make what is asserted more
precise, - if we say *1 am not sure, but I think the prob¬
ability is 7/8 that...', then the profession of uncertain¬
ty no longer seems unnecessary.
'Subjective' or eplstemological uncertainties are
most commonly expressed in the words 'it is probable that',
while objective uncertainties invite the phrase, 'the
probability is that'; but neither expression can by any
means be used as a criterion. I can use 'the probability
is that' to mean 'I am not sure, but I think that'; and
there are circumstances in which, when a person says 'It
is probable that...', it makes sense to ask, 'what are
the chances?'
It sounds odd to express eplstemological uncertainty
in a mathematical form, as in proposition (iv): 'The prob¬
ability is 3/4 that it is true that...', but this is not
because we do not feel different degrees of assurance about
our assertions, - degrees which can be expressed approx¬
imately in mathematical fractions, but rather because
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there is no imaginable procedure by which we could settle
an argument as to whether c/r degree of assurance in a
given case was 3/4, or 25/32.
A universal mar* of an objective probability is that,
given that we know precisely what we mean in asserting it,
it is always possible to imagine conditions under which
we could be completely certain of its truth. (We of
course cannot be certain of anything of which we do not
precisely know the meaning). In proposition (v), for
example, you might say that the meaning was such that it
implied that if one used the information it provided as
a basis of insuring enough people's lives, one could
count on not losing money; and although we do not normally
take it that we are entirely sure of the truth of such
statements, we can conceive how we could make them cert¬
ain, or at least increase their certainty. We could on
the one hand check and re-check the statistical methods
used in reaching the conclusion, make further empirical
investigations, etc., and on the other we could write
insurance policies in such a way as to provide against
unforseeable changes in life expectancy, - for example by
specifying that we would pay only if death were due to
the kind of causes of death operating at the time our
statistics were formulated. Similarly we can know quite
clearly jtwai'ly what we mean by assertions about the roll
of dice, flipping of coins, etc., which primarily depend
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on the "laws of chance", and thus have a clear prospect
of being sure of the probabilities to which we refer.
But in many cases, for example horse-racing probab¬
ilities, we do not entirely know what we mean by our
assertions, and to this extent they tend to be partly sub¬
jective and partly objective in character. You might say
that the difference between dice and horse-racing probab¬
ility propositions is that in the former cases, the prob¬
abilities themselves are borne out by rolling dice, while
the result of a horse race neither confirms nor de-confirms
the antecedent probabilities. This may be only because
rolls of dice are repeatable, horse races are not, and
one roll of the dice does not confirm the probability
alleged concerning it. But you could not quite make horse
racing propositions into dice rolling propositions by
saying that by a probability of the former kind you meant
that if the same race were repeated enough times, horse X
would be found to win oroportion Y of the races, partly
because betting on races does make sense even when it is
known that the race will be run only once ( and indeed
would not make the same kind of sense otherwise), and
partly because there are too many factors entering into
horse racing to make it an entirely legitimate hypothesis
that the race should be repeated.
There Is more analogy between proposition (ill) and
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life expectancy cases than there is between it and either
dice rolling or horse racing cases, because given a way
of deciding in particular instances whether one should lie
or not, it would be a question of competent collection
and interpretation of statistics, to determine the prob¬
ability; and it is imaginable that one could be at least
as sure as one's confidence in the said criterion allowed,
of conclusions so reached as one could be of life expect¬
ancy conclusions. (The way you would proceed, I presume,
would be by analysing the circumstances in which there was
any occasion to sneak into as many distinct types as poss¬
ible, then, employing the criterion to ascertain what the
result would be in each type of case, and then conducting
an empirical investigation into the relative frequency
with which each type of case occurs, and collating the
results.) This kind of conclusion could be turned into
one of type (iv), amongst other ways, through an assess¬
ment of the doubtfulness of the criterion employed, or
through raising queries about the analysis of cases, or
the sufficiency of empirical investigation.
Most 'objective' probability propositions arise when
we take some categorical proposition having reference to
a large number of cases, and try to conjecture what sign¬
ificance this has for a particular case falling into the
same class as the cases to which the categorical propos-
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itlon has reference} and I suppose that this applies even
to horse racing probabilities, since though a given set
of horses nay never have raced together before, and may
never do so again, still each horse has run before, and
individual statistics on its performance are available,
and may be compared with similar information about other
horses.
This has perhaps been a needlessly elaborate discuss¬
ion for my purpose , which has been to provide some ways
of distinguishing between subjective and objective prob¬
abilities, in order to focus attention on the former,
wjTSB which we are here primarily Interested, having prov¬
ided some discussion of the latter in connection with
'things which are true for the most part'.
I shall now ask in what sense an ethical proposition
which is represented as being probably true (in the sub¬
jective, eoistemological or "we can't be quite sure" sense)
can be practically useful. In the first place, obviously
if it is used as l,f it la definitely true, then it will
have whatever usefulness can be found in the proposition
so taken (which may, as we saw, be none). But I point this
out mainly because I think there is a tendency to invite
people to accept as definitely true, what is thought and
even represented by us as being merely probable. But this
is to obscure or Ignore the probability} and the question
69
we want to ask Is, how does the recognition of It affect
the usefulness of a probable proposition?
There are circumstances in which we can accommodate
our behaviour to the recognition of probability, for
example when we bet on games, races or life expectancies,
or when we take along an umbrella in spite of a prediction
of fine weather. And there are less obvious cases too: if
I receive incorrect change from a shopkeeper, I may think
it probable in view of the look in his eye that it was a
dishonest mistake. But, it being only probable, I might
act neither as if it were true nor as if it were untrue,
but in a way which expressed my willingness to entertain
either possibility, but my slight preference for the
former. Or, to take a case in which it makes more sense
to attempt to do more than recover one's losses as grace¬
fully as possible, consider the usual course of criminal
proceedings, in which, when there are sufficient grounds
for suspicion, the accused is arrested and a preliminary
hearing held to determine whether his guilt is sufficient¬
ly pfcobable to warrant a trial. But the police no doubt
entertain hearty suspicions about masses of people whom
they are not prepared to arrest; and many people are dis¬
charged after a preliminary hearing because the probabil¬
ity is insufficient, although they might be guilty, and
there is perhaps more likelihood of this in their case
than in the case of a man picked at random off the streets.
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Thus increasing shades of probability warrant increasing
definiteness of treatment. And so forth.
Is there any analogy to be drawn between these cases
and the probability of the truth of a purely moral prop¬
osition? An obvious difference is that In the above
examples there is a real, or at least a distinctly conceiv¬
able prospect of being proven wrong. This is what makes
the idea of risk which they all involve intelligible.
This is clearest in the case of predictive probabilities
like the weather, where it would not make sense to try to
follow an intelligent course of action unless some denoue¬
ment were anticipated, - in this case, unless it was
thought that it will certainly be either wet or dry, hot
or cold, etc. In the final two examples, which you might
call sincerity cases because of the absence of any import¬
ant element of prediction, the action taken in the light
of probability again would not make sense if you did not
think that something definite was the case, - that the
mistake was either intentional or not intentional, that
the accused either did or did not abscond with the mission¬
ary society funds. Or is it a difference? You might say
that when a probability is alleged concerning a purely
moral matter, there is an actuality to which it has ref¬
erence - that this actuality is not too unlike the present
actuality of a past action, or that we shall someday be
confronted with what we now see only through a glass,
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darkly. Either some form of Platonism, that is to say,
or Christianity might sypply the missing element here.
But even if the representations which either of them made
were true, I think they would not do the Job required of
them, for this reason: in the shopkeeper and criminal cases,
we assess the probability largely in the light of our
general information about similar occurrences. 'If the
shopkeeper's mistake was not honest, then he could be
expected to be disagreeable, or aloof, or over-apologetic,
etc. when it was pointed out to him, or to contradict
himself under questioning, or to say implausible things,
etc., (since this is the way people in general do respond
in such circumstances, and since in general our imagination
functions less efficiently than our memory). This shop¬
keeper did respond in this, that and the other of these
ways; therefore it is probable that his mistake was not
honest.' Without such general information, we should have
no intelligent grounds for an aplnion in a particular case.
Sow if moral probabilities were approximations to some
existing but non-accessible truth, some truth which is not
only not now, but never accessible, we should have no
general information upon which to base our Judgments of
probability; and consequently if it was still true to say
that we could intelligently make them, it would also be
true that the representations made by the Christian or the
Platonlst, (even if they too were true), would be lrrel-
evant. Or it might be put differently by saying that to
save an analogy of this sort two conditions must be ful¬
filled: (i) something must be said which would be relev¬
ant if it were true, and (ii) there must be some further
ground for thinking it true th^n the fact that if it were
true, it would save the analogy. In this instance if the
first condition is fulfilled, (which I have claimed not
to be the case), the second is not, and could not be, at
least on this side of the grave.
But I have perhaps not yet put my finger on the essent¬
ial point here, which is that in cases of probabilities
about states of affairs, the reason one can alter or mod¬
ulate one's behaviour according to the probability, take
intelligent risks, etc., is that these propositions make
no direct claim upon our behaviour. To say 'It is likely
to rain' is not to say 'Take your umbrella', or 'Stay at
home today', or any other Instruction to anything; and
this allows us extensive freedom in the implications we
permit it to have. But a moral proposition speaks direct¬
ly about behaviour, and therefore gives an air of contra¬
diction to any tampering with it. 'We should never tell
lies' provides unmistakeable direction for our behaviour;
but when this is prefaced by 'It is probable that', the
position is not so clear. If we become entirely truthful,
we treat the matter as if It were not probable, but certain.
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But what else can one intelligently do? There is as much
reason, in the circumstances, for telling lies some of the
time as for telling half-truths all the time; and there is
no reason for either, because each runs directly counter
to what is supposed to be 'probably true'.
For these reasons I think that from a practical point
of view it can make no difference to recognize an ethical
pronosition as merely probable, and that they must there¬
fore either be treated as certain, - which cannot be allow¬
ed, if they are not so, - or be disallowed from having
practical application. with regard to the latter alternat¬
ive, I think it must be said that the only way to follow
it is to talk about something else. One cannot say 'We
should not tell lies, but I don't mean you to act on this',
any more than one can say 'I am throwing this stone straight
at you, but I don't intend it to hit you'.
This is a convenient, if not an entirely appropriate
place to mention that the kind of statements we have been
discussing are most instructively to be conceived as gen¬
eralizations, reached in somewhat the following manner:
beginning with a procedure for deciding whether or not to
tell the truth, we apply it to all the cases upon which
we can lay our hands in which there is any occasion to
speak, and finding that the same result appears in all
cases, but not being entirely sure that we have covered all
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possible cases, we say 'It is probably true that we
should never lie'. X will not say that this la the only
procedure for arriving at such a conclusion, nor that
part of the uncertainty about it might not derive from
uncertainty about the way of deciding with which we began.
But with these reservations it does seem an entirely
appropriate method; and were this our way of proceeding,
I wonder why we would embark on so unrewarding a project,
rather than simply let the matter rest with an elucidat¬
ion of the way of deciding about truth-telling which we
were employing? From the point of view of moral enlighten¬
ment, one is no better off with a prognosis of how often
he can expect his decisions to turn out in a given way,
than he Is when provided with a way of discovering this
for himself (if it should concern him to do so).
So far I have argued (i) that in enunciating moral
propositions neither less-than-complete generality nor
less-than-coapiete certainty is consistent with a high
standard of clarity; (ii) that attempts to maintain clar¬
ity by making degrees of generality or certainty precise
are either fruitless, or If fruitful, represent not a
qualification of the original statement, but a quite diff¬
erent way of doing business; (ill) that complete partic¬
ularity can in principle be entirely clear, but is of
little value; and (iv) that the issue cannot be evaded by
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saying that it is a mistake to insist on a practical inter¬
pretation of practical propositions. If they are not
intended to be practically useful, this can only be taken
as a wildly idiosyncratic fact about their author. I have
also suggested that it nay be a mistake to attempt the Kind
of generalizations we have been discussing, - that it might
be a more direct and informative procedure to elucidate
some of the reasoning (if any) upon which they are based.
If there is any direction in which we may settle for
less than the obvious ideal, it would appear to be in
respect of comprehensiveness. If we could ever have good
grounds for saying, for example, 'The wise man is at least
without fear, hope or pity', 'riight actions are, whatever
else they may be, done from a sense of duty', - these
propositions plainly lack comprehensiveness, but still
appear to satisfy the criteria, both of contributing def¬
inite enlightenment, and creating no positive confusion.
Some Idealist philosophers would say that this cannot be
the case, - that in all cases the things which remained
unsaid would, if said, shift the meaning of the things
that were said, and that we can therefore never be in poss¬
ession of the final meaning until we have painted the whole
picture. I think there is little doubt that it Is often
the case that such shifts of meaning occur; but on the one
hand I can see no reason for affirming it as a universal
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truth, and on the other, I think there say be some case
for saying that in any event it is possible to begin with
the final meaning. After all, the writer of philosophy is
not discovering as he goes; - it is only of the reader
that this may oe said. One knows where one is going before
one begins writing. It is true that one learns many things
on the way, because until we write we have not ordinarily
been sufficiently precise in our thinking to make possible
an adequate assessment of what we have to say. But if we
learn anything radical, we can only tear up what we have
done and start again; and thus once again we know where
we are going before we begin.
This does not go all the way to solve the difficulty,
however, because if I know no more than I am prepared to
expound philosophically, then the things I do not know
might yet, if known, shift the meanings of what I already
possess. But in moral philosophy, (as I shall maintain
in Chapter Four), we 40 know more than we are prepared to
express philosophically. V»e are contemplating moral
experience, which on the one hand is not entirely suscept¬
ible of philosophical treatment, and on the other, is too
extensive and cofflplex a thing, even where it is so suscept¬
ible, to leave it either feasible or profitable to attempt
to represent it entirely in our theories. But it is there,
and being there, can supply for us this worrisome residue.
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Otherwise, we ax-e left with a counsel of grim despair.
Either we know or we do not know (in the lofty sense of
'know') what we say. If we do, then we are entitled to
say it. But if everything we think we know is still sub¬
ject to these dark suspicions, and must await their remov¬
al before we sa.v anything, I see no prospect of ever being
in a position conscientiously to aay anything whatever.
My discussion of the question of standards would be
incomplete if I did not make a specific point of what I
have remarked elsewhere, - that nothing which can be inter¬
preted only as an attempt to influence people, from the
propounding of myths in Plato's sense, to saying things
like 'Man is born free', can be reconciled with any ser¬
ious philosophical standards. The reason for this is that
the aim or import of such theories is not specified, and
in the absence of anything but conjecture as to what is
being claimed, it is altogether impossible to ma*ce any
assessment of its truth. In various places I have expressed
suspicions as to how extensive this kind of philosophising
is; and I think there are some good explanations of why
it is so seductive.
In the first place, for reasons which I shall discuss
in the following chapter, we have a very strong aversion
for anything which savours of casuistry, and we therefore
do not like to be explicitly casuistical. But the desire
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to communicate one's thoughts about morals is not only
difficult to suppress, - it is excruciating to try to
find something which one can reasonably call 'moral
philosophy', which is entirely devoid of any moral enlight¬
enment. It is therefore only to be expected that moral
ideas should find covert expression in fine fancies, deep
obscurities, shock treatments, psychological explanations,
and all the rest.
But there are explanations which make it a more
honest mistake than this. Moral experience is an immensely
complex and intangible affair, which is only with the
greatest difficulty reducible to anything which we can
clearly and confidently assert. Time and again the things
one tries to say need only be mentioned to appear absurd,
Inadequate, one-sided or incommensurate with the material;
and yet this difficulty has ordinarily little tendency to
reduce our confidence in the genuineness of the business.
It is therefore only too easy to slip into saying what
is sufficiently vague to do no violence to the subject,
yet sufficiently expressive to make it appear worth saying.
This is the explanation which 1 would prefer to think
was more often correct.
Chapter Three.
In this chapter I wish to discuss the question, Can
ethics be practical? I put the question thus vaguely
because there are, as we saw in Chanter One, many degrees
and mo&es of moral enlightenment, and I do not wish to
exclude any of them. I am not merely asking, Can philos¬
ophy tell people what to do? - but also, Can it tell
them how to think? Can it criticise their actions or
thoughts? or say things which, if accepted, could const¬
itute a criticism of the moral thinking or behaviour of
people? Can it represent facts from which one would ord¬
inarily draw moral inferences ('The West' is declining -
then we must do something about it)? - or in general can
philosophy say anything which is either intended to make
a moral difference, or is such that it might as well have
been so intended?
The question, can ethics be practical? could be
read as an empirical question, like 'Does it ever make a
difference in a person's moral outlook to take a course
in ethics?' And it could be a question asked from a stud¬
ent's point of view in a more interesting way - It could
mean 'Would a student be making a philosophical mistake
if he allowed philosophy to Influence his behaviour?'
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But I am asking it from a philosopher's point of view:
would we philosophers he making a mistake if we contrived
to say things which were in some way morally enlightening?
There appear to be two kinds of consideration which might
induce us to answer this question in the affirmative. One
has to do directly with the standards we discussed in the
first two chapters - it might happen to be the case that
moral ideas were not susceptible of clear statement, or
adequate justification; and in such an event whoever
agreed with me that such standards were necessary would
say that ethics cannot be practical. But this would not
ordinarily be a judgment which would serve as a ruie in
ethics, because it would be merely descriptive of the
results of our efforts so far; and unless there was an
argument that moral ideas were intrinsically incapable of
such clear and well-substantiated statement, we would be
quite entitled to consider it still an open possibility
that ethics should be practical. For my part, I see no
prospect of such an argument emerging, and I therefore
propose to discuss the question on rather different terms,
which might be described as direct or internal arguments
that ethics should not be practical.
As things now stand in philosophy, there is a very
hard rule against any tendency to be morally instructive.
It Is one of the first things a student of the subject is
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taught; and while students are slow to assimilate the rule,
old hands are in general so thoroughly bound over to it
that they feel the greatest personal embarrassment when
they detect any tendency on their part to be casuistical.
We go to the most elaborate lengths to find something to
say which is both ethical and non-practical; and our pass¬
ion for this thing is at times so intense that we have even
been known to claim that philosophers like Aristotle, Kant
and tflll had no casuistical intentions, and it is a mis¬
take to ask: what is the practical significance of their
views. (This is surely unnecessary - we could simply main¬
tain that they were mistaken. And I think the reason we
do not do this is partly that we have no very good argu¬
ments to advance to that effect, and partly that having
no arguments and feeling that we need then, we try to
concoct historical precedents. But authority has never
been a good argument in philosophy.)
I said that we have no arguments, but what I should
have said is that we have few or none that we are prepared
to advance in a confident or categorical way, - for one
does find scattered and tentative (one might almost say)
excuses for the rule against being casuistical. And for
my part, when I examine my own feelings on the matter, I
find quite a welter of anxieties about it, all of which
have a tendency to make me agree with the rule, some of
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which I would he prepared to put on paper, but most of
which, for varying reasons, I would very much prefer
simply to keep private and confidential. And I suspect I
am not alone in this peculiarity.
Because it is with this state of affairs as a back¬
ground that the question must be discussed, we should not
be surprised if some of the issues undertaken appear
tenuous, Improbable or embarrassing.
There appear first of all to be some moral arguments
against being casuistical in ethics. It Interferes with
the freedom of the Individual, to tell him how he must
behave; it is part of his moral worth to decide such things
for himself; he must be responsible, not only for his
actions, but also for his principles. "The questions,
'What shall I do?' and 'What moral principles shall I
adopt?' must be answered By each man for himself; that at
least is part of the connotation of the word 'moral'."*
*P.H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics. Pelican Books, 1954-. It is
Interesting that while Mr. Nowell-Smith postulates this
as a principle for philosophers to respect, he appears
quite content that other people should violate it most
flagrantly, and Indeed appears in places to think that
it Is only when interpreted as attempts to force our will
on other people, that our moral Judgments make sense.
(See especially Chapter 20, section (4).)
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Commendable though it may be, it is not difficult to see
why this type of argument seldom becomes explicit in
philosophy, - it is contradictory to employ moral principles
as the basis of an argument that we cannot in philosophy
affirm moral principles. There can therefore be no univ¬
ersal moral argument against ethics being practical.
And yet it is not as simple as this: if we took it
that this argument established our liberty to be casuist¬
ical and thereupon set to work, we might in the process
of doing ethics find ourselves affirming one or other of
the above moral principles, and thence see that the very
affirmation of it ran counter to what was affirmed; -
that, for example, in telling people that we must all
respect the liberty of the individual, we were at the
same time falling to respect their liberty; or if we affirm¬
ed the liberty principle, and also maintained that we
should not tell lies, in making the latter contention we
were contravening the former principle. That is to say,
although there can be no general moral argument against
being 'practical', there might still be particular arg¬
uments depending on the particular moral principles we
chose to affirm. One might get around this by systemat¬
ically avoiding the mention of any principle which had
such awkward tendencies. But this would be the merest
subterfuge; and if one privately held the relevant prln-
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ciples, one would at least be violating one's own con¬
science, even if this fact was kept hidden from the public.
But there are three lines of thought which seem to
bear on the problem as thus formulated. The first is that
it may just be one of the facts about some moral princ¬
iples, that one cannot think them without giving rise to
some sort of contradiction, or at any rate, muddle. It is
hard to be against intolerance, for example, without being
intolerant of it; and one cannot be in favor of a respect
for freedom without wanting to restrict people'3 freedom
not to respect freedom. It may be that such difficulties
can be cleared up by some careful thinking; but the import¬
ant point, I think, is that they are not peculiarly phil¬
osophical worries. Anyone who thinks these thoughts brings
these difficulties upon himself, and they therefore do not
provide a special reason for philosophers not to thin*
them.
The second consideration is that not every way of being
casuistical has the same tendency to restrict freedom, rob
people of their proper responsibilities, etc. 'Pure' cas¬
uistry, in the way I have defined it, "taking all the brain
work out of the moral life", is an extreme case of removing
individual responsibility, while the 'Greatest Happiness
Principle' would presumably arrogate responsibility only
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for decisions of principle, and things which are less
specific, like Bradley's talk about 'my station and its
duties', are even less interfering. But I am not altog¬
ether sure of the value of these remarks, because on these
grounds it would still appear that the way to increase one's
moral respectability is through decreasing what one act¬
ually says, with the ultimate respectability accruing to
the person who says nothing. And to the extent that it is
doubtful whether being vague or ambiguous is a legitimate
way of being morally upright, it would appear that the
minimum transgression would be gained by confining one's
talk to decisions of principle.
The third consideration, however, seems to settle the
matter more satisfactorily. It lies in the difference bet¬
ween being authoritarian and being rational or argument¬
ative. I presume that no one would say that individual
freedom or responsibility was in any way at stake where
one person requests another's assent to a proposition in
geometry, physics or psychology; because he is not ordered
advised, urged or beguiled into accepting it, but rather
presented with what purport to be suitable and sufficient
grounds for making his own (free and responsible) decision
It is understood in such transactions that if the still
doubtful person desires further information or explanation
it is something to which he is entirely entitled, and that
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If it is not forthcoming, (at least in cases where it
cannot be shown to be an unjustified request), then he is
no longer to be expected to accent the conclusion. The
only sense in which he is not free is that if he simply
pays no attention* or if he says 'Yes, I see that you have
a perfectly conclusive argument, but I will not accept it',
we feel that he is a fool or a ne'er-do-well, and that he
ought either to accept it, or at least to profess nothing
which implied that it was mistaken. That is to say, the
only time his responsibility is not respected is when he
does not behave with responsibility.
I think that if moral philosophy conducted its business
on terms similar to these, it would be entitled, at least
from the point of view of the moral considerations we have
been discussing, to say anything which it found to be
susceptible of this kind of treatment, not excluding
casuistry. But by the same token, if moral principles were
found not to be so susceptible, anyone who believed the
appropriate moral tenets (e.g. about personal respons¬
ibility) would have good personal grounds for making his
ethical theorising non-practical. (But I wonder whether,
if morals were non-rational, it would matter? To claim
that he was acting against his moral principles would be
to bring a rational criticism against himj and could he
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not reply that this was inappropriate, since morals were
not a sphere where this kind of procedure was valid?)
There is another, perhaps unclassifiable type of
anxiety which one sometimes feels about this question.
'Who am I,' one may ask, 'to instruct you how to conduct
your life?' The implication is that if X were somebody
special, like God, St. Peter or President Eisenhower, it
might be in order for me to do this, but since I am only
me.... . Or perhaps it is that morals are such a fine and
holy thing that it is sacreliglous to suppose that mere
people know anything about them. Or again perhaps it is
that people, those stout, empirical, real beings one sees
on buses, know about such things, but philosophers are...
well, they're not like people. Perhaps there is some way
of explaining the matter which shows that there is a
genuine difficulty here, whatever it might be, I think
there is a very good answer to the question 'Who am I?',
- or one which would be very good, if it were true, -
and that is, 'I am somebody who knows. It may be that
other people know too, or that some people merely opine,
or even that everybody knows. But none of this detracts
from the fact that I, in any event, possess the perfect
qualification for speaking authoritatively about anything,
that is, to know something about it. And I can show that
I know something about it by presenting my knowledge in
38
the rational or argumentative form which is the only
criterion by which we human beings can decide whether
a state of knowledge prevails.' In short, the solution
of this difficulty is the same as for the previous one:
if we can do moral theory in a rational manner, the prob¬
lem vanishes.
Quite a different kind of argument derives from the
reflection that ethics, whatever it tries to do, can be
expected to be a rational investigation, This implies, for
one thing, that it cannot assume what it is trying to
prove; and from this can be deduced that it cannot use
moral criteria as the grounds of its conclusions. The
argument then says, 'Therefore it cannot be the business
of ethics to pronounce moral verdicts'. The only condition
under which this conclusion would follow would be if
moral criteria were the only possible ones for settling
moral questions. But it is by no means obvious that this
is the case. It is not the case in other disciplines.
We do not employ the conclusions of physics as their own
criteria, nor of mathematics, psychology or history; and
yet we do conduct tolerably respectable rational invest¬
igations In these sciences. It cannot therefore be merely
because In ethics we cannot use moral criteria, that
there can be no science of ethics. It would depend also
on the proposition that there can be no other criteria.
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But it is strange that we should say 'also', and
not 'entirely' here, because in any other context it would
scarcely need mentioning, that we cannot use the conclus¬
ion of an investigation as its own criterion. Why does
this need mentioning in an ethical context? I think the
reason is partly the acute temptation we are all under,
to make philosophy merely the vehicle for the expression
of our own moral views (in the doing of which we would
embrace a theory which appeared to say morally good things,
and reject those which appeared to say wicked things,
thus using moral criteria); and partly the absence of any
established alternative procedure for settling moral
questions. The fact that we do naturally tend to use
moral criteria, combined with the fact that we know no
others, leads us to think that they are the only ones
possible. But this could not be regarded as an argument
to that effect.
what we are most often given as an argument that in
ethics moral criteria are the only ones is the point that
in most sciences we have empirical criteria, but in morals,
none. This would be a strong argument, X suppose, If It
were the case that moral philosophy were the same sort
of first-order discipline that, say, physics is. But if
we make the probably more appropriate comparison between
physics and actual moral deliberations, we find that
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ethical thought is (if we must have them), not without
its empirical criteria. In empirical sciences we say 'I
will not believe P if G is not the case (since "P is
true" implies that C is the case).' Here we have made
"what is the case" decisive of what we believe; but we
have done so on a principle for which there is no empir¬
ical evidence, - the principle that if 'P Is true1 implies
that 'C' is the case, and C i3 not the case, then P is
not true. Compare this now with 'I will not blame Jones
unless he is guilty'. Here again we have made what is the
case decisive of what we do, but again we have done so
on a principle for which there can be no empirical sub¬
stantiation, - the principle that we will not blame any¬
one who has not in fact done the deed in question. One
night object that of course there are immense differences;
but there are differences too between the way we think in
physics and the way we think in psychology, and between
both of these and the way we think in history; and the
differences are not greater than we would be led to expect
fz-om the characteristically different problem involved.
You may say that in the ethical case, there is nothing to
tell us that we should ever blame anyone; but neither is
there anything to tell us we should ever believe anything.
And likewise if you say there is nothing to tell us we
should blame a person if he did a certain deed, - there
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is also nothing to tell us we should believe if 'C*
is the case. There is a background necessary to the think¬
ing in both examples. What is chiefly upsetting about the
coamarison is that other types of thinking have as their
goal some sort of abstract theory, while first-order moral
thinking has as its goal virtuous behaviour. One might
take a pragmatlst line to show that they were actually not
so unlike in this respect, - that the ultimate goal of
science was also some form of behaviour. But 1 am not so
in love with the analogy as to undertake so desperate a
measure. No good purpose would be served by so blurring
a distinction; and the most that I am anxious to maintain
is that in moral experience there takes place a form of
genuine thinking, upon which it is just as appropriate for
philosophers to meditate as It is for them to reflect on
the thinking in other areas of experience.
Another argument that ethics cannot be practical is
this: if ethics is defined as the business of convincing
people that they should behave in some specified way, then
It assumes that this is the right way to behave, and this
again runs counter to the idea of philosophy as a kind of
investigation. No Investigation assumes what it is attempt¬
ing to prove. But this too is a mistake, and it can again
best be seen to be so by a comparison with science. Physics
is something which attempts to convince people of its
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conclusions, but it could not be defined as an attempt
to convince people of any specific conclusions. It is not,
for example, the study of how to convince people of the
'law of universal gravitation', - for then a further
science would be necessary to discover this and other laws.
it could be said to be its business to prove to people
whatever, in its sphere of interest, is found to be prov¬
able. And if the same were said of ethics, no problem
would arise. But perhaps this does not quite meet the
difficulty, which lies in the rather curious identification
of 'being practical' with convincing people of something
specified in advance. I think this identification can
partly be explained by the fact that morals existed before
any particular moral philosopher began his meditations,
and we are therefore tempted to think that he is only
rationalising what is already there (specified in advance).
But this consideration has no logical tendency to bind a
philosopher to agree with what is generally believed, or
to prevent him from saying things which are new and dif¬
ferent; - and in any case it does make a significant dif¬
ference to Know something, as distinct from merely having
an opinion about it. In spite of the fact that it has
always been believed in my family that the world is round,
tay youthful assent to this proposition when I was first
introduced to the arguments upon which it is based, can
be regarded as a piece of perfectly genuine, if low-order
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rational thinking, not merely as a rationalization of a
view which 1 would have held whether I thought it out or
not. And there are cases, too, in which pre-existing
beliefs have been raised to the level of science. There
were hello-centric and atomic theories before ever they
became knowledge, and there has probably never been a
scientific theory propounded with reapect to which there
did not pre-exist spate view, either in agreement of dis¬
agreement ,
But perhaps it is not as simple as this, - there is
a deep Inclination to think that it is acceptable enough
for mere scientific views to be mistaken. They do not
matter. But it does matter if people's ethical views are
mistaken. The world would be all wrong if there were much
possibility of this. (It is unthinkable that for centuries
people should have been consigned to hell in droves, mere¬
ly because no philosopher had yet appeared, smart enough
to set theai straight.) Yet if there is some sense in this,
the way I have expressed it is both exaggerated and unreal¬
istic. It is unrealistic because if there is a hell, one
can say without aid of moral knowledge that people have in
fact been consigned there in droves. One has only to
survey the disagreement, indecision, Indifference and
rebelliousness towards morals which have always prevailed
to know this. If this means that there is something "all
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wrong" about the world, then there Just is something all
wrong about it. And it is exaggerated, because to say
that there is a possibility of knowing as distinct from
opining in morals makes no prognosis whatever about how
right or wrong past generations may be seen to be when
such knowledge is acquired.
I hope I will not appear to be flaying the subject
too hard if I advance two more conjectures as to why
this argument looks good. The first is that we tend to
think that morals are so Important that it cannot poss¬
ibly matter what means of achieving conviction about moral
questions are employed, so long as they produce results.
And we therefore think that if anyone is interested in
practical questions, he will always be found to employ
all manner of bad reasoning, of which the question-begging
here under discussion is only one instance. The perils of
any kind of activity, however, are not usually a good
argument for total abstinence.
My final conjecture is that some of us are so settled
in the opinion that there can be no rational discussion
of moral questions that we think It unnecessary to mention
it in an argument of this sort; but it would follow from
this that any attempt to purvey practical enlightenment
would be unphilosophical. It would take more than a few
deft strokes to defeat this assumption. Suffice it to say
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that if it were granted, there would be no need to employ
such a round-about argument as the one we have discussed,
to show that ethics cannot be practical. To say that morals
are irrational is the same thing as to say that no moral
proposition can be philosophically established.
One final argument says that since moral propositions
say something directly 1*0 people in a way that other prop¬
ositions do not, there is a special necessity that people
should be persuaded of them, and therefore all moral arg¬
uments are persuasive. Other propositions may make some
claim upon one's assent ('This is true, and if you do not
believe it, you are mistaken'), but they are about some¬
thing else, and do not directly express concern whether
people accept them, moral propositions do directly express
such concern, - they are about nothing other than what
one should believe, - and are therefore inherently per¬
suasive. (But persuasive arguments are not good enough
for philosophy, and therefore philosophy cannot be pract¬
ical. )
But again the answer is not far to seek: the technical
definition of a persuasive argument is that it seeks to
procure belief without more regard for logical respect¬
ability than is necessary to this end, and this is why it
acquires and deserves no philosophical popularity. But not
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all instances of persuading people are instances of the
use of 'persuasive arguments'. Sometimes a good argument
will persuade, and if philosophers confine themselves to
the use of good arguments, no difficulty need arise.
Sometimes, of course, only a bad argument will do the Job;
but in such cases there is no proper course for a philos¬
opher but to abstain.
One scarcely knows how far it is either gracious or
useful to explore the dark recesses of this issue; but I
think I iiay take it that I have now removed all the more
obvious general objections to being casuistical In phil¬
osophy. But whether or not I am right about this, there
are two things I have not established: (i) I have not est¬
ablished that there Is nothing standing In the way of
this type of philosophy; - it will certainly happen that
some casuistical things philosophers would like to say
will not meet the required standards, and it might happen
that all such things so failed. It might also happen that
individual philosophers could not reconcile being casuis¬
tical with their own moral standards. But these are things
which can only be decided ad hoc, (ii) I have not shown
that moral philosophy must be casuistical. I take It that
the conditions under which one could make this latter
claim would be (a) If all conceivable ways of doing ethics
could be shown to have casuistical uses, - that is to say,
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if there are conditions under which the acceptance of
their conclusions could logically snake a moral difference;
or (b) if nothing could be said to be a type of moral
theory which did not involve or depend upon some moral
assumptions. The most obvious way in which this condition
could be satisfied would be if it could be shown that the
only adequate way of distinguishing moral science from
others like history, anthroDOlogy, psychology, etc., was
by reference to some form of moral criteria. But neither
of the conditions is easily fulfilled: if a way of doing
ethics which had no casuistical uses were suggested, there
would be a temptation to say it can not really be ethics,
because ethics by definition has casuistical uses; and
similarly with the question of whether a type of theory
Involved moral assumptions. It would apnear, therefore,
that in order respectably to consider the problem, it
would be necessary to have some independent criterion of
what constitutes an instance (a genuine instance) of
ethical theory. But on the other hand, if one were there¬
by enabled to reach the conclusion that ethics must be
casuistical, then this would Itself become a criterion
of 'genuine' ethical theory. For my part, I cannot think
what other criteria would be either less arbitrary or
more appropriate, and to this extent I would be inclined
to let the matter rest with the bald assertion that this
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Is the fundamental difference between ethics and other
*
kinds of investigation. But such an assertion might be
met with such a reply as, 'There are masses of instances
in the history of ethics of theories lacking all pract¬
ical import, and although there may be no way of showing
that these are in fact genuine Instances of moral theor¬
ising, still it would be too arbitrary and oaradoxical,
to maintain, merely on the ground that they had no pract¬
ical import, that they were not in fact ethical theory';
and in view of this I am bound at least to give some
examples of the way such theories do in fact have pract¬
ical import.
First, one or two examoles of theories which have
casuistical uses. We all tend to think that it is a matter
of no great consequence how we use words, as long as they
are used intelligently and not deliberately misused for
purposes of deception, concealment, etc., and we therefore
suppose that there can be no casuistical overtones in any
project to analyse moral language. And yet in the process
two sorts of thing are found to happen; the 'analysis'
contains a message of direct moral Interest; or it is
Indirectly casuistical in the sense that it represents
or bespeaks a soeclal moral outlook. An example of the
former is Mr. Nowell-Smith's analysis of 'advising'*,
* In Ethics. Chanter Two.
99
where he says, amongst other Interesting things, that
'advice' is addressed to a free, rational agent who can
accept or reject it, and that it is offered as a solution
to the problem of the person to whom it is given (rather
than as an expression of the tastes, moral opinions, etc.,
of the giver of it). If everyone behaved as if he under¬
stood this, it might not be so obvious that it constitutes
a piece of direct moral enlightenment. But it is not
universally recognized, and there are many conditions
under which 'seeing it' could make important practical
differences, (Of course 'seeing it' is probably not anal-
ysable as "coming to understand that this is what 'advis¬
ing' means", but rather as "coming to realize that where
a situation occurs which can amongst other ways be des¬
cribed as 'my being asked for advice', the intelligent or
rational way to respond to it is a way which respects the
other person's freedom, and tries to solve his problem".
Is it not stretching a point to say that the word 'advise'
plays any but an accidental role in this bit of business?)
An example of being indirectly casuistical is the
analysis of 'ought words' as 'Imperatives', where this
means that they are importantly analogous to the orders
of sergeant-majors, prime ministers or company presidents.
It is difficult to feel any sort of direct moral reproach
if one does not personally use ought words in this way;
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and yet one feels that the analysis does in some way
represent a moral point of view on the part of its author.
He may be disagreeing with you as to whether, when you
say he ought to do something, and he says he ought not to
do it, there exists 'real disagreement'(and this would
have extensive practical implications), or he may be a
tolerance maniac, who thinks that if moral Judgments are
painted in a distasteful manner then people will become
much more hesitant about making them. Of course these are
the merest conjectures, and it might be said that no
ulterior motive existed, - that 'ought words' had simply
been taken and analysed, and that was the result. Do it
yourself and you will find that whatever your moral feel¬
ings, if you do the Job squarely and properly, you will
get the same result. If there were a 'square and proner'
procedure for analysing words, then of course this would
settle the matter. But what does an analysis consist of?
For my part I see three and only three ways of interpret¬
ing the 'are' in propositions like "ought words 'are'
imperatives": (i) morally - 'they are so for the truly
moral person*, (ii) logically - 'This is the only under¬
standing on which they make sense', and (iii) empirically
- 'this is the way people do behave' (i.e. like sergeant-
majors, or whatever else the word 'imperative' is meant
to convey). The first alternative directly establishes
my case; and while the second and third do not carry any
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direct moral implication, they do invite one to add 'and
this is morally abhorrent, therefore...', or 'and since
this is quite acceptable (and we hadn't realized it before),
we are morally the wiser'. I presume that no philosopher
would like to admit that he conceived it a serious scholar¬
ly undertaking to record observations about people like
'they behave like sergeant-majors', and I also assume that
it would require more than the usual amount of analysis
to establish conclusions on either of the former two kinds
of terms. I therefore think that neither is 'analysis' the
clear-cut, 'objective' procedure which would provide the
material for a knock-down reply to such suspicions as I
have been voicing, nor is it inappropriate to ask such
questions as I have been asking, of a man who, after all,
calls his theory 'moral philosophy'. One can see clear
possibilities of moral implications in what he says, and
if it is not for the sake of these that he says it, then
why does he say it?
I will now give an example of an ethical investigation
presupposing a moral point of view. When we ask a question
like 'How do we learn to be moral?', we might suppose
that we were instigating a purely disinterested psycho¬
logical investigation, for which a man from ±>4ars would
be as well equipped as anyone, as long as he was reason¬
ably versed in the techniques of empirical psychology.
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But now suppose that the answer turns out to be that we
learn through being told things by our elders and betters,
through being hedged about with an elaborate system of
rewards and punishments, praise and blame, etc., and
through doing good deeds. If this answer were supposed to
be the whole story about moral learning, it should be
fairly plain that it could (logically) only be true, given
that the moral life had certain characteristics, about
its possession of which one might quite reasonably dis¬
agree, The most obvious of these are: (i) It could not be
true if morality did not consist of a body of traditional
beliefs not determined in any rational manner, (ii) It
takes the business of being virtuous to be a business of
following a set of rules, (ill) It assumes that but for
the sanctions which are contrived concerning it, one
would never have any motive for being good, - that virtue
is something about which we are naturally reluctant, and
that our prime motivation is the pursuit of our own pleas¬
ure, And (lv) it implies that if we are ever in doubt
about what is the right thing to do, the sole and suffic¬
ient way to resoltoe this doubt is to enquire what is
generally believed about the matter. In short, virtue is
conceived to be the tedious nuisance most of us found it
to be in our youth, when our poor parents had such a
struggle to keep us from squabbling, fighting and destroy¬
ing the furniture.
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Of course it .nay be that sort of thing. But it is
not something which is to be assumed without question.
And if we began with a different concept of it, - if we
conceived it to be a form of intelligent activity, to
which one could apply oneself with enthusiasm, curiosity
and delight, as one can to mathematics or chemistry, then
we could scarcely offer this kind of analysis of the
process of learning it. I presume that no one would
suggest that a conscientious method of teaching the Pyth¬
agorean theorem would be to offer students rewards for
believing it (although it might be reasonable enough at
first to offer children candy for attending classes in
mathematics). For my part, I find it hard to believe that
the perpetual popularity of this dull-witted theory of
learning is due either to a serious contemplation of the
facts or to the moral blindness of those who subscribe
to it. Gould it be that it is propounded, not as a dis¬
interested psychological conclusion, but as a kind of
shock treatment for people who are perhaps all too inclined
to regard their principles as absolute, - or as a way of
forcing people to realize what it is too casuistical to
say explicitly, that an active concern over morals can
be a form of intelligent activity?
These comments on particular theories are, however,
ad hoc, and no amount of them would ever establish the
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universal conclusion that ethics .gust be practical, with
sufficient labour it could conceivably be shown that there
has never been an instance of ethical theory which is not
in some sense 'practical*, but it is not necessary to
venture an opinion as to what a thorough examination of
the history of ethics would reveal in this regard, because
no accumulation of evidence would provide more than an
Outsider's Argument to the effect that these philosophers
were not mistaken in their conception of moral philosophy.
But I think we might lay down some criteria by which
one could answer the question, Can ethics be non-practical?
It can be if (i) it raaites no direct claim either on the
behaviour, or on the thinking, attitudes or moods immed¬
iately connected with such behaviour, of the moral agent;
(ii) if it does not presuppose anything which would play
the role described in '(i)', and about which there could
possibly be any difference of opinion; but (iii) is never¬
theless of such a nature that there are some grounds for
calling it an ethical, rather than a sociological, hist¬
orical, psychological, or any other kind of investigation.
I cannot think of any way of satisfying the third condition
which does not at the same time over-ride one of the
first two, and to that extent I think that ethics must
be 'practical'. But since I take it that we are, with
some qualifications, at any event at liberty to be
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practical, it does not appear to matter greatly whether
we must be, or not.
Chapter Four.
Having argued in the previous chapter that moral philos¬
ophy is entitled to say things of practical importance
so long as it presents them rationally or argumentatively,
I shall now assume that some form of practical enlighten¬
ment is what we are looking for, and ask what method of
investigation it is appropriate to follow.
I should first attempt to make clearer than I have
so far done, the distinction between a method of invest¬
igation and a procedure of justification, upon which 1
have already remarked in Chapter Two. When a practiced
theorist stands at a point in his investigations which
lies between having a problem and itnowing the solution
to it, he is not completely at a loss. He is not faced
with a choice between either merely waiting until a sol¬
ution occurs to him, or merely doing things, keeping busy,
in the hope that something he does may yield the desired
solution. But on the other hand, he does not ordinarily
have available to him any procedure which he can be con¬
fident will solve his problem, - any recipe for making
knowledge. What he is able to do is make enlightened
guesses, with the emphasis falling equally on both words.
His guesses are enlightened, - they can be classed as
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intelligent behaviour; - but they are also guesses. There
is no guarantee that they will produce valuable results.
Since they are intelligent behaviour, it would not be
Inappropriate to attempt to systematize them into some¬
thing which could be called a science. An example of such
an attempt, one might say, would be Mill's 'canonB of
induction'. If you want to find the cause of a given kind
of epidemic, it is an intelligent procedure to compare
the conditions prevailing where such epidemics occur
with those prevailing where none occurs, and it may be
that the cause will be found to lie in the differences
so discovered. Finding the differences is not the same
thing as finding the cause, - it only provides you with
something definite to worx on, where otherwise you would
be confronted with bafflement.
Rules of investigation can only be formulated with
reference to suppositions about what it would be like to
have the answer. In this case, we suppose nature to be
such that precisely the same conditions will yield prec¬
isely the same results. This is what makes it intelligent
to search for a cause by analysing for differences. What
makes it only an intelligent and not a guaranteed proc¬
edure is that we also assume that in nature conditions
are not repeated with sufficient precision for our pur¬
poses, and that not all the conditions prevailing at a
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given time have anything important to do with a partic¬
ular result. When we have made an enlightened guess, there¬
fore, as to what is the cause of a given state of affairs,
we must go about trying artificially to produce the prec¬
ision which nature does not afford, by means of what we
call 'controlled experiments'. These are designed (a) to
make a sequence of events precisely repeatable, and (b)
to eliminate non-operative factors by varying the condit¬
ions until we find the minimum antecedents which will
produce the result in question. When we have reached this
stage, and carefully checked all our reasoning and observ¬
ations, we feel entitled to say we have discovered the
cause. One might therefore try to say that investigational
procedures could be turned into recipes by making them
sufficiently precise and complete, adding sufficient
qualifications, etc. The reason this will not do is partly
that there is no way of ascertaining when we have noticed
all the samenesses or differences between two states of
affairs, partly that nature is perverse. If we address
sufficiently exact questions to her, she will always
answer them, but she will not always provide the answer
we seek.
If we ask, how do we know that the same conditions
Invariably produce the same results? - the answer seems
to be (a) that we do not know it in advance of our invest-
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igations, and (to) that It is not something which is
substantiated by our investigations. We think that the
same conditions will produce the same results, not because
we know nature to be like that, but because it expresses
the condition under which alone we can hope to have a
science. It is the nature of a science to consist of
unlversals, and in the context of successions of events,
the only universal element which can be expected is that
of Invariable succession. Finding these in nature is a
bit like 'finding' a piece of sculpture in a piece of
stone - we go at nature with hammer and chi«el until we
find what we are looking for. In a sense it was there all
along, but so were multitudes of other shapes. When we
find an invariable succession, it is either untrue or
meaningless to say 'Nature is like that*. It is untrue
if it means that this garden where I sit with the sun
splashing on the roses and the wind tittering the trees
displays any direct evidence of it; and it is tautologous
if it means that when you conduct such and such an exactly
controlled experiment, you will find that such and such
results ensue, no matter how often the experiment is
repeated.
If it is true that it is the idea of a science which
is the ultimate determinant of what constitutes knowledge
in that science, then by analogy we could expect that the
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Idea of a moral science which we have been outlining
will determine, not only what sort of thing will qualify
as a result, but what method of investigation will be
suited to the pursuit of such a result. If we regarded
the distinctions drawn in the first two chapters as a
sketch of the conditions under which we could affirm a
true universal, then we could say that it was this for
which we were seeking. In order to exploit this suggest¬
ion, I would like first to confess the Kantian inspiration
of what I have so far said, and then to discuss Kant's
further line of reasoning.
What I have said about scientific reasoning may without
too great violence be taken to rperesent Kant's train of
thought in the Critique of Pure Reason. Turning thence
to morals, his next step was to say something like this:
"Since any science is in search of its appropriate trus
universal, and morality has to do with actions governed
by maxims, it is plain that if we make the maxim of our
action such that it could be a universal law of behaviour,
this must be the special nature of the moral universal".
If we refer back at this point to the corresponding
reasoning about causes, we find that the universal, when
taken together (or as Rant says, "schematized") with the
idea of temporal succession, gives us the idea that a
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causal state of affairs is one where a given succession
of events occurs universally; and this information tells
us, not what is the cause of what, but how to look for,
how to identify an instance of a causal relation.* We
might therefore have expected to find a similar state of
affairs prevailing in ethics; - Instead, Kant's argument
appears to say that we can decide completely a priori
what maxim to adopt in any particular connection, such
as telling lies, keeping promises, etc. Or if this is
not Kant's understanding of it, his universal law prin¬
ciple at least does not provide us with any rule for the
inclusion of any empirical elements in our reckoning.
One might at this stage be led to seek for such a
rule in some form of abstract reasoning, - casting about
amongst moral factors for some place to locate a univer¬
sal element. This might prove successful, but it is un¬
likely to do so. There are all manner of moral factors,
and there are many ways in which, with varying degrees
of plausibility, we might relate them according to a
* See Critique of Pure Reaaori. A 180, B 222: "(In phil¬
osophy analogy is such that) from three given members we
can obtain a priori knowledge only of the relation to a
fourth, not of the fourth member itself. The relation
yields, however, a rule for seeking the fourth member in
experience, and a mark whereby it can be detected."
(Kemp Smith translation.)
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rule. There is no forseeable point at which we could be
satisfied, in the abstract, that what was posited was a
proper and sufficient rule.
How then may we proceed? - Again the best clue may
be found by reverting to the causal analysis. What hap¬
pened there was that we meditated upon the thinking which
actually goes on in scientific investigations, and so
discovered the universal element it contained. For us
philosophers, such an Investigation is not significantly
a priori, at least not more so than it is for the man
whose thought we are contemplating. We might therefore
hope to profit from pursuing the same method in ethics, -
contemplating the thinking which actually goes on in the
moral life, with a view to discovering what universal
elements it contains, - or perhaps one should say, what
characteristics it adopts merely on account of their
universality.
From the scientific analogy we may extract a further
point. The account above given of reasoning about causes
since it was intended only to display a pattern of anal¬
ysis, was brief and sketchy, and represented only one
strain amongst many of scientific reasoning about causes,
and nothing of any other form of reasoning which may form
part of the total complex of scientific thought. Because
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of the fragmentary nature of what was there said, it
would not pass as 'the philosophy of science', but only
as a very small part of it. Similarly we should not
exnect the work of ethical theory to be done at one
stroke, but rather, that it should be a laborious business
of sorting out different strains of moral thinking,
investigating their relations or want of relation to one
another, displaying such Incidentals as the invitations
to error which their logic provides, etc.
It is important to note that when we are engaged
in philosophic meditation about science, we would never
think of trying to weld into one theory, widely differ¬
ing scientific meditations on the same subject matter,
such as Ptolemaic and Newtonian astronomy, but would
always take as an object of study a view which either
was propounded by one man, or could logically be held
as one theory. Nothing but confusion could result from
trying to think at the same time about two character¬
istically different scientific phenoaena, We would be
well advised to follow the same advice in ethics. I
shall presently discuss the reasons for our systematic
avoidance of this wisdom in the past.
Finally I should like to point out that there appears
no reason why the philosophy of science should not be
casuistical, at least with resnect to the logical form
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of scientific thinking. It is common for philosophers of
science to make some prefatory remarks to the effect that
nothing is farther from their thoughts than the intention
to Instruct scientists how to conduct their business. This
is understandable enough if it merely expresses an unwill¬
ingness to make any predictions as to what scientists will
or must find to be the case, but beyond this I can see no
reason for such reticence. Mone of us has ever displayed
much bashfulness about criticising Ptolemaic astronomy or
armchair psychology; and if we can with justice criticise
dead modes of thought, I cannot think what difference the
fact that a mistake is still alive should make. Perhaps
this may be put more strongly this way: if we cannot rec¬
ognize that a bit of thinking is logical or scientific,
then we cannot do philosophy of science; if we can ident¬
ify what is logical, and can do philosophy, we can by the
same token Identify what fails to be logical; and if we
know that a mistake exists, there can be no philosophical
reason why we should not say so. From this I would not
infer that it was the whole object of the philosophy of
science to instruct scientists in their business. The prim¬
ary object must be simply to understand what is going on.
But if the study of the work of good scientists provides
a way of instructing bad ones, or in a prehaps unlikely
event, reveals shortcomings in the work of even good
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scientists, why should we file these away in a drawer
marked 'Top Secret'?
The remarks above about the necessity of taking one
body of thought as an object of study have some interest¬
ing implications. They seem to imply that we must seek
out one man, whose moral thinking will be the basis of
our investigations. I say one man, because although there
may be many like him, there would be no obvious profit
in multiplying cases; and if there were others unlike
him, then according to the above reasoning we should have
to take either him or one of them, not both.*
It will be a fairly important question, which man we
elect. Should we institute a search for Aristotle's
"practically wise man"? And if so, by what criteria will
he be chosen? To use moral criteria would be question-
begging; and to say 'we will take him to be wise if he
is regarded as wise', would be to use an Outsider's Arg¬
ument in a subject setting itself up as an insider's
investigation. There is a third alternative: choose the
man upon whom your methods of investigation work. On the
* Note that one of Aristotle's reasons for saying that
ethics must be a sloppy business was that "there is much
difference of opinion" about morals. (See the passage
quoted on p.55» footnote.) He could not have a genuine
science because he chose to meditate on a multitude of
different moral systems at the same time.
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face of it, this sounds odd, - it bears startling resembl¬
ances to the well-known fallacy of representing in sub¬
stantiation of an empirical theory those instances which
do support it, and ignoring those which do not. But the
resemblance is only superficial: there is no prospect of
justifying a philosophical theory by saying it is based
on the thinking of a good man, or of good men. The quest¬
ion whether or not our theory is any good will be decided
according to whether or not we have found a true univer¬
sal. This is the principle on which our method is based.
We are either confident of the principle, or we are not.
If we are, then we are quite entitled to adopt this bit
of procedure; and if we are not, then we can only go out
of business until we find some other principle on which
to operate. But when we do this, we will again be in the
same position: we can either choose that body of thinking
upon which our method works, or we can choose another
method.
But we are not yet out of the woods. It now appears
open to us to go about applying our method of investig¬
ation until we find some person upon whom It works. But
there are two difficulties in this project. The first lies
in the inaccessibility of the information. In conducting
a philosophical study of empirical science we do not en¬
counter this difficulty, because here people write treat-
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ises, text books and learned articles in which by and
large their thoughts can be taken to be expressed care¬
fully, clearly and thoroughly. Ordinary moral discourse,
however, not being conducted under the same critical pres¬
sure, and making such extensive claims on the individual
that it is less likely to be done with philosophical calm,
care and precision, is inclined to be a very low-quality
product, even if the deliberations which it expresses
happen to be of a high standard. We therefore have to
search, not only for the 'practically wise man', but for
one with a fine talent for expressing his wisdom.
The second difficulty is that even if we find such a
rare specimen, what he tells us will mean nothing unless
we can re-think his thoughts in such a way as to become
conscious of their logic or rationality. This, after all,
is what we are seeking; and yet it is not a distinct char¬
acteristic of any bit of discourse, any more than necess¬
ary connexion is an observable feature of a causal sequ¬
ence of events. (Which part of a syllogism is its validity?;
Putting these two reflections together, and considering
that whereas only some men are practising scientists, all
men, including ourselves, are In some sense practising
moralists, I think it becomes fairly plain that the sens¬
ible way to have it is that the moral thinking which phil¬
osophers should investigate is their own moral thinking.
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This way, difficulties of communication are largely over¬
come: when we report to ourselves about ourselves, there
need not be serious doubt about the accuracy, extent or
relevance of the information received; we can ask ourselves
questions simply and quickly without the elaborate explan¬
ations of what it is we want to know which are required if
we ask the same queetion of another person; there need not
be any problem arising from modesty or reticence; and most
of all, where other people are available for an interview
here and there, we have ourselves around fairly constantly,
we can become familiar with ourselves to a high degree, and
we needn't worry about wasting precious time if we linger
over questions which may be of the greatest significance,
but which may on the face of it appear quaint, frivolous
or perverse.
On the other hand, if we invite the practically wise
man to tell us how he conceives this business of morality,
he may ramble on, telling us about his favorite grievances,
or about the moral trials he has faced in the past, or his
early family life. If we succeed in persuading him to tell
us the sort of things we are anxious to learn, he may yet
mislead us through being unclear, incomplete or unsystem¬
atic. We could conceivably right such shortcomings through
sufficiently well-aimed questioning, but the only condition
under which we could do this would be if our questions were
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prompted, by our own notion of morality; and if we possessed
this qualification, we might as weli leave other practic¬
ally wise men unmolested.
I said earlier that we had in the past systematically
avoided the choice of one person's thought as an object
of philosophical investigation. X thin* this is partly
because a great deal of philosophical activity concerning
morals begins with distress over the prevalence of moral
disagreement, and is directed towards finding a way of
reconciling these multitudinous conflicts. This, when one
thinks of it, is a staggeringly ambitious scheme, and one
in which success is most improbable, because what can one
do but add yet another disagreeing voice to the general
clamour? But even if we should accept this a6 the task of
philosophy, it would not follow that we should linger over
the varying views longer than was necessary to discover
the dimensions of our problem. It would still be reason¬
able to expect that the Great Reconciling Light, whatever
more imposing characteristics it possessed, would at least
be one well-integrated system, such as you might expect
one man's thought to be, but could scarcely expect that
of two or more people to be.
But the more important reason lies in what I have
been maintaining, - that if I am to study one person's
moral thinking, the obvious candidate is myself. One may
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(and I do) suspect that in the history of ethics, the
experience of any given philosopher has in fact provided
the ultimate source of ideas; but philosophers have at
any rate professed to embrace every possloie alternative,
from canvassing the views widely held, eliminating excess
and ambiguity and ironing out Inconsistencies, (Aristotle
and W.D. Ross*), to moral psychology (Butler and Hume),
and studying history (.larx) and evolution (Spencer). It
would not be inappropriate at this point to consider and
criticise some of these alternative methods, particularly
since none of thea is yet dead. But to do it thoroughly
would be a very lengthy task; and in any case, since the
day when we were informed of the "naturalistic fallacy",
the problem has not been so much that they are not dead,
as that they will not lie down. But assuming, as I think
I may, that all such methods have a drastic implausibility
* See Foundations of Ethics. (Oxford), pp. 1 and 3: "I
taxe as my starting-point the existence of a large body
of beliefs and convictions to the effect that there are
certain kinds of acts that ought to be done, and certain
kinds of things that ought to be brought into existence.
Our object must be to compare them with each other, and
to study them in themselves, with a view to seeing which
best survive such examination, and which must be rejected."
"Our attempt must be to make these thoughts little by
little more definite and distinct, and by comparing one
opinion with another to discover at what point each opinion
must be purged of excess and mis-statement till it becomes
harmonious with other opinions which have been purified
in the same way." "This is the time-honoured method of
ethics. It was the method of Socrates and Plato. ... It
was the method of Aristotle. ... Kant's method was the
same."
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about the®, and assuming, (what may not be altogether
true), that they are all undertaken as ways of avoiding
the study of our own moral experience, I would like to
ask, what is it that has so driven us away from the method
I am advocating?
In the last chapter I mentioned some considerations
of personal embarrassment, which might equally be operative
here. I may feel that I cannot surely presume to have
knowledge of so holy a thing as virtue; or that it is
graceless of me to say that I do, when this implies that
I am superior to other mortals. There are no doubt cases
in which these points are very well taken; but they surely
have no general validity. If it is reasonable to think
that anybody knows about virtue, it is reasonable to
think that I may do so, and Indeed it is absurd to pretend
that I do not if, as a philosopher I am engaged in telling
people about it; and to say that I do know about virtue
carries no implication as to what other people know. It
would be pointless, perhaps to do philosophy in any
casuistical manner if you thought that everybody was as
well-instructed morally as yourself; but that some people
could profit from such instruction is what no one denies.
Meed I argue this point further? Do let us assume that
all such misgivings are unnecessary.
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A rather different sort of reason derives from the
well-known proneness of human kind to err. I think a little
differently today about some moral issues from what I
thought yesterday, and considerably differently about
most all moral issues from what I thought ten years ago.
It is therefore not unreasonable to expect that ten years
hence I shall again have changed my views considerably;
and if this is so, what can be said for a philosophical
argument which relies on today's thinking? This difficulty
would not provide a reason for turning for safety to the
views of other people, which can be assumed to be similar¬
ly infected; but it might at least provide a reason for
turning away from one's own views.
To say in reply to this that it is simply the nature
of a scrupulous morality to be in continual change, and
that philosophy cannot be expected to provide final answers,
is to say something from which I would not wish to dissent;
and yet it would relieve the difficulty only if there were
some specifiable common principles governing the changes,
for otherwise philosophy would have nothing to say except
that "change is everywhere". It should be noted, however,
that to agree that perpetual change is in the nature of
morality is to cancel any tendency this difficulty has to
make us look anywhere else for the sake of finality. You
might say that when we change our minds, we do It accord-
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ing to some principles; and this of course Is often true.
But often we change our minds without any clear awareness
of any principle, and sometimes we make ultimate decisions
(or we find on thinking about it afterwards that we have
done so), in respect of which we cannot even imagine upon
what principle they might have been made. I therefore
think that if it were assumed that in philosophy we were
looking for a principle or principles having direct pre¬
scriptive force, like the "Greatest Happiness Principle",
or the rules of thumb we exchange in ordinary discourse,
this argument would prove (a) that we could not look to
our own experience for it, but (b) that we could not look
elsewhere for it, either.
But it is not necessary to assume this. If there are
any changes we make on purely logical grounds, these are
not deduced from, or subsumed under any prescriptive prin¬
ciple, but are, so to speax immediately recognized as
proper or valid. We might conceivably formulate prescript¬
ive logical rules, ll&e 'if you have said "All men are
mortal", then you must affirm mortality of everything of
which it can be said, "This is a man"'. But this would be
an absurd thing to do, for at least two reasons: (i) we
would need further rules for subsuming any given bit of
business under the rules, and further rules for subsumption
under the rules of subsumption, ad infinitum, and (il),
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either the rules would he themselves derived from an intuit¬
ive grast) or immediate recognition of their propriety -
the propriety of doing the things they recommended, - or
they would be merely arbitrary, and logic would be deprived
of its peculiar force or necessity.* Sut I shall have more
to say of this in Chapter Five.
Finally, I think we have always (quite rightly) felt
that we cannot use arguments of the form, 'This is true
because I think bo', or 'because I am convinced of it',
or 'feel it very strongly', or 'because I have so exper¬
ienced it'. In short, we cannot ground philosophical
arguments on our own experience, emotions or feelings.
But to use this argument for the present purpose betrays
a lack of awareness of the distinction between a method
of investigation and a method of Justification. I have
proposed that our* method of investigation should consist
in a study of our own moral experience; but the form of
Justification I have proposed is that any conclusions we
* Is there any sense in the widespread contemporary talk
about 'the rules governing the use of concepts'? We might
be better able to make up our minds about this if these
rules were specified sometimes, rather than merely referred
to. For my part, I have neither enjoyed any instruction
in such rules, nor have I figured out for myself what
they are, or set up my own rules in any other way. And
when I use words, I am not conscious of my obedience to
any rules, - although my feelings of responsibility vary
from use to use, and one of the ways of explaining this
would be to say that my feeling of responsibility varied
as the degree to which my usage conformed to 'the rules'.
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reach should be acceptable If they are recognizable as
a true universal. Since there is no suggestion that we
should use moral experience as the ground of an argument,
the point, although in some contexts well taken, can here
have no relevance.
It is interesting to ask, however, whether there
could ever be a general rule against the use of personal
experience as an object of investigation. I think it
should be plain enough that if we have any method of
proving any conclusions we reach, it should be entirely
Irrelevant, by what means we have acquired them, (and
to this extent the prevalence of the rule in question
may be symptomatic of a deep irrationality in moral phil¬
osophy. If we entertain no definite prospect of Justify¬
ing our conclusions, then the type of argument mentioned
in the last paragraph is all that we are left with, and
the rule becomes quite plausible.) But there are certain¬
ly occasions upon which it would be very poor advice to
suggest an examination of personal experiences if we want¬
ed to discover the specific gravity of lead, for example.
But in these cases it is not the intrinsic peril of per¬
sonal experience which warns us against it, - it is just
that this Is not what our statements purport to be about.
There is another aspect of the matter which requires
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to be mentioned. If I am right in contending that moral
philosophy is a specific kind of analysis of the moral
experience of the theorist, it would appear to follow
that the calibre of the resulting theory will vary accord¬
ing to the moral calibre of its author. One might object
to this either on the ground that it would prevent a lot
of people from being moral philosophers, or that it would
result in the appearance of queer specimens of philosoph¬
ising, based on quaint, cranky or queer moral outlooks.
I would certainly agree that the method has this tendency,
but I do not think that this constitutes a genuine ground
of objection. Whatever method is advocated, there will
always be good and bad practitioners of it, and there will
also always be those who refuse to adopt it. There just is
a profusion of queer specimens of philosophising, and of
aspiring philosophers who would be much better advised to
do something else. Of course, if we were, by this method,
bound to accent as good philosophy anything which was in
fact based on the experience of its author, then the
objection would be a strong one. But we have also set up
a criterion of good philosophy, which makes no specific
reference to the method of investigation. Once we have
decided that a specimen is bad philosophy, we are Invited
to explain this either by the quaint moral outlook of its
author, or by whether or not he has followed the suggested
method. But we could never use any of these references as
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the criterion. In case any philosopher is made anxious
by the thought that he may not be a sufficiently good
man to perform his function, he may find some reassurance
in the reflection that, as 1 began by saying, remarks
about procedure only count as intelligent advice. It is
logically possible that one might secure the necessary
information by some such procedure as cross-examining
the practically wise man. The argument against doing so
only demonstrates the unlikeliness of it.
Ay argument in this chapter has taz.en a form which
may fail to carry conviction for either of two reasons, -
one may have doubts either about the claim that knowledge
always consists in the discovery of a true universal, or
about the extensively used analogy between scientific
thinking and moral thinking. And since the former claim
Itself rests on the latter analogy (or at least employs
it), I will add here a discussion of this kind of proc¬
edure. There is an age-old difficulty in philosophical
discussions of knowledge; we cannot say (or at least we
cannot say as a synthetic proposition), that 'since all
knowledge is characterized by X, therefore possessing X
will be the mark of knowledge in field M', because either
the premiss is a generalization from all fields of know¬
ledge including M, in which case the argument is analytic,
or the premiss is an incomplete generalization, in which
4
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case we do not have an argument. I can see two ways of
avoiding the difficulty, but X am not sure that either
of them is entirely satisfactory.
The first points out the absurdity of the alternative:
suopose one were to say 'In all fields except M, knowledge
is characterized by X, but in M it is characterized by Y'.
One could then be required most urgently to explain why
one called both phenomena 'Knowledge'. One might reply
to this that they were each called knowledge by their
authors or proponents. ->ut this would not solve the diff¬
iculty, because on the one hand it would leave unanswered
both the question, why do thev call the respective phen¬
omena 'knowledge', and the question whether those who
cailed what was characterized by X 'knowledge' were using
the word 'knowledge' in the same sense as it was used by
those who called what was characterized by Y, 'knowledge';
and on the other hand it would not explain why you, the
episteisologist, have adopted the same usage. After all
one does not have to talk in any particular way, and
when one nurports to be a philosopher one can at a minimum
be expected to use words responsibly; and this means
having some better reason for adopting a terminology,
than that it happens to be used (perhaps carelessly) by
other people. One can at least be expected to understand
and agree with their reasons.
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But if it is true that a variety of phenomena must
share at least one significant characteristic before it
makes sense to call them all by the same name, we still
are not entitled to turn this around in such a way that
from the observation that modes of knowledge A to L
possess characteristic X, we can infer that M will possess
the sane characteristic, because while we know that every¬
thing which can responsibly be called knowledge will share
at least one characteristic, we do not know that this one
property will be 'X', even although, on our supposition,
all but one do possess X, It might still be that M did
not possess X, but did possess a characteristic which the
others also shared, although we had not previously noticed
that they shared it.
This might appear an over-scrupulous doubt, were we
not confronted with so many examples of how epistemology
had gone wrong through the failure to entertain it. Hume's
generalization that every true "idea" had Its correspond¬
ing "impression" is not a bad one, though he himself dem¬
onstrated its limitations. The view that every true idea
is practically useful is also a fair enough remark, and
more liberal than most of its breed, but the absurdity of
employing it as a criterion of knowledge anywhere must
have been obvious from the start. Likewise to say that
every instance of knowledge is either "a priori" or
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empirical is a generalization covering many instances,
but, as its author showed, by no means all.*
But all this does not show that there is no prospect
whatever of arguing from all but one, to the remaining
form of knowledge. We have assumed that all genuine forms
will have something: in common; and we may assume that
this characteristic, though it may be difficult to unearth,
is not undiscoverable. Thus it is conceivable that in the
absence of one form, we should find the characteristic
which all, including it, possess. This is the first point.
The second is that all known generalizations about
knowledge have shortcomings, even as applied to the rec¬
ognized forms, - they will not account for mathematics,
or history, or psychology, or "common sense", - or if
they do, they do so only be means of devices and exped¬
ients which have nothing to recommend them beyond making
the generalization plausible. Amidst all the differences
between the various recognized forms of knowledge, it
would be surprising if there were many significant and
genuinely different characteristics which they shared;
and thus if we could make a generalization which genuinely
and without artifacts could be affirmed of all recognized
forms of knowledge, there would be a very strong likelihood
*See also the remarks on pp. 55-56, above.
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that this would apply also to the final member. But only
a strong likelihood. This is the second point.
The third is that it is not as if, when we were talk¬
ing about knowledge, we were discussing something indep¬
endent and sacrosanct, like facts are sunposed to be, -
something that we tamper with at our peril. knowledge is
not something which is there, but something we make; and
with some ponderous qualifications, such as that aoout
tampering with facts (and even this, the facts themselves
do not demand), - we can make it as we please. 'There is
consequently not quite the same terror about the procedure
as there would be about, say, arguing from the psycholog¬
ical characteristics of Englishmen to those of Chinamen,
if we had no independent knowledge of the latter. There
would be more analogy to arguing from the shared charact¬
eristics of what has always been regarded as good archit¬
ecture, to whether a new style of building is well or
poorly designed architecturally. In neither case is the
analogy exact, but the latter at least brings out the
point that in thinking this way about knowledge, one is
not in peril of being confronted with a stubbornly refract¬
ory fact. If we choose to say, for example, that only
those things which stand up to such and such tests will
we regard as historical knowledge, we are at liberty to
make whatever sense we can of this scheme, in a way that
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we are not at liberty if we say, having observed. English¬
men, that Chinamen are reserved, conservative and beer-
loving.
And finally, it is not as if we were entirely without
moral knowledge, and were actually attempting to const¬
itute it by means of an argument from other forms of
knowledge. Although practices vary widely, there is a lot
of moral thinking going on, and this may provide us with
some way of verifying the generalization gained from
other forms of thinking. Of course it is not easy to say
upon what terms moral thinking may be introduced into the
deliberations. If X had a cranky moral viewpoint, and it
was assumed that moral thinking should be taken equally
with history, mathematics, etc., as an inviolable datura
for generalization, I could foul the whole proceedings
by simply Insisting of every criterion of knowledge which
was advanced, that it did not account for my moral think¬
ing. And If some genius produced a criterion which took
care of all my objections, and did no violence to other
forms of thought, he would still have to come to terms
with all the other cranny people.
I therefore think it Is better that the investigation
should begin with a study of the non-moral forms of
thought, and that It will be successful if there emerges
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something which (a) accounts fairly for the recognized
forms of thought, (b) will serve not merely as a comment
upon them, but as a criterion of them (i.e. if it is a
convertible proposition), and. (c) can quite thinkably
apply in the moral field - that is to say, is such that
it would be in no way quaint, surprising, odd or Incredible
that a nerson should actually think morally in the way
he would have to think if this were the criterion of
genuine thinking of all kinds, Including moral thinking.
What then of the neople whose moral thinking did not
happen to be of that sort? In the first place, I think
it is probable that, once given the interpretative clue
provided by such an inquiry, it would be seen that much
more of moral experience than one might otherwise suppose
did in fact display the characteristic in question; and
our moral piety would no doubt be greatly relieved if
this turned out to be the case. But certainly not all
moral thinking would measure up, - and of this I think
all one could say is that it doesn't measure up.
In the next chapter I shall explain the results of
an inquiry like that above outlined, although I shall
merely claim, not demonstrate, that they are true of all
genuine forms of thinking. But I have not yet said any¬
thing to justify the particular use in this chapter, of
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arguments from what prevails in the philosophy of science
to what must prevail in the philosophy of morals. The
points for which I have employed the analogy are as follows:
(i) instead of attempting to reason completely a priori
as to what the nature of the moral universal may he, we
should Investigate moral experience to find what recog¬
nizably universal elements It contains; (11) we should not
exnect to discover only one principle, - there may be
different ones appropriate to different context®; (lii)
instead of investigating at one time diverse bodies of
moral thinking, we should study what either Is, or could
logically be Incorporated as, the thought of one man. My
subsequent contention that thi3 man might as well be the
theorist himself was made without reference to any scient¬
ific considerations.
I think I need advance no elaborate arguments to show
that these claims are sufficiently reasonable In them¬
selves, and I therefore take it that the only doubtful
point is whether knowledge does in fact consist in the
discovery of a true universal. The discussion of this
question is the task of my next and final chapter.
Chapter Five.
So far I have left the notion of a 'true universal' large¬
ly indeterminate; and the contention that it is the bus¬
iness of moral philosophy to discover such gems in exper¬
ience has been substantiated only by what might be regard¬
ed as a doubtful analogy. I would like now to remedy as
far as possible these shortcomings.
There is some temptation, when explaining one's use
of terms, to try to argue that 'this is what they mean'
('this is what one must mean by them'), in a sense this
is unnecessary, or even foolfesh. There is no need to
ar«ue anything. One is entitled to use words in any way
that suits one's purpose, so long as it is made suffic¬
iently clear how one is using them; and all that it need¬
ed, therefore, is that I should provide such an explan¬
ation. And yet it is not as simple as this. I have to
use words to exnlaln how I am using words, (unless I can
use them with such arresting precision that it can be
seen merely from their use how they are meant), - and
unless I adopt usages which are very like the common ones,
I am making it unnecessarily difficult for anyone who
reads what I have to say. I could in principle take an
English dictionary and move every word along to the mean¬
ing given for the word following; then substitute for
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each word given in definition, the word alphabetically
preceding iti then use my new language to write philos¬
ophy. But this would have an unnecessary tendency to
conceal what I was trying to communicate; and I there¬
fore think there is some need to have and to demonstrate
a community of usage between yourself and other people.
The word 'universal', at least in its logical uses,
is apolied to empirical concepts, like 'pine', "tobacco',
and 'match', and like 'above', 'below', 'around'j to
propositions, like 'all men are mortal' or 'we should
never tell lies'; to truths, like 'Caesar crossed the
Rubicon' or 'the universe is expanding'; and to arguments,
like the proofs of mathematical propositions. Words are
called universal in some such sense as that they stand
indifferently for all instances of whatever they design¬
ate (one cannot apply a name to one phenomenon, and with¬
out reason decline to call another just like it by the
same name); general propositions are universal in the
sense that they claim something is true without exception,
or that whatever they assert covers all instances within
the range of their assertion; truths are universal in the
sense that everyone must affirm them, or that anyone who
affirms anything different in the same connection must be
mistaken; and arguments are universal In the sense that
they purport to be binding on all rational minds, or that,
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given the premisses one cannot logically affirm any other
conclusion.
There is a difference between claiming universality,
and possessing it; and in the sense in which I am using
'true universal', anything is an instance which possesses
the universality it claims. There are no obvious restrict¬
ions to the scope of the claim an idea makes. I can form¬
ulate a general proposition about 'dogs', or about 'brown
dogs', 'one-eyed brown dogs', or 'one-eyed brown dogs born
in the month of May', and they will equally claim univer¬
sality, which will be satisfied if what I say is true of
all instances within the particular scope of my claim.
From the mere mention of a general proposition, a truth
or an argument, given that we understand the words it
employs, we can see the claim it makes, or the pretensions
it has; but when we responsibly use or assert any of
these, we at least think that the claim is well justified,
- that they actually possess what they claim to possess.
This distinction does not seem to apply very easily to
Individual concepts. If we merely utter 'Cat', there is
nothing in the utterance itself which tells us what, if
any, claim is being made. It might, on occasion, be equiv¬
alent to 'This (pointing) is a cat'; but even this could
he taken in at least four ways, - as "I propose to call
phenomena like what I am now pointing at, 'cats'", or
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"It is general for English speaking people to call things
liKe what I am now point at, 'cats'", or "it may surprise
you to learn that this curious beast is in fact a cat
(i.e. born of feline parents, fond of mice, capable of
begetting 'kittens', etc.)", or "There is in nature a
species sufficiently extensive and sufficiently unlike
other species to make it worthy of a name of its own, and
I hereby christen it 'cat' (or it has been so christened
by English speaking people)". Although attempts have been
made to say that one or other of these is the proper mean¬
ing, I think that such a project must be regarded as hope¬
less, because on the one hand there are contexts In which
one could quite reasonably mean any of these by 'This is
a cat', and on the other, if we conceive such an argument
to be an attempt to show that concepts can make claims,
we can see that it succeeds only by the (questionable)
conversion of them into propositions, which can make
claims.
The situation is the same if we analyse the use of
concepts in propositions. If I say 'All cats are slinky',
for the word 'cats' I can equally substitute 'beings to
which I have given the name "cat"', or 'beings which are
by English speaking people called "cats"', and as long as
I do not lead you to think that I mean one when I actually
mean the other (if there is any difference), I cannot be
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criticised for my usage. But if you had asxed me whether
I would care to make any generalizations ahout cats, and
I replied, 'Well for one thing, all cats are slinky', then
you might say I was bound to use the word in only one way.
If your request was about 'beings called "cats" by English
sneaking people', and my reply was about 'beings I have
chosen to call "cats" (i.e. tigers)', then you might say
it was wrong of me to employ 'cats' the way I did, - I was
bound by the context to use it 'the way English sneaking
people do'. But this is not exact. I was bound only to use
it the way it was used in the question, and this might just
as well have been an idiosyncratic use, and might have been
unlike both the common Ebglish usage and my own use. I,
who mean tigers by 'cats', can answer your question about
cats (i.e. gossipy women), by putting 'cats' in inverted
commas to signify parenthetically 'as you call them', with¬
out obliging myself to discontinue my own peculiar use.
Even granting this, one might now say that in any case
we would each have to translate ourselves into standard
English usage before we could become mutually clear about
the other's personal usage; and no doubt this is what we
would ordinarily do. But we need not do so, - we could get
straightened away by pointing, or by taking careful note
of the other's use until it becomes clear that 'if he is
talking sense at all, he must mean tigers (or whatever)'.
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No doubt, before we could do thla It would be necessary
that some of the words we each used should be common; but
we are not bound to any one usage of any one word.
But let us return to the distinction with which this
digression began, the distinction between claiming univ¬
ersality, and possessing it. If I assert the proposition,
'All typewriters wear out', this may be explicated in at
least three ways. It may more fully read 'I have never
known a typewriter which did not wear out', 'I have never
known an excention to this rule, and I suspect there is
something about typewriters which makes them wear out',
or 'I know why it is Impossible to build an eternal type¬
writer, (anl this receives substantiation from the fact
that in the past, typewriters have without exception worn
out)'. If on cross-examination I admitted that what I
meant was the first of these, I could quite reasonably
be asked, 'Well, why didn't you say so?'. The reason for
this is that one can Know from the mere mention of a
proposition of this kind, what claim it makes, and from
this one can in this case see that the Intention of the
user of it is less than what he actually says.
One might wish to ask 'Why didn't you say so?' also
in the second case, but it is not so obviously appropriate
here, because when I say that my reason for saying that
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all typewriters wear out is partly that they have always
been anovn to do so, partly that I suspect there is some
reason why they could not be otherwise, I show that I am
at least aware of the logical pretensions of 'All type¬
writers wear out', even if I have not matched them with
my reasons for asserting it. In this case my reasons tend
directly to this end, where they did not in the former case.
In the third reading, we may suppose that the proposition
actually possesses the universality that it pretends. And
I presume this is something we would all require of any
serious or scientific thinking, even if we are not so
scrupulous about assertions in ordinary conversation.
Much philosophical discussion of knowledge is made unnec¬
essarily difficult by the attempt to insist that the things
which are said should apply not only to deliberate attempts
to know, but also and equally to ordinary chit-chat about
the weather, friends, enemies and domestic animals. One
can talk scientifically about these things, but in ordin¬
ary conversation we are to a degree Just letting our tong¬
ues wag, and it is therefore not appropriate to apply the
same standards to what we say.
My second point about universale is that they are things
which are posited, proposed or undertaken. There is nothing
in nature which requires us to think at all, and when we do
undertake to think, there is nothing which requires us to
143
think in any given way. When we make assertions, it is
we, not things, who lay down the principles upon which
what we observe - things, facts or whatever - may be
deemed relevant or not so. When I am confronted by a cat,
I may with no epistemologlcal sin ignore it; but if I
choose to remark on it, I may think 'How lithe it is!',
or 'How soft and warm', or 'It stands eight and a quarter
inches high', 'weighs two pounds', 'is fond of sleep',
etc. There are masses of things one could say; one does
not have to say any, or all of them. And if I content
myself with, say, mentioning the beast's weight, some odd
soul who thought that things themselves determine what
we say about them might retort, 'You say that it weighs
two pounds, but surely you can see how soft and warm it
is'. Another might reproach me for all the truths about
it I had not mentioned; and yet another might say that
there is nothing two-pound-ish about the cat. A cat is
a cat, and a pound is a purely arbitrary unit of measure¬
ment which is no part of the being of cats br anything
else. To all such there is much the same reply: 'X under¬
took of my own free will to mention the cat's weight. In
saying that it weighed two pounds, I neither affirmed
nor denied that it had other characteristics; and I am
not concerned whether there is anything objectively two-
pound-lsh about it, nor whether there is objectively
anything else about it, because I have my criteria of
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whether a thing weighs two pounds (or is soft and warm,
or anything else), and when I make an assertion my only
concern is whether the object of the assertion satisfies
the criteria in question*. It is the nature of what one
asserts which prescribes the criteria by which one can
ascertain whether it is true, but the only sense in which
things themselves determine what, out of all the assertions
we might make, we do say of them, is that we generally
insist that what we say should be true. This is essentially
the same point as I made earlier (p. 110) concerning
reasoning about causes.
To agree with this it is not necessary to disagree
with the venerable theory that universals are "in things".
They may quite well be 'there', but as long as they remain
there, not shared with, represented in, copied by or taken
ur> into our thinking, they are nothing to us, and we can¬
not be said to have knowledge. If one thinks that the
universals which are 'there' can be identified by some
process which is separate from the process of conceiving
or thinking a universal, he will say that we possess a
true universal when the one which we think is just like
the one which is 'there*. But if he thinks there is no
distinction to be drawn between 'identifying a universal',
and thinking, conceiving or positing one, he may still
think that when we have a true universal we suppose it is
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'Just like' the one which is 'there', or that we are
justified, in so supposing, even though we cannot immed¬
iately 'see' the likeness. If one thinks that this supp¬
osition is unnecessary, it becomes very difficult to
continue in agreement with the theory that universale are
'in things', but it is not obviously impossible; and the
reason the relation between the two sorts of assertion is
so liberal is that one belongs to the science of meta¬
physics and the other belongs to the science of enlstem-
ology, and if there are relations between these two sciences,
they are not such that a proposition in one can directly
contradict a proposition in the other.
But however one sees it, it is difficult to deny that
it takes a bit of doing to come into possession of a
universal. This applies as much as anything to the elem¬
entary case of the use of empirical concepts. When one
asserts 'This is a cat', one may mean any of the four
things mentioned on p. 133-9. If the meaning is 'I propose
to call things like this 'cats'', it is obvious enough
that an undertaking is being made; but if it is 'Things
like this are called "cats" by English sneaking people',
one may be either at the same time proposing to call them
something else in spite of this, or proposing the same
usage for oneself because of this. The third (or inform¬
ative) meaning is not relevant for the present purpose,
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and the fourth is too obviously an undertaking to require
further comment.
It does not appear to make any difference, for what
reasons one says things. If I say 'Two plus two equals
four', I may do so because everybody I have asxed has
professed to think this is the case, or because when I
say anything different, people seem to disapprove, or
because I think the proposition self-evident, or because
I think it best to adopt the same notation as other people.
But whatever my reason, I am making this so for me,
committing myself to it with whatever it may entail. It
is something I do not need to do, - I could ignore the
whole business, or adopt an opposing view. But I do it.
My next point is that the thinking or positing of
things as universal ma^es certain demands on us, almost
as if there were another will requiring our submission.
This contention partly depends on the last, because if
thinking a universal were not something we willed or
did, but was, say, something we could not fail to do,
there would be no place for "demands" upon us, to which
we could accede, or against which we could rebel.
It is not very clear, in the case of Individual
concepts, how this government or control occurs, because
as I pointed out, they make no explicit claims, and the
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'control' must derive from the intention with which they
are used. If I say (to vary the example) 'This is a lemon',
I need not say it under the aspect of universality, - it
tnay be just 'I call this a lemon now, but this is not
what I have done, or what I shall do another time, unless
it so nleases me. And I shall not call other things like
it lemons either, unless it pleases me'. There is no sense
in which I cannot fail to do other than this, - I am free
to behave as it suits me in this as in other regards.
(But it is not quite the same if I say 'These are lemons'.
They may, of course, be a completely miscellaneous assort¬
ment of objects. But if there are important similarities
between them, and you produce another thing just like
'these' and invite me to call it a lemon, I might for
some special reason decline, but 1 now appear at least to
be under an obligation to provide such a reason. Still
I might dissent from this obligation by saying that the
significant similarity between the things was just chance,
and I did not call them by the same name because of the
similarity. I just hapnened for a moment to feel like
saying 'These are lemons' of a group of things which,
as far as I was concerned, were completely miscellaneous.
And to say something like this would be logically differ¬
ent from, say, declining to call a further object a lemon,
on the ground that It was larger than the rest, because
in this case I would be admitting that, had it not been
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larger, I should have been obliged to give it the same
name as the rest. In this case I recognize a conditional
obligation, while in the former case I eschewed all oblig¬
ation. )
But to return to the singular usage, ordinarily when
a person gives a name to a thing, we expect him to cont¬
inue to call the same thing by the same name (unless there
is some special reason to make a change - it does not
long remain appropriate to call a given animal a kitten),
- and to use the same word for other things sufficiently
similar to it. And this expectation is neither just an
old custom, nor is it based on any explicit representation
that is made about the use of the word, but on the assump¬
tion that the person is in fact intending to posit or
re-affirm a universal. Our expectation is that the indiv¬
idual should be consistent with his own intentions, what¬
ever they may be. Since we can not always enquire about
a person's intentions, we generally assume that they are
the normal ones. But if any criticisms based on this
assumption are met with an explanation that the intentions
of the person criticised were in fact different from the
normal ones, then unless we subscribe to some sophistic¬
ated philosophical doctrine, we regard this as a satis¬
factory reply. And it is striking that we will then insist
that a person be consistent with his chosen usage, even
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though we ourselves think it perverse or frivfolous. But
we can only Insist that a person be consistent with int¬
entions which he does have. We can perhaps demand that
he have some intention, but we cannot require that he
should have any specific one.
At this point it might be objected that ordinarily
in using words people do not have any conscious opinion
as to the logical specifications of their use, - they
simply chatter in whatever way they have learned from
parents and teachers, - and that therefore this talk,
about having intentions is something which could only
apply to a few rare birds, like philosophers. To some
extent I think this is true. It is only people like phil¬
osophers and scientists, engaged in serious intellectual
pursuits, who stop to choose words, adopt usages, and in
general be deliberate about what they say, and how they
say it. But even if most people could not begin to answer
a question aoout their intentions In using a word, they
could still be pressed into making some such desperate
remark as 'Well I suppose I Just Intended to use it In
the normal way. I suppose that is what I always intend'.
And while such a remark could not be regarded as a des¬
cription of a conscious purpose, it could be regarded as
true in the sense that it describes that person's ling¬
uistic habits, and this is sufficient for our purposes.
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The governing function of universale is clearer in
cases where some claim is made, - in universal proposit¬
ions, truths and arguments. If I say 'All cats are slinky',
I am thereby bound to affirm of everything which I must
agree to be a cat, that it is slinky. ((Here can be seen
the effect of the foregoing remarks. I need not mean any
specific thing by 'cat', but I must mean something deter¬
minate, something by reference to which it can be decided
whether this, that or the next thing is (what I call) a
cat. And the same can be said about 'slinky'. If I mean
nothing determinate by the concents which my propositions
contain, the claims which such propositions attempt to
make are vacuous.)) But suppose I have said this about cats,
and you are presenting rae with a succession of beasts,
inviting me to affirm of each that it is slinky. Now
suppose that we come upon a sweet lovable creature,
tenderness and generosity glowing in its eyes and discern¬
ible in its every action; and we will suppose that in
other respects it is quite like all the other animals in
the parade - not the same colour, perhaps, or quite the
same size, but having sharp claws, smooth fur, delicate
movements, fond of cleaning itself, etc. You feel logic¬
ally entitled to insist that I affirm of it as of all the
others, that it is slinky. And yet it appears not to be
so.
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At this point there are several alternatives avail¬
able to me. I may throw caution to the winds and assert
that this gentle beast is slinky like the rest; or I may
agree that it is not slinky, but claim that on the other
hand it is not a cat. These are both ways of sustaining
my original assertion about cats. On the first alternat¬
ive, when the discrepancy between what appears to be the
case and what I claim is the case is pressed upon me, I
may say either that it is slinky in some recondite sense,
- that it has a veneer of generosity hiding its natural
slinkiness, that we just happen to have caught it in one
of its better moods, etc.; or I may say 'If you think
this cat an excentlon, this only shows that you have not
understood what I mean by slinky', and thence proceed to
show that I mean something by it which (a) it is not too
surprising that I should mean (as it would be if I meant
'fond of cleaning themselves'), and (b) can be affirmed,
not only of this, but of all the other exhibits. (Perhaps
the former condition is not entirely necessary.) The first
answers again were ways of sustaining my original (appar¬
ent) use of 'slinky', while the other is an amendment of
it. On the other hand if I claim that it is not a cat, and
am then pressed with the similarity of it to the other
exhibits, I may either say it can't be a cat (because all
cats are slinky), or X may point out some characteristic
it has or has not, over and above the absence of slinkiness,
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which distinguishes it from the other exhibits in a way
that they do not distinguish themselves from one another
by the several differences they possess.
But I need not sustain my original assertion - I may
in some way back down at this point. And what I do here
may either amount to quitting the field ('All right, I
was wrong about cats'), or positing some new universal,
like 'All cats are slinky except those born under a new
moon'. And from this again some new logical inquisition
may ensue. But the point about all this is that having
made a universal affirmation, I am logically driven into
this complex dilemma. I am not logically driven to any
particular resolution of it. Any of the above ways of
handling the problem (except "it can't be a cat") might
conceivably turn out satisfactorily enough. But I sua log¬
ically driven to do something. If I make no affirmation,
you can parade all the cats in Christendom before me, and
there will be no logical claim on oiy behaviour; and if I
maxe a less than universal statement ('Some cats are
slinky'), the only thing which can put me through my
paces is a universal counter-statement ('No cats are
slinky').
Another point which may need to oe mentioned is that
it does not require an external agent to put us through
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such trials as these, nor a parade of actual cats. Our
thoughts move themselves in this fashion, and up to a
point they manage very well with recollected and even
supposed cats. Indeed, it is the thought of supposed cats
which makes us hesitate to pronounce universal pronos-
itions, even when they tally with all known instances.
I shall now attempt to illustrate the way in which
the idea that something is true makes claims upon our
intellectual behaviour. One might expect that this would
be the same as the last, because it was the claim that
(it is true that) all cats are slinky which made for all
the difficulty. If I had merely 'mentioned' it - thought
it without attempting to regard it as true, then I should
have had no occasion to be upset by the appearance of
that lone non-slinky animal. Perhaps the difference lies
in the distinction between claiming that something is
true, and regarding it as true, or deciding that it is
true; or perhaps it is in the distinction between cases
where we can decide something entirely on its merits,
and cases where we must rely on probabilities. In any
case, you will see from what follows that there is a
marked difference.
If I say 'Hannibal crossed the Alps', and you say
'Jones thinks he went by sea', you are questioning my
opinion that he went by land. I cannot say 'tfones must
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be wrong, because he went by land', because this assumes
precisely what is in question. Nor can I, unless I can
unmistakeably prove that Hannibal went by land, satisfy
your doubts by offering you my reasons for thinking this.
Jones may have just as good reasons for thinking he went
by sea. I am therefore bound to provide an independent
criticism of Jones's reasoning on the subject, and of the
reasoning of anyone else who has a significant competing
theory. (This is why in philosophy we very often find the
argumentation of a theory partly taking the form of a
systematic critique of all opposing views. We are some¬
times tempted to think that this is a needless and a
graceless gesture; and yet what can an author do, if the
affirmation of the truth of his theory implies but does
not prove the untruth of a variety of others? Of course
if we offer our theories in a more tentative spirit, this
may not be necessary; but it is hard to tell when this
is merely an excuse for logical laziness.)
This is not the most decisive of rational principles,
depending as it does on at least three factors. It denends
firstly, as I said, on the degree of assurance with which
we wish to affirm something. If I am only suggesting that
Hannibal crossed the Alps, - offering it for your consid¬
eration, I may take as read, alternative views and their
criticism; (and if I recount it as part of an historical
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narrative, in which it is only disconcerting to stop and
hear arguments all along the way, it may he taken that I
have in fact subjected the matter to critical examination,
which I do not here reproduce). Secondly, it depends on
the kind of support which is available for the kind of
contention in question. No one would think of demanding
of a mathematical argument that it should enter into a
critical discussion of alternative views, because there
is not that residue of doubt, when everything has been
said which can be said in favor of a given proposition,
which supports the 'if' in the proposition, 'If I am right,
then you are wrong'. Wherever there is such a residue of
doubt, the 'if' remains, and since when I assert that I
am right I at the same time assert that you are wrong,
and yet your mistakenness does not follow from the grounds
upon which I assert that I am right, your mistakenness
must be independently established. Thirdly, it depends
on the assumption that two differing views on the same
subject cannot both be correct. And while this is a very
venerable principle in rational discourse of all kinds,
it has recently been questioned, particularly in respect
of its use in ethical discourse.
Many of the criticisms, it seems to me, amount to
nothing more than pointing out how very difficult it is,
often, to be sure that we are "really disagreeing" in a
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moral argument. If X think it incumbent upon me to look
after my aged parents, I may through misadventure get
into a moral argument with someone whose parents are
quite capable of looking after themselves, and who does
not conceive himself to have the same duty; and it may
take some time before we realize that there is no dis¬
agreement - he quite agrees that I should look after my
parents, and X quite agree that he needn't, under the
circumstances, look after his. But no multiplication of
such Instances would have any tendency to show that it
is a mistake to think that when we are "really disagree¬
ing", we can not both be right.
Still other criticisms, one suspects, are advanced
in the interest of tolerance and forbearance, since if
there were no reason to suppose that those who disagreed
with me morally were mistaken, I should never have grounds
for moral indignation. But this is surely a desperate
expedient, since it works not only between people, but
within a given person's thought; and if I am prevented
from ever thinking I was wrong (sc. when I disagree with
my former opinions), I can by the same token never think
I am right, even about tolerance. And thus if the argument
were explicitly based on the Tightness of tolerance, it
would be self-defeating.
But there are other arguments, and these I shall now
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discuss. The first rests on the assertion that it is not
a logical principle, that differing assertions about the
same subject cannot both be correct. For the purpose of
this argument, a logical principle need be only negative¬
ly defined as something which relies only on itself for
its validity. It is claimed that what I shall for short
call the 'disagreement principle' rests on an empirical
generalization or observation, and therefore cannot be
logical. When we are discussing Hannibal's journey to
Italy, my Knowledge that I am disagreeing with Jones dep¬
ends on a piece of very general empirical information,
namely that nothing can be in more than one place at the
same time. G-iven this, I reason that if Jones and I are
both right, then poor Hannibal must at the same time have
been coaxing his elephants over mountain passes, and hold¬
ing buckets for them in an ocean storm. This one cannot
do. (Try it yourself!) Therefore one of us must be wrong.
The argument goes on to say that only where reference to
some piece of information of this sort is available, can
statements be said to disagree; and since ethical prop¬
ositions are not descriptive of anything, there is no
such reference available to them, and they therefore can¬
not disagree.
There is a temptation at this point to try to save
the day for moral propositions by saying that they are
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descriptive of something, - of a future event (my doing
what I thin* I ought to do), of my private feelings, or
of some assignable characteristics of things or people
{Beatrice is 'good' if she behaves in certain ways, apples
are good if they are crisp, tart, etc.).* I might here
run through the now-famlllar criticisms of these content¬
ions, but for the present purpose it would be like point¬
ing out to the man holding a seive for his friend to milk
a he-goat, that it is a selve he is holding. X would prefer
to ask, is it or is it not an empirical observation, that
the same thing cannot be in more than one place at the
same time? This again is a question which has enjoyed
considerable philosophical airing, as the problem of the
"identity of indiscernibles", but since this is a very
much wider issue than the present, I feel justified in
declining to discuss its deep intricacies, and I hope that
what follows may be taken as a sufficient treatment of
that part of the question which is important for our
purposes.
Is it then, or is it not an empirical observation,
that nothing can be at the same time in two places? "It
has never been known to happen", you may say. But in
* It may not be that those who expressed these views had
any such high-minded motive. One suspects that they are
more often attempts to sustain the flagging cause of
empiricism, in the face of its chronic Inability to
render any plausible account of morals.
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what way do we know that it has not happened? I am pacing
a gravel path when suddenly I am struck by two pebbles,
lying side by side, as nearly as I can tell identical in
shape, size, colour, weight, and if you like chemical
composition and anything else investigation might reveal
about them. At last it has happened, say I, for here is
an instance of the same thing being in two places at the
same time. But no, you say, they are different things.
You don't care how like they are, they are not the same
thing. But how do you know that they are not? You might
say 'They can't be, because they are in different places',
but if this did not beg the question, it would at least
make it a logical, not an empirical question, whether they
were the same thing. But again you might say 'They are
different things because they have different histories'.
This would make it look like an empirical question of
studying the respective pasts of the pebbles. Let's do
that then. Suppose we find that until the gardener came
this morning and raited the path they were lying over a
foot apart, not side by side; and we £aight perhaps find
that they came from different quarries. But this only
multiplies the number of times they were in different
places, and the number of different places they were in,
and contributes nothing to the solution of the problem.
But now you say the investigation may not only reveal a
different sequence of places, but also that the pebbles
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were not always the same. They only became the same this
morning, when scraped by the gardener's rake, or ten years
ago, when blasted from their respective quarries. But this
only adds a further complication to the thing, which Itself
cannot be empirically settled, namely can things possessing
different properties be said to be the same thing? Again
you might say that it follows logically that if they are
different they are not the same; but again if this is a
good argument, it is still a logical, not an empirical
resolution of the matter.
Here a fresh sally might be made, to the effect that
my very use of words proves the points I refer to the
stones as 'they' and not 'it', as X would do if I thought
they were the same thing. But this takes us nowhere,
because we are neither of us in any serious doubt about
whether 'they' are the same thing. What we are trying to
decide is whether this is a bit of empirical knowledge,
and if anything, this point affirms that it is not.
The dispute so far has foundered at all points on the
definition of sameness, and we might therefore hope to
settle it more definitively by trying a little experiment.
If we taxe just one stone there will be no risk of running
into any confusion about its self-sameness. Now for the
experiment. Set the stone on the table before us, and just
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see whether we can get it to be In two places at the same
time. Move it an inch to the right, and we find that it
has taken up a new place and was no longer where it was.
Pick it up and it is now in the hand, not on the table.
Divide it in two and it is no longer the same; and each
part will yield the same experimental results. Surely
there can now be no doubt that it is plain empirical
knowledge, that the sane thing cannot be in two places
at the same time.
But is this an experiment? Have we in any significant
sense tried to put the stone in two places at the same
time? We have tried to move the stone from place to place,
and succeeded. This proves that stones are movable, noth¬
ing else. We can say that we have conducted a significant
negative-result-yleldlng experiment only when there are
reasons for thinking that what we do will achieve the
result we have in mind, if such a result it possible.
There are no such reasons here. But suppose we taxe the
stone with both hands, and try with one to move it to
one place, and with the other to move it to a different
place. Would this not be an appropriate experiment? This
if anything will produce the result we have in mind, and
if this falls, we have an empirical proof that it is not
possible. But would it actually prove anything more than
that you can not move a thing by exerting forces in
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opposite directions (or some variant of this depending on
the strength and direction of the forces exerted)? Or
suppose it worked, - would we not then be in the same
dilemma we were in when we found the two stones on the
path? Are they the same stone, or have we somehow turned
one stone into two? - The tnuth seems to be that we can¬
not try such an experiment, because we can have no idea
what it would be like for the experiment to succeed. I
therefore think that this principle, whatever it is, is
no empirical observation.
But this does not yet prove what I require to est¬
ablish, which is that if two people "really disagree" in
moral matters, they cannot both be right. One could still
say that in its empirical employment, the 'disagreement
principle' is derivative from the principle that the same
thing cannot be in different places at the same time, and
that since this ultimate principle, whether or not it is
empirically founded, has obviously only an empirical ref¬
erence, the derivative principle can similarly only have
an empirical reference. But it is not as simple as this.
Having an alternative assertion to make is not the only
condition under which two people may disagree. One person
may simply contradict the other ('Hannibal did not cross
the Alps'), and while one's reason for doing this might
on occasion be that one thought he went by sea, one might
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as properly do it without an alternative view to offer,
but rather because one could not believe that anyone
could get elephants across the Alps, or because one thought
that the evidence for this theory was insufficient or
concocted, etc. And one would be disagreeing just as much
if one had no reason beyond a dislike for the author of
the view, or a natural contentiousness. And even where
there is not this direct disagreement, the question whether
what is said would imply that a thing is in two places at
the same time is not the only way of deciding whether two
theories are both tenable, - sometimes people say things
which, if they were both true, would imply that a thing
both possessed and did not possess a given property at the
same time, or that it had a set of properties which were
known to be physically incompatible, such as high specific
gravity, low muscular power and the ability to fly. I
would therefore prefer to say that the primary principle
is the one about agreement, and that the one about the
same thing being in different places at the same time is
a secondary or derivative principle which serves in emp¬
irical thought as one of the criteria of whether we are
disagreeing. This would dispose of the difficulty about
the criteria having empirical references, and leave us
free to affirm the 'disagreement principle' in ethics,
and find whatever criteria we may, of when we are really
disagreeing, and when we are not. What would qualify as
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such criteria in ethics? - There would first be cases
of direct disagreement,('You ought/ought not to take
candy from children'). In some such cases it might turn
out that the author of one of the conflicting assertions
did not have the appropriate fceasons for saying what he
said, and in such an event the disagreement would be after
all only apparent. But at least if the conditions for
making the relative assertions were fulfilled, there
would be 'real disagreement', and not both could be right.
And secondly there would be cases where there was not
direct contradiction, and here you might expect that the
criteria would be as manifold as they are in empirical
discourse. One obvious suggestion is that two people dis¬
agree morally to the extent that their remarks, if both
acted upon by those people upon whom they make claims,
would result in one or more persons doing two or more
different things at the same time. This principle would
require more qualification than it would be worth while
to attempt. In a sense one can do two things at the same
time, - one can at the same time give money to charity
and enhance one's reputation, and one can at the same
time listen to music and write philosophy. No doubt you
could play a violin standing on your head, Juggling
grapefruit with your feet, and at the same time discuss
the naturalistic fallacy. This kind of difficulty is in
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practice partly resolved toy the fact that in moral dis¬
course we ordinarily make claims on a man's activities,
attitudes, etc., as a whole, or in such a way as to in¬
clude some things and specifically exclude others, so
that although it may toe 'physically' possible for a man
to do a variety of things at the same time, it is not
possible within the terms of the claim we make upon him.
And this is not peculiar to moral discourse: if in the
example I have been exploiting 'Hannibal' were short for
'Hannibal's army', it would be only if we were talxing
about the whole army that we could not affirm that it
went both by land and by sea. And because of the heavy
role played in these matters by the exact nature of what
we sav. and the endless variety of things we might con¬
ceivably say, I can see no prospect of providing anything
like a sufficient set of criteria for either empirical
or moral discourse. And I think it is for this reason
that it is not merely tautologous to talk about disagree¬
ment. If we could provide a sufficient set of criteria
for when we were "really disagreeing", then the word
'disagreement would be merely discriptive of cases where
the criteria were effective. But since the concept of
disagreement is meaningful in itself even in the absence
of criteria for it, and since there can be no sufficient
criteria, it is more enlightening to talk of disagreement
than of its criteria.
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I shall now take it that I have deflated any argu¬
ment to the effect that it is a mistake in morals to
accent the principle that if two people "really disagree",
at least one of them must be mistaken; but I do not take
it that this has any tendency to show that we must adopt
it. One is tempted to say that we must, because to do
so makes morals intelligible, or because it makes rational
discourse in ethics possible. Out this has distinct taut¬
ological tendencies, because when asked what 'rational
discourse' is, what can one reply, save that it is the
kind of thing in which, when two people disagree, it is
thought that at least one of them must be wrong? And even
if this difficulty is overcome, the questions remains,
why make ethics a thing where rational discourse is poss¬
ible? And if there is an answer to this appealing to some
further principle, this again will have to be justified.
We may as well make a stand right at the beginning, saying
that we simply choose to adopt this principle, and if
anything appending the rhetorical question, why not? And
since as 1 argued, all thinking is 'undertaken', there
should be no criticism arising in this quarter.
A parallel aocount of the way arguments exercise a
'governing' function would, I suppose, Include all that
I have so far been saying. I argue that if I undertake to
use the word 'cat' to refer to beasts like this one, then
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I must call this (cat) a 'cat', and X must refrain from
calling this (puppy) a 'cat'; and I ar^ue that given
certain intentions about the use of the words 'cat* and
'slinky', X cannot say 'All cats are slinky' because of
this guileless beast, (or because of all those cats which
I must suppose, but have not seen). And the logical induce¬
ment we feel to criticise competing theories when our own
view is less than certain is similarly an argument. But
there are some distinct senses in which the idea of the
universality of an argument makes a difference to us.
Most of the distinctions between the different kinds of
argument rest on the idea that an argument should be
universal. I presume there would be no reason to be dis¬
satisfied with a persuasive argument if we did not recog¬
nize that it failed to be universal, and that the same
recognition is what informs us that an argument for a
vague or insufficiently specified conclusion cannot 'really'
be an argument, because it holds only for some individual
(non-universal) interpretations of the conclusion. Similar¬
ly the knowledge that rationalization is a mistake rests
on the recognition of an important non-universal element, -
my determination to believe, regardless of the success or
failure of my arguments. The compulsivenese of the thing
may perhaps best be seen from a geometrical example. When
we are considering some elementary geometrical proposition,
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such as that when parallel straight lines are intersected
by a straight line, the angles of intersection are equal,
we (in some more-than-visual sense) 'see* that it must
be so, and we are torn between the conflicting urges, on
the one hand to simply let the taatter rest with this dumb,
inexplicit knowledge, (who, after all, could doubt the
proposition? - what need is there to prove it?), and the
equally strong insistence that we do not have an argument,
that the matter remains unproven. When I, an unpracticed
geometrician, return to such problems, I feel this anxiety
very acutely, and in spite of amy Insistent conviction of
what I am trying to establish, it is often with the great¬
est difficulty, and always with much annoyance, that I
re-discover what I can accept as an argument. When I am
in the midst of such throes, I at no point consciously
think anything like 'This is not universal, and therefore
will not do'; but when I reflect on it afterwards, I can
find no other way of accounting for my dissatisfaction
with one state of affairs, and satisfaction with the other.
I have been trying to show, not only that universality
plays an essential role in our thinking, but what sort of
a role it plays. In the case of our use of concepts,
universality lies, not in the concepts themselves, but in
the fixity of our determination to use them in a certain
way; and if there is any sense in talking about true
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universality in this connection, it lies either in whether
we do carry out such a resolution, or in whether it is
possible, or makes sense to do so in any particular case.
I have pointed out that where there is not this fixity of
intention we cannot be said to be significantly using
words, and we cannot express any propositions which mean
anything determinate, and thus none which have any pros¬
pect of being thought true or false. In the case of general
propositions, their universality lies in the determination
they express to affirm something of a given class of
beings which is itself defined by our determination to
use a word in a given way, and the truth of such a univ¬
ersal lies in the possibility (in terms of the facts) of
so doing. Where the claim of a proposition Is less than
universal, it cannot be falsified except by a negative
universal, and thus we cannot Know except through univ¬
ersale; and where the claim is particular ('This cat is
black*), it is nothing but an exercise in the use of words
in the way we have undertaken to do. (At least this is
so for an individual when he is saying this of an animal
which he is seeing under good lighting conditions. You
might say that it is not the case If in a settled context
of usages I inform someone else of the colour of the
animal. But communication is a different thing from know¬
ing, and it is the latter we are discussing. And again
you night say that if I judge a cat to be black under
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peculiar lighting conditions when it appears purple, it
is not merely an exercise in the use of words. But in
this case the judgment is essentially different. It express¬
es the more complicated opinion that 'if I saw the same
animal under white light, it would then possess that
appearance to which I have undertaken to give the name
"black"'; and it is based, not simply on present observ¬
ation, but also on past experience of the conjunction
between similar lighting conditions and similar colours.)
In the case of the universality of truths, I have
shown that we could not claim that anything was true
without at the same time claiming that anyone who 'really
disagreed' with us was mistaken, and that this claim to
universality is fulfilled, we have a true universal, to
the extent that we can show that these other people are
mistaken, either by the direct method of unmistakeably
proving our assertion, or by independently criticising
their contentions in such a way as to at least show that
ours is the most tenable. And finally in the case of
arguments, I have shown that all arguments claim univers¬
ality; and they succeed - what can one say? - through
conforming to the kind of conditions described in Chapters
One and i'wo.
It is worth pointing out that essentially the same
difference as I have been discussing, between claiming
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universality and possessing it, is to be seen in the
scientific example discussed in the last chapter. The
proposition, 'X is the cause of makes a claim, the
precise empirical nature of which is determinable by the
analysis of the proposition; and this claim is fulfilled,
or we have a true universal, when sufficient and approp¬
riate experiments have shown that what it says will be
the case, is the case.
I must now ask in which, if any, of these senses we
can look for true universale in morals. To attempt an
answer to this question verges on doing moral philosophy,
rather than discussing the doing of it, and since this is
no part of my purpose, I shall content myself with some
general points and some examples, which should not be
read as In any way purporting to be a full-scale piece of
moral theorising.
On the face of It one would say that since the mere
adoption of a terminology makes no claim to universality,
there is no prospect of discovering any true universale
In this direction. It is true that we may make some of
the same remarks about moral terminology as about any
other use of words, such as that we can logically be
expected to have some determinate intentions regarding
the use of any word, and to be consistent in the use of
it, at least as far as any given intellectual operation
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goes, and that where more than one person is involved in
a usage, it can be expected that all possible steps should
be taken to relieve confusion as to how each is using
words. But while such principles may require sterner
insistence in moral discourse because of the tendency we
have to have secret usages (e.g. when we 'promise'),
still they are by no means peculiar to moral talk; and
they certainly do not holtf forth very broad vistas for
philosophical investigation.
The field of universal propositions is likewise un¬
promising, not because we cannot propose them, nor because
we cannot act on them, but because there is no prospect
of their claim to universality being fulfilled. If I say
'I should always tell the truth', thlB is not verified if
I actually do so in all possible instances, nor if I firm¬
ly Intend so to do, nor by the observation of what other
people do or think they should do in this connection. If
there is any form of verification, it is a generalization
from particular cases in which it is known to be the right
thing to do, and since these are themselves cases of
knowledge, it would be more direct merely to investigate
the way it is known in individual cases. People, I suppose,
are always under a temptation, when asked for their reason
for doing something, to offer a general principle from
which the particular case follows logically ('I thought
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it right to tell the truth now because I thin* one should
always tell the truth'). But this is hardly a satisfactory
answer, because one can always find some general principle
under which to subsume any given case, and unless there
is some independent reason for subscribing to the general
principle, then to say this is no different from telling
one's interrogator to mind his own business. And while we
do certainly very commonly give voice to general principles,
I think they can only be regarded as a desperate device
for instructing the young and the backward. I cannot see
how an adult could intelligently employ them as a guide
to his behaviour, particularly when I consider how many
qualifications a conscientious casuist is induced to
supply, in order to raise them to what he conceives to
be universality.
But we have been looking at these questions in what
you might call a material, rather than a logical way, and
the latter may be more fruitful. If you ask me why I
thought I ought to say 'X' on a certain occasion, suppose
I reply 'Because that is what I was thinking, and it would
be illogical of me to think one thing, and say something
different, just as it is illogical to think all men are
mortal, and say Wittgenstein is immortal'. To this it
might be objected that there is no logical inference from
the fact that one thinks something, to the proposition
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that one ou&ht to say it. But there is no logical inference
from the fact of ay having said 'All aen are aortal' and
'Wittgenstein is a man', to the proposition that WI ought
to say 'Wittgenstein is mortal'"j and yet if I end by
saying Wittgenstein is immortal I would be accused of
being illogical. And is it any different if I think the
first two propositions, but sav the fourth? Unless you
have access to my thoughts, you may not know that I am
being illogical, but .£ know, - or at least I do if I can
recognize a logical mistake at all. If this is clear
enough in the case of thinking the premisses of a syllog¬
ism, but saying something different from their conclusion,
does it make any important difference if what I am think¬
ing is not a pair of premisses, but merely something
contradictory of what I say? If I think 'Wittgenstein is
mortal', but say 'Wittgenstein is immortal', it is the
same as if I think the two premisses above, but say the
contradictory of their conclusion, because to think the
premisses is not different from thinking the conclusion.
It is therefore not merely an opinion with me that I
should here not tell a lie. 1 know 1 should not. And the
elucidation of this knowledge is what I would call a
proper piece of business for moral philosophy. But it
would be a mistake to raise the knowledge here contained
to a general oroposition about truthfulness. It would be
necessary first to investigate whether anything could
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logically Interfere with this connection between thinking
something and saying it. Most of us would say that,
whether logically or otherwise, this is often necessary,
and a philosophical account of the matter could not neg¬
lect to investigate the reasons for agreeing or disagree¬
ing with this opinion.
It is much the same if I am asked why I thought it
necessary to return this book. Given the appropriate
facts, I can only answer 'Because I promised to do so,
and it is the logical intention of a promise that it
should be kept. My promise was an explicit undertaking
to return the book, much more palpable than my undertak¬
ing to affirm of each one of your parade of cats, that
it is slinky. When I said 'All cats are slinky', in spite
of the fact that I did not explicitly undertake to affirm
sllnkiness of each cat, you felt logically entitled to
expect that I should do so. It is even clearer that I
must {logically} return the book, because this I have
explicitly undertaken'. If you say, 'But it Is inconven¬
ient for you to do so, and how do you know that this is
not a reason for breaking your promise?*, the answer is
that it was not part of the terms of the promise, that
I should return the book unless it was inconvenient. This
is not to say that it could never be - there are no
obvious restrictions to the terms in which a promise may
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be made. But if in any given instance, convenience was
not one of the terms, then it does not provide a reason
for breaking it.
It is no accident that some political philosophies
have attempted to derive all social duties from the Idea
of a contract, for a contract is a thing which can quite
properly be expected to be universally recognized, since
it can be determined logically whether a beeach of it
exists, and a breach of contract is as abhorrent to the
average person as any other logical mistake. Unfortunate¬
ly we do not make social contracts, and we cannot be
expected to keep a promise we have not made.
There is a peculiarly moral use, also, of the logic
of 'truth*. If I decline to pay my taxes, I may simply
do it, without making any claims about it. But if I do it
as the right thing to do, this claim entails that the tax
collector is mistaken in his direct disagreement with ine.#
* notice that it is only within a moral context that
there can be any rational ethical discussion. We cannot
at the same time discuss with a man whether he should
concern himself about chemistry, and whether HpO is the
formula of water; and we can similarly not at the same
time discuss with people whether they should concern
themselves about virtue, and whether being virtuous
involves telling the truth. A person must be at least
hypothetically willing to be good before we can discuss
with him how to go about it. This is therefore the first
question to be settled in any first-order moral discussion.
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But since say claiming I am right entails but does not
prove he is wrong, I am logically bound to criticise his
claim on his terms. These happen to be social terms, like
'The government needs money to finance its many functions.
It can only get it from its citizens, and it has devised
this system for the distribution of the tax load, in the
belief that it is equitable'. And so forth. I prefer not
to conjecture in detail how the criticism of such an
argument might run, but there are a few things about it
which it is worth pointing out; (i) i*3ot every criticism
would entirely invalidate the tax collector's claim. If,
for example, I argued that the system for distributing
the tax burden was not in fact equitable, this would not
show that I should pay no taxes, because this too would
presumably be Inequitable, (ii) Some criticisms would
involve the rejection of the whole idea of government,
b.^t even they would not necessarily acquit me from the
duty of paying taxes, for if I chose in spite of this
to remain in society, I would at least have to accept
government as a fact, and this, depending on my moral
principles, might at least induce me to pay taxes in
order to relieve the burden of this evil on other people.
And again, depending on my moral principles, the rejection
of the idea of government might more logically lead to
ray quitting society than to my declining to pay taxes.
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(ill) Some criticisms would be inconsistent with the
morality, from the point of view of which the argument
began. For example if I argued, not merely that the
distribution system was inequitable, but that the whole
idea of equity was false, I will not say that this would
necessarily be inconsistent with any pretensions to moral¬
ity, but it certainly might be inconsistent with a given
person's moral ideas, and to that extent could not be
sustained. But none of this has any tendency to show that
it is impossible in such cases for the individual to have
the better argument. If he did, or thought he did, I
suppose he would Just have to decline to pay, and take
the consequences. And this is what conscientious object¬
ors, and believers in euthanasia do. I scarcely need
point out the difference between such a state of affairs,
and simply cheating on one's income tax, dodging the
draft, etc., and I think the root of the difference is
the logioal principle I have been attempting to elucidate.
And while the logical dilemma here is amorphous, it is
not more so than the perplexity encountered above when
we tried to affirm 'All cats are slinky'.
A similar logioal affray can be seen in cases of
stealing. Consider the following situation. As 'Don't
take that, it's mine.' 3 at this point may not care
whose it is, and take it anyway. But if he regards him-
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self as rlftht in taking it, then he disagrees with A,
and he nay say, 'What do you mean, "mine"?'. A; '1 mean
that I have acquired it by the established procedures
governing the ownership of goods, and I may now regard
as wicked, anyone who seeks to deprive me of it.' At this
point B may claim that the procedures have been violated,
or he may criticise the procedures themselves. 1'he former
line of attack would not ordinarily show that the goods
really belonged to 8, (although in some cases, as where
A purchased a watch from a pawn shop, it might); and the
latter would result in a state of affairs very analogous
to the tax example - the individual disagreeing with the
established social order, - where tevi arguments would have
any tendency to show S's right to the goods in question,
and probably all of them would make it reasonable for A
to suggest that B go into politics, and until he has
achieved his reforms, leave other people's goods alone.
Once again, these remarks could not be elevated into
universal Injunctions in favor of paying taxes, or against
stealing, nor are they Intended to lay the groundwork
for such generalities. They are intended as examples of
the way moral philosophy may explore the logic of moral
experience. This is not the logic of the words used in
moral discourse, but you snight say the logic of thinking
about questions like 'Shall X pay my taxes?', 'Should I
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steal?', 'tell the truth?', 'keep my promises?', etc.
One discovers the logic of these things, not by impart¬
ially examining the words used, but by meditating on the
way, in ordinary first-order experience, one has gone
about thinking through, trying to answer such questions;
- by seeking out the typical Intellectual crises encounter¬
ed in such processes, the things which have proved ult¬
imate and decisive, and making clear the rationality
which they (perhaps unconsciously) display. It is import¬
ant, I think, that rationality may, and in a sense even
must be unconscious, or at least un-deliberate. One can¬
not contrive, at least not in any orderly way, to be
rational. There are no rules to be followed. It is a
natural event, something which just happens, and it is
only after the event that one can realize or understand
what has occurred. This may be why Kant spoke so ferv¬
ently of the "sound natural undertanding", and why Hegel
said that "we must not Interfere with the immanent move¬
ment of conceptual thought", and that "the owl of Minerva
takes its flight after the day is past".
And it Is important, too, as explaining the great
diversity of interpretation of moral experience. If I
feel a very strong impulse, as a rule, to keep a promise,
this is to me, as a bit of immediate experience, Just
that - a very strong impulse, or perhaps a feeling of
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convincingness. It is a feeling, and this gives rise to
moral sense theories; it is as if a small voice were
insistently telling me something, and this gives rise
to Conscience theories; it is very convincing, and this
gives rise to intuitlonist theories; it is a bit like
the urge to have a cigarette, and this gives rise to
habit theories; and it results in behaviour expressing
a concern for other people, and this invites benevolence
or utilitarian theories. But all rational thought is
originally un-self-conscious. When I was a child squabbl
ing over games of hide-and-seek, I used to get wildly
annoyed when if I accused somebody of breaking the rules
he retorted that I did the same myself sometimes. Nobody
had told me about the tu cuoioue. and I was very far
from being able to explain that the retort amounted to
nothing but changing the subject. I merely experienced
an annoyance accompanied by an intense sensation of the
propriety of being annoyed; and if at the time I had had
any philosophical tendencies, I should probably have
explained this as a sense of guilt at my own tendency
to cheat at times, or as an intuition that "One should
never say 'You do it yourself sometimes'".
The way of philosophising which I have been suggest¬
ing is not advanced as the jgrjiy thing one can do as
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moral philosophy, I think that it is within the scope
of this method to accomplish most of the things I suggest¬
ed as goals of philosophy in Chapter One, (though not
casuistry or the 'supreme principle' goal), and possibly
other things as well. I suspect that what is tenable in
the analysis of moral language could also be comprehended
in the method, but to sort out this question would be
a lengthier process than I would care to undertake at
this point, and I shall therefore say that either this
is the case, or the analysis of moral language is a sep¬
arate and subsidiary business, dependent for Its definit¬
ion on the results of investigation as I have described
it. I should be happy to allow that such things as moral
psychology and moral metaphysics, (the nature of the
universe insofar as it makes any difference from a moral
point of view), were proper objects of philosophical
Investigation, but these again, I wo^ld say, would be
dependent upon knowledge of what sort of a thing morality
is, and would not themselves contribute to this knowledge,
and ought therefore to be regarded as separate and sub¬
sidiary investigations,
I shall briefly review the merits of conceiving
moral philosophy in the way I suggest. It is in accord
with the highest theoretical standards, since when one
is in possession of a logical principle one knows some-
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thing, - one does not merely opine or presume. It is a
distinctively ethical investigation, since it lays hold
on a definite, if limited, form of moral knowledge, and
is neither morally non-committal nor covertly morally
suspect, as there is some tendency for moral theories to
be; and if It is mista&en in the ethical claims it makes,
it is at least publicly making them, so that they can be
seen and discussed without the air of suspicion, conject¬
ure and enbarrassment which surrounds the seeming moral
implications of theories which are ostensibly non-committ¬
al. It is morally respectable, in that through presenting
its conclusions in a discursive or argumentative, rather
than an authoritative or obscurantist fashion, it in no
way infringes upon the freedom, responsibility or self-
respect of the individual. Considered as the heart of an
investigation which might also include moral education,
moral psychology, moral language, etc., it promises some
guidance as to the meaning of the word 'moral* in the
names of these studies (and this is what they have common¬
ly lacked most acutely, and never possessed on anything
like a philosophically established basis); and finally
it is not without prospects of providing practical en¬
lightenment. I have pointed out that no prescriptive rules
are available from this kind of investigation; but I
think that anyone versed in the logic of moral thinking
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Is bound, to be better equinoed to keep moral discourse,
both with himself and with others, on a high plane. It
Is my belief that this cannot fail to have a beneficial
effect on practical behaviour. But if I am wrong about
this, it can at least be said with assurance that It will
make moral discourse less disgusting.
